533 F.Supp.3d 637
N.D. Ill.2021Background
- Plaintiffs Word Seed Church (a small congregation) and Civil Liberties for Urban Believers (CLUB) sued Hazel Crest seeking a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief, alleging the Village’s zoning ordinance violates RLUIPA and the Equal Protection Clause by restricting religious assembly and land use.
- Hazel Crest’s zoning (adopted 1997) bars churches from business districts (B-1/B-2), permits churches only as a "special use" in three residential zones (R-1, R-2, R-3) with FRA, yard, and parking requirements, and requires a special-use approval process (public hearings, Planning & Zoning recommendation, Village Board decision).
- Word Seed intends to purchase property in Hazel Crest (identified 1822 W. 170th St.), alleges inability to operate as-of-right, and claims credible threat of enforcement and financial/time burdens from the special-use process.
- Deposition of the Village zoning administrator: $400 application fee, variable timeline depending on application completeness, multiple existing churches (15) mostly in residential zones, Village allows rezoning/text amendments but has declined church use for the TIF-funded 170th St. property; a 2008 amendment removing various uses from B-2 exists in the record but was not codified on the Village website.
- The Seventh Circuit previously addressed the same Hazel Crest ordinance in River of Life (en banc) and upheld the Village under the RLUIPA Equal Terms test; the district court here denied Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction and declaratory motion for failure to show likelihood of success on Counts I–III and declined the declaratory claim as duplicative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing | Word Seed and CLUB have imminent injury because Word Seed intends to buy property and cannot operate as-of-right; credible threat of enforcement | Hazel Crest argues Plaintiffs lack concrete injury | Court: Word Seed and CLUB have Article III standing (pre-enforcement challenge permitted) |
| RLUIPA Equal Terms (Count I) | Ordinance treats religious assemblies worse than similarly situated secular assemblies (e.g., assembly halls allowed as-of-right) | Village relies on neutral land-use criteria and River of Life precedent showing conventional commercial zoning exclusions are permissible | Court: Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success; River of Life controls; no basis to invalidate ordinance facially |
| Equal Protection (Count II) | Ordinance discriminates by favoring secular assemblies over religious ones | Village: zoning decisions rationally relate to legitimate objectives (commercial development/TIF goals) | Court: Rational-basis review applies; Plaintiffs did not show action impossible to relate to legitimate goals; no likelihood of success |
| RLUIPA Unreasonable Limits (Count III) | Designating churches as special use and limiting them to three residential zones unreasonably limits religious exercise (especially for small churches) | Village: special-use criteria are neutral and applied; many churches exist in Village; applicants can seek amendments or available residential lots | Court: Record is underdeveloped on availability, costs, and comparative burden; Plaintiffs have low likelihood of success on facial or as-applied challenge |
| Declaratory Judgment | Plaintiffs seek declaration that ordinance and implementation violate RLUIPA and Equal Protection | Village: relief duplicates substantive claims; record inadequate | Court: Declined to hear declaratory claim (duplicative and insufficient record) |
Key Cases Cited
- River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upholding Hazel Crest zoning under RLUIPA Equal Terms analysis)
- Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (special-use permit schemes are not per se discretionary where criteria are specified)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (standard for facial challenges)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (pre-enforcement standing for plaintiffs facing credible threat of enforcement)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
- Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (RLUIPA’s purpose to protect religious exercise)
- Tempco Electric Heater Corp. v. Omega Engineering, Inc., 819 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1987) (district court discretion to decline declaratory judgment)