THE SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA v. STEPHANIE WOODFORD
270 So. 3d 481
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2019Background
- Stephanie Woodford served as Hillsborough County School Board Chief Human Resources Officer from July 2013 until her termination on April 27, 2017; she sued alleging whistle-blower retaliation under section 112.3187, Florida Statutes.
- Section 112.3187(8)(b) requires local public employees to file a complaint with the local governmental authority within 60 days if that authority has an ordinance or has contracted with DOAH to “conduct hearings under this section,” with judicial suit available only after exhaustion of the administrative remedy (or if no remedy exists).
- The School Board moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing Woodford failed to exhaust the School Board’s administrative remedy because the School Board had contracted with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) in 2004 to adjudicate administrative disputes.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning the School Board had no policy/practice for handling whistle-blower complaints and had not put Woodford on notice to follow any administrative process.
- The School Board petitioned for writ of certiorari to quash the trial court’s order; the Second District granted the petition and quashed the order, holding the contract with DOAH constituted an administrative remedy that Woodford was required to exhaust and rejecting an implied notice requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Woodford was required to exhaust administrative remedies before suing under the Whistle-blower's Act | Woodford argued the School Board lacked an administrative procedure for whistle-blower claims and did not notify her to use any such procedure, so exhaustion was not required | School Board argued it had contracted with DOAH to adjudicate administrative disputes, which satisfies the statute's alternative remedy and requires exhaustion | Held: Exhaustion was required because the School Board’s general DOAH contract sufficiently provided an administrative remedy under section 112.3187(8)(b) | |
| Whether the DOAH contract must expressly reference the Whistle-blower's Act to trigger the exhaustion requirement | Woodford argued the statute requires a contract to be for the specific purpose of “conducting hearings under this section,” so the contract must expressly reference the Act | School Board argued the statute does not require express references; a general DOAH contract covering adjudication of administrative disputes suffices | Held: Contract need not expressly reference the Act; general language covering DOAH adjudication is sufficient to constitute the required administrative remedy | |
| Whether the local authority must give employees notice that an administrative remedy exists before the employee must exhaust it | Woodford contended she was not put on notice to follow an administrative process, so she should be excused from exhaustion | School Board argued the statute itself notifies employees of the condition precedent; no additional notice by the employer is required | Held: No affirmative employer notice requirement exists in the statute; the statutory scheme itself puts employees on notice | |
| Whether the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is reviewable by certiorari | N/A | School Board argued denial of a pretrial dismissal for failure to exhaust should be reviewable because it causes irreparable harm by permitting litigation that should be administrative | Trial court implicitly treated exhaustion as unnecessary; appellate court found certiorari jurisdiction appropriate because denial of a pretrial motion that would have terminated litigation implicates irreparable harm | Held: Certiorari jurisdiction exists and was properly used to quash the order denying dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Stephens v. Geoghegan, 702 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (standards for certiorari review)
- Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So.2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (pre-suit requirements and irreparable harm for certiorari)
- Bradshaw v. Bott, 205 So.3d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (certiorari review of denial of summary judgment for failure to meet presuit Whistle-blower Act requirements)
- Univ. of Cent. Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Turkiewicz, 21 So.3d 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (certiorari to review denial of motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust under Whistle-blower Act)
- Dinehart v. Town of Palm Beach, 728 So.2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (general ordinances sufficient to satisfy Whistle-blower Act administrative procedure)
- Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Reaume, 937 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (court departs from essential requirements when it permits litigation in court where an administrative remedy must be pursued)