The State v. Randle
331 Ga. App. 1
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- In 1993 Randle pled guilty (Alford plea) to one count of child molestation for placing his hands on a minor’s genitals; he was 21 at the time and completed sentence and probation by 2001.
- Randle obtained restoration of most civil rights in 2002 and in 2013 petitioned under OCGA § 42-1-19(a)(4) for release from lifetime sex-offender registration (statutory eligibility requires 10 years after completion and satisfying OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F)).
- At the release hearing Randle introduced certified records, a clean subsequent criminal history, stipulations that he completed required treatment, and his testimony about rehabilitation and family stability; the State presented no witnesses.
- The prosecutor argued Randle bore the prima facie burden and that the admitted touching of the victim’s genitals created a presumption that the victim suffered “intentional physical harm” under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D), precluding relief.
- The trial court found Randle had met his prima facie burden, inferred the touching did not constitute intentional infliction of physical pain or injury, and granted release from registration; the State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Randle) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intentional physical harm under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(D) is established by unwanted/offensive touching | The admitted touching of the child’s genitals presumes the victim suffered intentional physical harm and bars release | "Intentional physical harm" requires intentional infliction of physical pain or injury; offensive touching alone is insufficient | Court: "intentional physical harm" requires conduct beyond offensive/unwanted touching—i.e., intentional infliction of physical pain/injury; offensive touching alone does not create the presumption |
| Whether Randle bore and failed to meet prima facie burden to shift burden to State | Randle failed to make out a prima facie case that the statutory criteria (including no intentional physical harm) were met | Randle presented records, stipulations, and testimony from which the court could infer absence of intentional physical harm and thus met prima facie burden | Court: Randle met his prima facie burden; trial court did not abuse discretion in finding criteria satisfied |
| Proper statutory construction of “intentional physical harm” | (State) argues for a broad reading that encompasses nonconsensual physical contact in child-molestation context | Majority: interpret phrase by plain meaning and existing battery jurisprudence to require infliction of physical injury or pain | Court: apply plain meaning and prior battery cases; phrase means intentional infliction of physical pain/injury |
| Whether trial court considered statutory criteria adequately | State contends court failed to address all § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) factors | Randle relies on the record and presumptions that trial court followed law | Court: No requirement for detailed written findings; absent contrary showing, presume court considered criteria; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (upholding guilty plea notwithstanding defendant’s claim of innocence)
- In re Baucom, 297 Ga. App. 661 (2009) (standards and abuse-of-discretion review for § 42-1-19 release hearings)
- Miller v. State, 291 Ga. App. 478 (2008) (discussing procedural burden in release petitions)
- Lawrence v. Lawrence, 286 Ga. 309 (2009) (abuse-of-discretion standard overview)
- Hammonds v. State, 263 Ga. App. 5 (2003) (construing "intentionally causes physical harm" as touching that goes beyond insult to infliction of pain or injury)
- Lyman v. State, 188 Ga. App. 790 (1988) (battery interpretation supporting pain/injury requirement)
- Dinnan v. State, 173 Ga. App. 191 (1985) (similar battery interpretation)
- Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4 (2004) (discussion of statutory phrasing and interpretation)
- Clark v. State, 328 Ga. App. 268 (2014) (physical-touching offense did not involve factors listed in § 17-10-6.2(c)(1))
- Summerlin v. Ga. Pines Community Svc. Bd., 286 Ga. 593 (2010) (principles of statutory construction and plain-meaning analysis)