Thiebaut v. Colorado Springs Utilities, 455 F. App'x 795

In 2005, Bill Thiebaut, the District Attorney for the Tenth Judicial District of Colorado, filed a Clean Water Act (CWA) §1365(a) citizen-suit against the City of Colorado Springs alleging discharges into Fountain Creek.
Thiebaut named three plaintiffs: himself in official capacity, the Office of the District Attorney for the Tenth Judicial District, and the People of Colorado.
The district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding Thiebaut lacked standing; the Sierra Club suit was consolidated with Thiebaut’s suit.
The City argued Thiebaut lacked Article III and statutory standing; Thiebaut argued three theories of standing and sought appellate review of a final district-court judgment.
On appeal, the issue is whether Thiebaut, in his official capacity as district attorney, has standing under parens patriae, associational standing, or a “standing for one is standing for all” theory, with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Thiebaut have parens patriae standing?	Thiebaut asserts Colorado authority to represent sovereign interests.	Colorado has not authorized him to represent sovereign interests in federal CWA suits.	No; parens patriae standing is not shown.
Does Thiebaut have associational standing?	Thiebaut argues the office represents the district’s and state’s citizens.	The office lacks authority to pursue CWA claims in federal court, so associational standing fails.	No; associational standing is not established because the office’s purpose is not germane to standing in this context.
Does the “standing for one is standing for all” theory apply?	Courts may proceed when at least one plaintiff has standing, allowing others to proceed.	Court may dismiss non-standing plaintiffs even if another plaintiff has standing.	Rejected; district court did not err in dismissing Thiebaut due to lack of standing.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing elements; injury, causation, redressability)
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (U.S. 1982) (parens patriae requires quasi-sovereign interest and substantial injury to state citizens)
Housing Authority of Kaw Tribe of Indians v. Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991) (state authorization to represent sovereign interests; standing analysis uses state law)
Kaw Tribe, 952 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991) (parens patriae analysis; state authorization necessary)
American Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 154 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1998) (standing prerequisites in CWA actions; Article III applies)
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2007) (standing can be shared; one plaintiff may suffice for review)
Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2011) (parens patriae discussion; standing context cited)
Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994) (standing of individual plaintiffs in multi-plaintiff suit)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (core standing elements)