781 F.Supp.3d 897
W.D. Mo.2025Background
- The Stanley M. Herzog Foundation, a Christian nonprofit, challenged the EEOC’s implementation of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), particularly a Final Rule requiring employers to accommodate employees seeking abortions.
- The Foundation argued that complying with this rule would violate its sincerely held religious beliefs against abortion.
- The PWFA generally requires covered employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, which the EEOC defined to include abortion.
- The Foundation sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act, seeking to bar enforcement of the Final Rule against it.
- The Court considered both the EEOC’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the Foundation’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
- After review, the Court denied the motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction against the EEOC’s enforcement of the abortion accommodation mandate as applied to the Foundation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III Standing | Foundation faces immediate compliance costs and threat to religious practice | No injury-in-fact; injuries are speculative and not traceable to EEOC | Foundation has standing: compliance costs and credible enforcement |
| Ripeness | Challenge is fit for review; threat of enforcement and imminent compliance burden | Not ripe; no harm unless/until employee seeks abortion accommodation | Claims are ripe for review |
| Substantial Burden under RFRA | Final Rule forces violation of religious beliefs or risk enforcement action | Religious exemptions exist; defense can be raised post-complaint | Final Rule likely imposes substantial burden on religion |
| Compelling Interest / Least Restrictive Means | No compelling interest justifies burdening Foundation; less restrictive means available | Broad interest in ending discrimination, ensuring health in workforce | EEOC has not shown compelling interest by least restrictive means |
| Preliminary Injunction Factors | Likely success on RFRA claim; threat of irreparable harm; balance favors preserving religious rights | Lack of irreparable harm; delay in filing indicates no harm; public interest harmed by injunctive relief | All factors favor injunction; threat of constitutional violation prevails |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Standing requires injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (RFRA applies to corporations; compels government to use least restrictive means)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (RFRA's strict scrutiny standard applies case-by-case)
- Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (Redressability requires only that some injuries would be addressed by relief)
- Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368 (Threat of enforcement sufficient for standing in pre-enforcement challenge)
- Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657 (Substantial burden standard under RFRA)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (Government's harm from injunction is weighed against constitutional rights)