the State of Texas v. Isaac Wesley Brandley, 03-19-00602-CR

Brandley was arrested Feb 2016 for family-violence assault, released on bond, and formally charged by information Dec 2016; counsel appointed Mar 2017 and a waiver of arraignment included a request for a speedy trial (Apr 2017).
Multiple trial settings and agreed resets occurred from 2017–2019; the case was set for jury trial several times in 2018–2019 but repeatedly did not proceed.
The State disclosed potentially exculpatory materials late (a Non‑Prosecution Agreement previously signed by the complainant, 135 recorded jail calls, and 107 pages of police records) shortly before trial settings, prompting defense continuances and objections.
Defense counsel repeatedly announced ready and invoked the speedy‑trial right at pretrial settings (Oct 2018, Apr 2019, July 2019) but also sought continuances when late disclosures arrived; counsel filed a Motion to Set Aside the Information for speedy‑trial violations in July 2019.
The trial court found a 42‑month post‑arrest delay and, crediting defense testimony about employment harm, anxiety, and impairment of defense witnesses, granted Brandley’s motion to set aside the information; the State appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Brandley)	Held
Whether the 42‑month delay required Barker balancing	Delay largely attributable to agreed resets and defense requests; State was ready for some settings	Delay was long, much caused by State’s late disclosures of exculpatory evidence	Length triggered Barker; factor weighed heavily against State
Whether the State justified the delay	Late disclosures were investigated when defense subpoenas revealed relevance; disclosures were turned over when discovered	State repeatedly failed to timely disclose Brady/Article 39.14 material, causing continuances	Trial court could reasonably attribute much delay to State’s late production and weigh cause against State
Whether Brandley asserted his speedy‑trial right	Brandley never filed a clear written speedy‑trial demand; he filed to dismiss which suggests desire to avoid trial	Counsel repeatedly announced ready, invoked speedy trial at pretrial settings, and later filed motion to set aside	Assertion weighed neutral/slightly against Brandley but did not defeat claim given State’s negligence
Whether Brandley suffered prejudice	State: no particularized prejudice shown from delay; available remedies existed	Brandley: lost employment opportunities, repeated court appearances, anxiety, and impairment of defense (witnesses moved/incarcerated or less effective)	Court found some prejudice (employment, anxiety, impaired defense) and declined State’s rebuttal; dismissal affirmed

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (U.S. 1992) (long delays can be presumptively prejudicial)
Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (speedy‑trial principles and Barker application in Texas)
Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (application of Barker factors and standards of review)
Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (three‑plus year delay significant in speedy‑trial analysis)
Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (prejudice component focuses on impairment of defense)
Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (need for unambiguous speedy‑trial demand)
Munoz v. State, 991 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (limitations on pro forma speedy requests)
Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (assessment of prejudice in speedy‑trial claims)
Palmer v. State, 222 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (when prior false accusations may be admissible for impeachment)