the Iola Barker and James Trice v. Monica Hurst and Scott Martindale
01-19-00529-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 15, 2021Background
- This is Justice Goodman’s dissent to a Court of Appeals decision reversing a trial-court fee award after dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).
- Iola Barker and James Trice obtained dismissal under the TCPA and sought roughly $73,000 in mandatory attorney’s fees; the trial court awarded $16,000.
- The majority reversed and remanded, concluding the reduced award bore no relationship to uncontroverted evidence of fees; Goodman dissents.
- Goodman reviews standard of review: reasonableness of fees is for the trial court and reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
- Goodman argues the record contains multiple reasonable bases to reduce the requested fees (limited complexity, amount in controversy, counsel expertise, much time spent awaiting appellate decisions), and that undisputed fee evidence is not conclusive.
- Because no findings were requested, Goodman would imply facts supporting the trial court’s exercise of discretion and would affirm the $16,000 award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding only $16,000 in TCPA attorney’s fees when appellants submitted uncontroverted evidence they incurred ~$73,000 | Barker & Trice: uncontradicted evidence presumptively establishes reasonableness and trial court should have awarded fees closer to $73,000 | Hurst & Martindale: trial court reasonably reduced fees given limited complexity, small amount in controversy, counsel’s experience, and that much time passed on appeal rather than active litigation | Goodman (dissent): No abuse of discretion; undisputed evidence is not conclusive and record supports a substantial reduction |
Key Cases Cited
- Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. 2016) (TCPA requires award of reasonable attorney’s fees)
- Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018) (reasonableness of fees reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, 544 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2018) (appellate review standard for discretionary awards)
- Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) (appellate courts may not substitute their judgment for trial court’s reasonable discretion)
- Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Tr., 296 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. 2009) (undisputed fee evidence is some evidence but not conclusive)
- Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. 2010) (same; trial court not bound by uncontroverted fee evidence)
- McMahon v. Zimmerman, 433 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (trial courts may rely on common knowledge and experience to evaluate fee reasonableness)
- Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019) (factors such as novelty and difficulty bear on fee reasonableness)
- M & F. Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi–Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 512 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2017) (appellate implication of findings when none requested)
- McGibney v. Rauhauser, 549 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018) (trial court must independently assure itself of reasonableness)
- Schoeffler v. Denton, 813 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (upholding substantial reduction where circumstances contradicted fee request)
- Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (concurring remark on subjective judgments; cited metaphorically)