History
  • No items yet
midpage
593 S.W.3d 212
Tex.
2019
Read the full case

Background

  • Homeowners sued engineers for claims arising from services by licensed professionals; plaintiffs failed to file a chapter 150 certificate of merit with the complaint.
  • Chapter 150 allows mandatory dismissal for failure to file a certificate of merit and contains no statutory deadline for a defendant to move for dismissal.
  • Engineers participated in extended litigation: late appearance, scheduling orders, discovery, designation of experts and responsible third parties, mediations, continuances, and settlement negotiations before moving to dismiss near trial after limitations had run.
  • The trial court dismissed the homeowners’ claims under chapter 150; the court of appeals reversed; the Supreme Court (majority) concluded the engineers waived the chapter 150 dismissal right.
  • Justice Boyd dissented, arguing the question is waiver (intent-based) not estoppel, and that the engineers’ litigation conduct did not clearly demonstrate an intent to relinquish the statutory, deadline-free dismissal right.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the engineers impliedly waived their chapter 150 mandatory-dismissal right by extensive litigation conduct and delay Engineers’ delay, participation in discovery and scheduling, settlement negotiations, and waiting until after limitations ran show they waived the right Chapter 150 contains no deadline; waiting and litigation conduct alone do not clearly demonstrate intent to relinquish a statutory right that can be asserted at any time Majority found waiver; dissent (Boyd) would hold no waiver because conduct did not clearly demonstrate intent to abandon a deadline-free statutory dismissal right

Key Cases Cited

  • Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. 2008) (distinguishes estoppel from waiver; explains estoppel can bind regardless of intent)
  • Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 2003) (statutory dismissal right without deadline not waived merely by delay; waiver requires clear demonstration of intent)
  • Crosstex Energy Servs. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2014) (no implied waiver of chapter 150 where litigation conduct did not clearly demonstrate intent to waive dismissal right)
  • G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. 2015) (litigation conduct can imply waiver only when conduct is unequivocally inconsistent with the right)
  • Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008) (waiver/estoppel analysis in arbitration context; prejudice and different standards apply for FAA-governed arbitration rights)
  • RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins, 499 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. 2016) (assesses totality of circumstances for implied waiver of arbitration rights; underscores contextual analysis)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Thomas A. Lalonde, Jr., P.E., Individually and D/B/A Lee Engineering Co., Lee Engineering Co., Stanley Harold Prather and Prather Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Paul Gosnell and Kim Gosnell
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 14, 2019
Citations: 593 S.W.3d 212; 16-0966
Docket Number: 16-0966
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
Log In
    Thomas A. Lalonde, Jr., P.E., Individually and D/B/A Lee Engineering Co., Lee Engineering Co., Stanley Harold Prather and Prather Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Paul Gosnell and Kim Gosnell, 593 S.W.3d 212