315 Ga. 893
Ga.2023Background
- 2020 Georgia constitutional amendment (Paragraph V) waived sovereign immunity for certain declaratory-judgment actions against the State (and some local governments) but required such actions to be brought "exclusively against the State and in the name of the State of Georgia." It allows injunctive relief only to enforce a favorable declaratory judgment.
- Plaintiffs SASS Group, LLC and Great Vape, LLC sell hemp-derived products (including Delta-8 and Delta-10) and claimed those products are lawful "hemp products" under Georgia law.
- The Gwinnett County District Attorney issued a public statement treating Delta-8/Delta-10 as Schedule I controlled substances and initiated enforcement actions and seizures against businesses.
- Plaintiffs sued the State of Georgia and the District Attorney in her individual capacity seeking declaratory relief (against the State) and an injunction (against the DA individually). The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and later an interlocutory injunction against the DA.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Paragraph V's exclusivity requires suits seeking the Paragraph V waiver to name only the State (or an authorized local government), and that naming the DA individually barred the entire suit. The trial court denied dismissal but the Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review.
- The Supreme Court held that "action" in Paragraph V means the entire lawsuit; because the suit named an unauthorized defendant (the DA in her individual capacity) the entire action must be dismissed, vacated the interlocutory injunction, and remanded with direction to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "action" in Paragraph V — does it mean a single claim or the whole lawsuit? | "Action" means a claim/ cause of action; exclusivity applies claim-by-claim. | "Action" means the entire lawsuit; exclusivity requires the whole suit be against the State. | "Action" means the whole lawsuit; exclusivity applies to the entire case. |
| Effect of naming an unauthorized defendant (DA individually) alongside the State in a Paragraph V suit | Non-Paragraph-V claims or individual-capacity claims can coexist; only claims invoking Paragraph V should be dismissed. | Naming any defendant not authorized by Paragraph V defeats exclusivity and requires dismissal of the entire suit. | Naming the DA individually is fatal: the suit must be dismissed in full. |
| Validity of interlocutory injunction against DA when suit invoked Paragraph V | Plaintiffs argued injunction was proper to prevent economic harm and enforcement. | Defendants argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate because Paragraph V exclusivity was violated. | Injunction vacated because the trial court should not have reached the merits once dismissal was required. |
| Whether joinder/ consolidation rules save mixed suits (claims against State + individual) | Plaintiffs: permissive joinder/consolidation allows both claims in one action. | Defendants: constitutional exclusivity overrides ordinary joinder rules for Paragraph V suits. | Joinder does not override Paragraph V; constitutional exclusivity controls and requires dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744 (1994) (discussing Georgia's adoption of sovereign immunity)
- Intl. Bus. Machines Corp. v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215 (1995) (addressing injunctive relief against government actors; later overruled on that point)
- Ga. Dept. of Nat. Res. v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593 (2014) (holding sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief against the State)
- Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408 (2017) (confirming sovereign immunity bars suits against State officers in official capacities absent consent)
- Price v. Dept. of Transp. of Georgia, 257 Ga. 535 (1987) (distinguishing "actions" and "claims" in constitutional waiver context)
- Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 (1945) (presumption that same word in constitution carries same meaning throughout)
- Georgia Motor Trucking Assn. v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 301 Ga. 354 (2017) (presume constitutional text bears its plain and ordinary meaning)