Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court,
We granted the appellant’s petition for discretionary review to address whether a defendant must raise a speedy-trial claim in the trial court in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. Holding that he must, we affirm the holding of the First Cоurt of Appeals.
I
On April 11, 2008, the appellant was involved in a violent altercation with a friend in which he stabbed the friend 11 times. The appellant was arrested, and, on May 9, 2008, the State charged him with aggravated assault, a third-degree felony.
The appellant’s casе was reset several times because the appellant had difficulty getting and keeping counsel. Finally, on January 80, 2009, the trial court appointed counsel. After that, the case was reset for pretrial hearings and conferences. On January 2, 2010, the State filed аn agreed motion for continuance because a witness was sick. The next day, the judge granted the State’s motion and added the notation, “Def. ready.” The case was reset seven more times before the trial began on March 4, 2011. In total, the case was reset 25 times over three years.
The appellant agreed to every reset in this case. Each reset form states, “The undersigned Counsel hereby agrees this case is reset for [type of hearing] to [date].” The State, the appellant, and (when the appellаnt had one) his trial counsel signed each form. At no point throughout this process did the appellant object to these delays or file a speedy-trial motion. The first time the appellant raised the issue of a speedy-trial violation was on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of conviction.
II
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial. This ensures that the defendant is protected from oppressive pretrial incarceration, mit: igаtes the anxiety and concern accompanying public accusations, and ensures that the defendant can mount a defense.
The right to a speedy trial attaches when a person becomes an accused. This can be when he is arrested or when he is charged.
The question before us is whether a defendant must first preserve error for appellate review through a timely objection in the trial court before he is entitled to such an analysis.
Ill
The preservation requirement is that “[u]nless a litigant ... moves to avail himself of a procedural benefit ... no such benefit inures.... Because the judge has no independent duty in this regard, his failure ... isn’t error about which complaint might later be made on appeal.”
In Barker, the Supreme Court distinguished the speedy-trial right from typical fundamental rights, as to which the State bears the entire burden of proving that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver. “We do not depart from our holdings in other cases concerning the waiver of fundamental rights, in which we have placed the entire responsibility on the prosecution to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Such cases have involved rights which must be exercised or waived at a specific time or under clearly identifiable circumstances ....”
Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, Barker did not reject the notion that a defendant may be required to preserve a speedy-trial claim. It stated that the defendant does bear some responsibility for
Just as Barker does not specifically address the issue, our own case law is far from consistent. We have never held that a speedy-trial right is waivable-only or systemic in nature. However, before Marin, we delivered many opinions that ignorеd the issue of preservation entirely and, in some cases, held that the defendant had not waived
IV
We are persuaded that the preservation requirements do apply to sрeedy-trial claims for several reasons. The vast majority of errors must be preserved. It is informative to look at the few rights that warrant an exception to this rule. Waivable-only rights include the right to assistance of counsel, trial by jury, and a statutorily mandated right that appointed counsel have ten days before trial to prepare. Absolute, systemic requirements include personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and a penal statute’s being in compliance with the separation of powers section of our state constitution.
Other policies are persuasive as well. If the appellant brings his complaint to the trial court first, the trial court can grant the appropriate remedy before the expense and other burdens of a trial (and an appeal) have been incurred.
Further, a requirement of preservation allows the trial court to develop the record sufficiently for a Barker analysis. At least two of the Barker factors (the reason for delay and the prejudice to the accused) are fact-specific inquiries and may not be readily apparent frоm the trial record. A requirement that the appellant assert his complaint at the trial level enables the court to hold a hearing and develop this record so that the appellate courts may more accurately assess the claim.
Our conclusion is strengthened by the fact that every court of appeals to consider the issue has upheld a preservation requirement.
y
In this case, the appellant made no effort to demand a speedy trial. He claims that announcing ready was such a demand. However, this is not a demand for a speedy trial; instead, it merely asserts that he could go to trial at that moment should the State push for it. A speedy-trial demand should be, at the very least, unambiguous. Finally, the appellant’s other actions are inconsistent with a demand for a speedy trial. He did not file a speedy-trial motion, did not request a hearing on the delays, and explicitly agreed to each and every reset. The appellant signed each agreed reset. These are not the actions of someone seeking to preserve and protect his right to a speedy trial.
We affirm the judgment of the courts below.
Notes
. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a).
. Henson v. State,
. Barker v. Wingo,
. Id., at 521,
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. United States v. Marion,
. Barker,
. Barker,
. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1 ("As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that ... the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion...
. Marin v. State,
. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; Aldrich v. State,
. Barker,
. Id., at 528,
. See id., at 524-25,
. Blaсk’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009), waiver ("The voluntary relinquishment or abandonment — express or implied — of a legal right or advantage.
. McKinney v. State,
. See Marin,
. Dunn v. State,
. The appellant cites to two recent cases which he claims follow our older precedent. We are unpersuaded by his argument because his authorities are not on point. See Dragoo v. State,
. Aldrich,
. See Henson,
Dissenting Opinion
filed a dissenting opinion.
The majority holds that a defendant must raise a speedy-trial claim in the trial court in order to preserve the issue for appellаte review. The majority seems to
We should not categorically say that a defendant cannot complain for the first time on appeal thаt he failed to get his constitutional right to a speedy trial. An appellant is certainly less likely to get relief if he waits until the point of appeal to raise the speedy-trial issue, but failure to raise the issue at trial does not in and of itself preclude an apрellant from relief.
The record here does not reflect that the defendant waived his constitutional right to a speеdy trial. The court of appeals erred in concluding that Appellant’s failure to file a motion for speedy trial or motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial precluded him from appellate review. Because preservation anаlysis is for error, not for the category of constitutional rights that belong to the defendant unless affirmatively waived, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding that a defendant must preserve his right to a speedy trial by raising the issue in the trial court.
. See Barker v. Wingo,