944 F.3d 506
4th Cir.2019Background
- In 2018 Maryland enacted the Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act to address perceived foreign meddling and gaps in online campaign disclosure.
- The Act requires "online platforms" (sites with >=100,000 monthly U.S. visitors that accept qualifying paid political ads) to publish within 48 hours and retain for one year certain purchaser-identifying information and ad data, and to keep records for state inspection.
- Publishers (including The Washington Post and several Maryland newspapers) challenged the platform-specific publication and inspection requirements as violating the First Amendment and obtained a preliminary injunction from the district court.
- The district court applied heightened scrutiny (it favored strict scrutiny but also found the law failed exacting scrutiny) and enjoined enforcement as applied to the Publishers.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the Act imposes content-based, compelled-speech burdens on platforms and the press and fails exacting scrutiny because it is both under- and over-inclusive and not sufficiently tailored to Maryland’s interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Act is a content-based regulation of speech | The Act singles out campaign-related content and therefore is content-based | The law is a disclosure regime aimed at transparency, not content discrimination | Court: Act is content-based and targets political speech, triggering heightened scrutiny |
| Whether the Act unlawfully compels speech by platforms/newspapers | Forcing publishers to post and retain third-party political ad data compels speech and burdens editorial autonomy | Disclosure is factual, modest, and limited to ads publishers already accepted | Court: Publication and inspection provisions are compelled speech that intrude on editorial choice and anonymity protections |
| Whether applying disclosure to neutral third-party platforms is permissible | Plaintiffs: Platform-focused burdens are distinct and chill channels for political speech, leading platforms to refuse political ads | State: Platforms are appropriate disclosure surrogates and analogous to regulated broadcasters/ad carriers | Court: Platform-based regime poses unique First Amendment harms (market manipulation, chilling) and is not justified by broadcast analogies |
| Whether applying the Act to news media (press) is justified | Publishers: Applying to the press raises special First Amendment concerns and lacks evidentiary support | State: Prophylactic regulation is warranted to prevent possible foreign use of publisher ad networks | Court: Maryland failed to show concrete evidence of foreign-paid ads on news sites; prophylactic intrusion into press is unjustified |
| Whether the Act is narrowly tailored / substantially related to government interests | Plaintiffs: Act is both under- and over-inclusive and not narrowly tailored to deter foreign interference or serve secondary disclosure interests | State: Important interests (prevent foreign interference, inform voters, enforce laws) justify the disclosures; some overlap with existing rules is acceptable | Court: Under exacting scrutiny the Act fails—it leaves major mechanisms of interference unaddressed, but burdens many innocuous sites and press outlets, so the fit is unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content-based regulation triggers heightened scrutiny)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (exacting scrutiny for disclosure laws requires substantial relation to important interests)
- Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (disclosure burdens differ for direct political participants)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional)
- Hurley v. Irish‑Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (compelled inclusion alters speaker’s message)
- Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (government cannot compel editorial content)
- McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (First Amendment protects anonymous political advocacy)
- Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (press confidentiality and limits on compelled disclosure to government)
- Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (internet is a wide-open forum not analogous to broadcast scarcity)
- Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcast regulation justified by spectrum scarcity—distinguishable)
- Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (cable carriage analysis and limits of compelled carriage analogies)
- Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (heightened scrutiny for content- and speaker-based restrictions)
- McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (fit and tailoring required even under aggregate contribution limits)
- Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (government must show more than speculative harms to justify speech burdens)
- NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled disclosure of membership lists can chill association and speech)
