Thomann v. The Department of State Police
66 N.E.3d 834
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- In 2013 Illinois enacted the Firearm Concealed Carry Act; the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board (Board) evaluates objections to license applications and must determine whether applicants pose a threat to public safety.
- Plaintiffs (Illinois Carry and three individuals) sued alleging the Board’s pre-2014 procedures denied procedural due process by failing to give applicants notice and an opportunity to respond; they sought declaratory/injunctive relief and administrative review, plus attorney fees under the Illinois Civil Rights Act (740 ILCS 23/5(c)).
- During litigation the Board adopted emergency and later permanent rules providing notice and an opportunity to respond; the circuit court remanded certain cases to the Board for reconsideration and dismissed plaintiffs’ declaratory count as moot.
- Plaintiffs then filed a petition for attorney fees (seeking approximately $181,390) under subsection 5(c) of the Civil Rights Act, arguing they prevailed and also were a catalyst for the Board’s procedural change.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the fee petition, arguing subsection 5(c) applies only to discrimination claims involving identified suspect classes (race, color, national origin, gender), and thus is inapplicable; the circuit court granted the motion and plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of 740 ILCS 23/5(c)(2) (fee-shifting for claims "to enforce a right arising under the Illinois Constitution") | Subsection 5(c)(2) plainly awards fees to a prevailing party in any claim enforcing an Illinois constitutional right, so plaintiffs are entitled to fees. | 5(c)(2) must be read in context; fee-shifting is limited to discrimination actions under section 5(a)/(b) (suspect classes); the constitutional-language only covers concurrent constitutional claims in that statutory discrimination action. | Affirmed: 5(c)(2) is not a free-standing fee provision for all constitutional claims; it applies only in the context of statutory discrimination claims involving listed suspect classes. |
| Catalyst theory (fees where plaintiff’s suit caused unilateral change by defendant) | Plaintiffs were prevailing parties because their suit led to remands and induced the Board to change procedures; thus catalyst-based fees are recoverable under 5(d)(3). | Plaintiffs’ collateral attack was improper because Administrative Review Law was the exclusive method to challenge Board decisions; that made the declaratory count frivolous and precludes catalyst recovery. | Court concluded plaintiffs did not qualify for fees on that basis given the Administrative Review Law context; dismissal affirmed (court did not need to reach all alternative bases). |
| Sovereign immunity / waiver | Plaintiffs contend 5(c) waives immunity for prevailing parties in applicable cases. | Defendants argued sovereign immunity bars recovery absent explicit waiver; 5(c) does not waive immunity here because its scope is limited. | Court did not reach this issue because it affirmed dismissal on the statutory-scope ground (5(c) inapplicable). |
| Sufficiency of record on fee hearing (transcript missing) | Plaintiffs argued defendants forfeited some legal arguments by not raising them below. | Defendants noted absence of hearing transcript limits review and preserve ability to press alternative grounds on appeal. | Appellate court treated alternative grounds as properly raised and reviewed statutory questions de novo; affirmed dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Mitchell, 395 Ill. App. 3d 161 (appellate court) (appellate record burdens and transcript rules)
- Negro Nest, LLC v. Mid-Northern Management, Inc., 362 Ill. App. 3d 640 (statutes awarding costs are in derogation of common law and strictly construed)
- JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 455 (statutory interpretation; read provisions in context to effectuate legislative intent)
- Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363 (appellee may urge any point supporting judgment on appeal)
- City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662 (992 N.E.2d 629) (noting legislature expressly provides fees when intended in administrative-review context)