Theresa Ann Ela v. Kathleen Destefano
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16629
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Theresa Ela sued Deputy Kathleen Destefano under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and § 1983 after Destefano used law‑enforcement database access to look up Ela’s DMV records without a legitimate purpose.
- Internal investigation found no disclosure or use of the information; Destefano admitted no legitimate purpose and was disciplined administratively.
- At trial the district court granted judgment as a matter of law on liability; the jury found 101 DPPA violations but awarded zero actual damages and did not reach compensatory damages.
- Ela sought $2,500 per violation (total $252,500) in statutory liquidated damages, plus $153,787 in attorneys’ fees.
- The district court awarded a single $2,500 liquidated‑damages payment, $15,379 in attorneys’ fees, and costs; Ela appealed the damages interpretation and fee reduction.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the $2,500 award but reversed and remanded the fee award, holding (1) $2,500 is the statutory floor and (2) additional awards above that are within district‑court discretion, and that the district court erred in its fee analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DPPA’s liquidated‑damages clause requires $2,500 per violation | Ela: statutory text requires $2,500 for each separate unlawful obtain/use/disclosure (101 violations → $252,500) | Destefano: statute does not mandate per‑violation multiplication; court has discretion and may award a single statutory amount | Court: §2724(b) sets a $2,500 floor if any violation is shown; Congress did not include explicit "per violation" language, so additional awards are discretionary (affirmed $2,500) |
| Standard of review for awards above the $2,500 floor | Ela: (implied) award per violation is mandatory | Destefano: district court has discretion; appellate review for abuse of discretion | Court: awards above statutory floor reviewed for abuse of discretion |
| Whether statutory context supports per‑violation damages | Ela: silence about "per violation" is not dispositive | Destefano: Congress elsewhere used explicit per‑violation language, so omission in §2724 is meaningful | Court: statutory context (comparison to §2723 and other statutes) supports discretion and counsels against reading a mandatory per‑violation rule |
| Whether the district court abused discretion in reducing requested attorneys’ fees by 90% | Ela: Kehoe and DPPA permit fees even without proof of actual damages; lodestar approach required and 481 hours were reasonable | Destefano: (implicit) fee reduction appropriate given minimal recovery | Court: district court erred by not starting with the lodestar and overemphasizing the result/Johnson factor 8; remanded to recalculate fees consistent with lodestar and Johnson factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Kehoe v. Fidelity Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2005) (interpreting §2724(b) as permissive and recognizing district court discretion on damages)
- DIRECTV, Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2004) (standard for reviewing district‑court discretionary awards)
- Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (presumption from Congress’s disparate inclusion/omission of statutory language)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (nominal damages and fee principles discussed; distinguished here)
- Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2008) (lodestar as starting point for reasonable attorney’s fees and use of Johnson factors)