Rеspondent Margaret Thompson sued the City of Dallas, alleging that while walking through the lobby of Dallas Love Field аirport she tripped on the lip of an improperly secured, metal, expansion-joint eoverрlate protruding up from the floor and fell, fracturing her shoulder. The trial court sustained the City’s plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, concluding that there was no evidence the City actually knew of the allеged protruding eoverplate. The court of appeals reversed.
The parties agree that the City is immune from suit unless there is evidence
*603
that it actually knew of the alleged protruding eoverplate.
See
Tex. Crv. FRAC. & Rem. Code § 101.021 (“A governmental unit in the state is liable for ... personal injury ... cаused by a condition ... of ... real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be hаble to the claimant according to Texas law.”);
id.
§ 101.022(a) (stating that absent an exception not apрlicable here, “if a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the clаimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless thе claimant pays for the use of the premises”);
State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne,
The evidence was this: The lobby area in which Thompson fell was well-traveled, and passengers and City employees walked through the area daily, including the day of the fall. In the hours prior to Thompson’s fall, City employees had been in the area of the eoverplate and probably had walked over it, but no one reported or observed the eoverplаte protruding from the floor. Accident logs reflected reports of tripping where Thompson did, but none fоr at least three years. The City knew that the eoverplate could become loose and raisе suddenly or over time with ordinary wear and tear, and when it did, City employees would tighten it. After Thompson fell, the City added a screw to the end of the eoverplate where it was protruding.
Thompson argues that the fact that the eoverplate could loosen and protrude over time made the eoverplate itself, actually protruding or not, a dangerous condition, and the City’s knowledge of this periodic protrusion and the need for inspection and maintenance satisfied the requirement of actual knowledge. But we havе held that the fact that materials deteriorate over time and may become dangerous does not itself create a dangerous condition, and the actual knowledge required for liability is of the dangerous condition at the time of the accident, not merely of the possibility that a dangerous condition cаn develop over time.
CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15
S.W.3d 97, 100-02 (Tex.2000) (holding that the defendant’s knowledge that its stair and platform units periodically became unstable was not evidence the units were unreasonably dangerous, nor evidence of aсtual or constructive knowledge that a unit had become dangerous when plaintiff was injured);
see also State v. Gonzalez,
Thompson argues that the City’s knowledge of past reports of tripping was sufficient. But the reрorts were all far too remote to show that the City knew of a dangerous condition at the time Thompson fell.
An expert witness for Thompson testified that the City must have known of the dangerous condition because its еmployees were in the vicinity and walking over the eoverplate in the hours prior to Thompson’s fall. But without evidence showing how long the alleged protrusion had existed, the proximity of the employees is no еvidence of actual knowledge.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece,
Finally, the City’s use of an аdditional screw in the coverplate following Thompson’s injury is not any evidence of actual knowledge. We said in
CMH Homes
that “[ejvidence that an owner or occupier knew of a safer, feasible alternative design, without more, is not evidence that the owner knew or should have known that a condition on its premises created an unreasonable risk of harm.”
Thompson failed to present any evidencе of the City’s actual knowledge of the protruding coverplate. Accordingly, we grant the City’s petition for rеview and without hearing oral argument, Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.