the University of Texas at Austin v. William A. Bellinghausen, Jr., 03-14-00749-CV

Background

Plaintiff William Bellinghausen (licensee) tripped and fell on a UT‑Austin sidewalk near the Recreational Sports Center on Aug. 27, 2011 and sustained injuries; he said he tripped on a protruding crack/uneven expansion joint.
UT‑Austin’s pavement records and a 2008 campus sidewalk survey rated the area as in "Good" condition; university officials produced affidavits showing no prior complaints or reports of injuries at that location before the accident.
David Henry, a UT maintenance supervisor, was working ~150–200 feet away earlier that morning and observed an inattentive pedestrian (looking at his phone) fall in the same vicinity around 9:00 a.m.; Henry did not inspect the sidewalk then and did not report the incident.
After Bellinghausen’s fall around noon, Henry inspected the site, observed the uneven expansion joint, took a photo, and submitted a repair request.
Officer Gonzalez’s police report notes Henry’s statement that he had seen “another person trip and fall on the same protruding crack at about 9:00 am”; the University contends that language reflects the officer’s shorthand, not Henry’s contemporaneous perception that the slab was unreasonably dangerous.
Procedural posture: trial court denied UT‑Austin’s plea to the jurisdiction (finding a fact question existed); UT‑Austin appealed, arguing sovereign‑immunity waiver was not established because there was no evidence of actual knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition before Bellinghausen’s fall.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sovereign immunity is waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act for this premises‑defect claim	Bellinghausen contends UT‑Austin had notice (actual knowledge) because Henry saw an earlier fall in the same spot and the police report records that observation	UT‑Austin argues waiver requires actual knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition at the time of the accident, and the evidence fails to show that Henry (or UT) had that knowledge before plaintiff fell	Trial court: denied plea (found fact issue). UT‑Austin appeals asserting no evidence of actual knowledge.
Whether Henry’s observation of an inattentive pedestrian falling ~150+ feet away constituted actual knowledge of a dangerous sidewalk condition	Henry’s observation (as memorialized in the police report) shows the University knew of repeated falls at that location and thus of a dangerous condition	UT‑Austin: Henry was too distant to see causation; the pedestrian was distracted; Henry did not inspect or report the sidewalk then; he only identified the uneven joint after Bellinghausen fell	Trial court: treated report as creating a credibility/fact issue; University maintains the observation does not supply actual knowledge as a matter of law.
Whether general awareness that sidewalks around campus can be uneven constitutes actual knowledge of a specific unreasonably dangerous condition	Plaintiff points to Henry’s testimony that uneven slabs exist across campus and that expansion joints can settle	UT‑Austin contends general awareness of potential sidewalk irregularities is insufficient; waiver requires knowledge of the dangerous condition at the time and place of the accident	Held (trial court): implicitly accepted circumstantial inference; University disputes as insufficient under Texas precedents.
Whether Officer Gonzalez’s report (stating Henry saw a person trip on “the same protruding crack”) creates a genuine fact issue	Bellinghausen relies on the written report language to argue Henry identified the crack earlier and thus UT had notice	UT‑Austin argues the report paraphrases Henry’s later observations and uses officer shorthand; audio/video and Henry’s testimony show he said the man fell “right there” (vicinity) and did not identify the crack as the cause until after Bellinghausen’s fall	Trial court: relied on the report to deny plea; UT‑Austin argues the report does not, as a matter of reasonable inference, show actual knowledge.

Key Cases Cited

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for evaluating evidence and reasonable inferences in summary judgment/jurisdictional‑fact context)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to the jurisdiction review standards and burden shifting when jurisdictional facts are challenged)
Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. 1968) (unreasonable inferences and stacking inferences cannot create fact issues)
Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2010) (licensee duty—actual knowledge required to waive governmental immunity for premises defects)
City of Dallas v. Thompson, 210 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. 2006) (awareness that a condition may develop over time is not proof of actual knowledge that a dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident)
Reyes v. City of Laredo, 335 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2010) (same principle: knowledge of propensity for danger does not equal knowledge that a dangerous condition existed at the relevant time)
Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, 228 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. 2007) (definition of what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous condition)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. 2003) (if licensee has same knowledge as licensor, duty to warn does not arise)