Robert V Baucom filed a petition pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (1) for relief from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the petition, and Baucom now appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) abused its discretion and (2) erred by failing to include written findings of fact and conclusions оf law in its order. Discerning no error, we affirm.
In reviewing the denial of a petition under OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (1), this Court “applies the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard to its review of the trial court’s findings of fact.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Miller v. State,
Baucom’s petition alleged that he is subject to the registration requirements in OCGA § 42-1-12 because he was previously convicted under the laws of Tennessee of a criminal offense against a victim who was a minor, but the petition did not specify what that offense was. According to the petition, more than ten years had elapsed since Baucom was released from probation, and, from the time he was placed on probation, Baucom hаd not been “arrested, accused or convicted” of any further offenses under any state or federal law.
During the hearing on Baucom’s petition, his counsel advised the trial court that Baucom had been placed on probation in Tennessee in 1989, had successfully completed that probation, and after being placed on probation had “no further brushes with the law.” Baucom’s counsel also asserted that the petition was supported by a Comprehensive Psychiatric Sexual Child Abuse Addictionology and Pain Review by Dr. Todd Estroff. According to Baucom’s counsel, Dr. Estroff concluded that he “seriously doubt[ed] that Baucom would ever constitute a risk of any sort of offense of this nature to anyone.” Dr. Estroff s report, however, is not included in the record on appeal.
When Baucom’s counsel tendered Baucom’s Tennessee sentence, the trial court observed that the document did not provide any information about the allegаtions against Baucom. 1 Baucom’s counsel did not explain those allegations, stating only that he believed Baucom had been convicted under Tennessee law of using a minor *662 for obscene purposes. Although Baucom then testified at the hearing, he provided no further information about the facts underlying his Tennessee conviction.
An assistant district attorney from the Gwinnett County District Attorney’s Office appeared at the hearing and opposed Baucom’s petition, сiting the State’s lack of information about Baucom’s prior offense. The limited information the State was able to gather indicated that Baucom was originаlly indicted in Tennessee for aggravated rape but later pled guilty to the lesser included offense of use of a minor for obscene purposes.
1. Bauсom contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. We disagree.
Baucom filed his petition pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (1), which provides:
Any sexual offender required to register under this Code section who meets the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection may petition the superior court of the jurisdiction in which the sexual offender is registered to be released from the registration requirements of this Code section. The court may issue an order releasing the sexual оffender from further registration if the court finds that the sexual offender does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense.
OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (2), in turn, states: “In order to petition the court pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, the sexual offender shall: (A) Have been sentenced pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 17-10-6.2; 2 and (B) Have had ten years elapse since his or her release from prison, parole, supervised release, or probation.”
Baucom argues that his petition should have been granted because he presented prima facie evidence that he did not pose а substantial risk of perpetrating a future dangerous sexual offense and the State failed to rebut that evidence. Baucom asserts that he presented “whаt in likelihood is the highest and best evidence,” the report of a licensed psychiatrist, Dr. Estroff, that “he essentially posed no threat whatsoever of reoffending.” Dr. Estroffs report, while apparently tendered at the hearing on Baucom’s petition, is not included in the record on appeal, leaving us unable to еvaluate the strength and credibility of Dr. Estroffs conclusions. “The burden
*663
is on [Baucom] to show error affirmatively from the record, and we will not presume error where thе record is silent.” (Footnote omitted.)
Smart v. State,
Also absent from the record in this case is any evidence or information regarding the conduct underlying Baucom’s Tennessee conviction. While, in considering a petition under OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (1), a superior court’s inquiry is prospective, focusing on the potential risk that the petitioner will commit a dangerous sexual offensе in the future, the facts surrounding the petitioner’s original offense would be relevant to assessing that risk. When he took the stand, Baucom could have offered some explanation regarding his prior offense, but he chose not to do so.
Given the omission of Dr. Estroff s report from the appellate record and the dеarth of evidence regarding the facts underlying Baucom’s Tennessee conviction, we conclude that the trial court was authorized to find that Baucom fаiled to present prima facie evidence of entitlement to relief under OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (1). See OCGA § 24-4-2 (“What amount of evidence will change the onus or burden of proоf is a question to be decided in each case by the sound discretion of the [trial] court.”). As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baucom’s petition. See
Miller,
supra,
2. Baucom argues that the trial court erred by failing to set out written findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order denying his petition. We disagree.
“When construing a statute this court must look to the plain meaning of words and if there is only one reasonable construction, the statute must be construed in that manner.” (Citation omitted.)
Davis v. State,
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Baucom’s petition for relief from the registrаtion requirements of OCGA § 42-1-12.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Baucom’s Tennessee sentence is also absent from the appellate record.
The State does not argue that Baucom was ineligible to petition the trial court under OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (1) by virtue of the fact that he was sentenced under Tennessee law and not under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c), and given our disposition above in Division 1, we need not reach the validity of such an argument here.