Theron Ingram v. Brook Chateau, 586 S.W.3d 772

Background

Theron Ingram became a quadriplegic after a 2015 motor vehicle collision and executed a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care (DPOA) appointing Andrea Hall as his agent with authority including to "move me into, or out of, any health care or assisted living/residential care facility" and to "make all necessary arrangements for health care services."
On March 15, 2016, Hall admitted Ingram to Brook Chateau and signed a "Voluntary Arbitration Agreement" on his behalf; the agreement stated admission would proceed whether or not it was signed.
In February 2018 Ingram sued Brook Chateau for negligence (pressure ulcers); Brook Chateau moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, attaching the DPOA and the signed arbitration agreement.
The circuit court denied the motion after summary consideration; the court of appeals affirmed; the Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer.
The central legal dispute: whether Hall had authority under the DPOA to bind Ingram to a voluntary arbitration agreement signed as part of the admission process.
The Supreme Court held Hall had authority to sign the admission arbitration agreement as incidental to her express power to move Ingram into a residential care facility and reversed the circuit court, ordering arbitration; a dissent argued the DPOA limited authority to "necessary" health-care arrangements and arbitration (being voluntary) exceeded that authority.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an arbitration agreement signed by an agent under a DPOA is enforceable	Ingram: agent lacked authority; arbitration was voluntary and not a "necessary" health-care arrangement	Brook Chateau: DPOA gave agent express authority to move Ingram into a facility and to execute admission documents incidental to that move, so the arbitration agreement is binding	Court: Agent had authority to sign the agreement as incidental to the express power to place Ingram in the facility; arbitration compelled
Whether the court was required to order arbitration under § 435.355 when the moving party produced the agreement	Ingram: disputed existence/scope of agreement precluded summary enforcement	Brook Chateau: it presented the signed agreement and opposing party refused arbitration, triggering § 435.355 mandatory relief	Court: Under § 435.355, once the moving party shows an agreement and the opponent refuses, the court must order arbitration; circuit court erred
Whether implied/incidental authority exists under a DPOA to perform acts not expressly enumerated	Ingram: powers of attorney must be strictly construed; agent cannot bind principal to acts not expressly authorized	Brook Chateau: statutes and agency principles permit incidental authority; third parties may rely on general powers to accomplish the principal's stated purpose	Court: Incidental authority is recognized; agent may perform acts reasonably necessary or incidental to authorized transactions (e.g., signing admission documents)
Relevance of the agreement being voluntary and not a condition of admission	Ingram: voluntariness shows the agreement was unnecessary and thus beyond agent's authority	Brook Chateau: voluntariness is inapposite; the arbitration clause was part of the admission package and incidental to placement authority	Court: Whether voluntary is irrelevant to agent's authority to sign documents incident to admission; arbitration enforceable (dissent would rule opposite)

Key Cases Cited

Kindred Nursing Ctrs., Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) (recognizes arbitration clauses often appear in facility admission documents)
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (discusses enforceability of arbitration provisions in nursing-home admissions)
Soars v. Easter Seals Midwest, 563 S.W.3d 111 (Mo. banc 2018) (standard of review for denial of motion to compel arbitration is de novo)
Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. banc 2003) (arbitrability is a question of law for the court)
In re Estate of Lambur, 397 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. App. 2013) (discusses strict construction of powers of attorney in statutory contexts)
Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. banc 2012) (interpretation of a durable power of attorney is a question of law)