The State v. Jung
337 Ga. App. 799
Ga. Ct. App.2016Background
- At ~4:30 a.m. on Oct. 2, 2014, Gwinnett County officers responded to a two-vehicle collision; Jae Sun Jung was the driver of one car and showed signs of intoxication (odor of alcohol, bloodshot/watery eyes, slurred speech, unsteady gait).
- Jung submitted to standardized field sobriety tests; officer observed HGN 6/6, walk-and-turn 8/8, one-leg-stand 3/4, and a positive portable breath test.
- Jung was arrested and read Georgia’s implied-consent notice; when asked whether he would submit to a state-administered breath test, he answered “Yes.” Station breath tests registered .228 and .221.
- Jung moved to suppress the state-administered breath-test results, arguing his consent was not voluntary; after a hearing the trial court granted the motion, finding Jung lacked capacity to consent due to confusion and high intoxication.
- The State appealed, arguing the trial court failed to evaluate voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances and over-relied on intoxication.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed the suppression ruling under deferential factual-review principles and affirmed the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jung) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jung voluntarily consented to the state-administered breath test | Reading of implied-consent notice and Jung’s affirmative response establish consent | Jung was confused/highly intoxicated and lacked capacity to give actual voluntary consent | Consent was not voluntary; suppression affirmed |
| Whether the trial court applied the totality-of-circumstances test | Trial court failed to address all relevant factors and over-weighted intoxication | Trial court considered applicable factors and properly weighed intoxication among others | Trial court sufficiently considered totality; no reversible error |
| Whether intoxication may negate voluntariness of consent | Intoxication alone should not defeat consent where suspect appears to understand | High level of intoxication can prevent exercise of free will and negate consent | Intoxication is a permissible and potentially dispositive factor; here it supported suppression |
| Whether State met its burden to prove an exception to the warrant requirement | Implied-consent statutory procedure alone suffices as exception | Mere acquiescence to implied-consent reading does not equal actual, voluntary consent | State must prove actual voluntary consent; it failed here |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744 (trial judge sits as trier of fact; deferential review of suppression rulings)
- Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (mere compliance with implied-consent reading does not automatically equal voluntary, actual consent)
- Kendrick v. State, 335 Ga. App. 766 (constitutional protection against compelled withdrawal of bodily substances applies equally to breath/blood)
- Tye v. State, 276 Ga. 559 (no single factor controls voluntariness inquiry)
- Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822 (high intoxication can render a statement involuntary)
- Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787 (trial court may accept or reject portions of officer testimony)
- Durrence v. State, 295 Ga. App. 216 (appellate courts will not reverse suppression absent record evidence demanding contrary finding)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 1552 (natural dissipation of alcohol is not per se exigency for nonconsensual testing)