The Honorable v. Spencer, Mayor of the City of Reading v. City of Reading Charter Board
97 A.3d 834
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2014Background
- Vaughn D. Spencer was elected Mayor of Reading in Nov. 2011 and sought to staff his office with five prospective employees to start Jan. 2, 2012.
- The City Managing Director, Carl Geffken, advised in Dec. 2011 that four prospective hires could be engaged as part‑time employees without amending the prior year’s budget or Position Ordinance; Geffken made offers and later provided a sworn declaration describing those events and asserting he acted independently.
- The City Charter Board issued an advisory opinion requiring positions to be listed in the annual Position Ordinance and budget before filling; Council later amended the 2012 ordinance to include some positions.
- A complaint led the Charter Board’s Investigative Officer to conclude the Mayor violated the Charter by hiring positions not properly authorized; after a hearing the Board found Spencer responsible, rejected the stipulated Geffken testimony as not credible, censured the Mayor, and fined him $1,000.
- The Mayor appealed to the trial court, which reversed the Charter Board for lack of substantial evidence and for capriciously disregarding the Geffken Declaration; the Charter Board appealed to this Court and Spencer moved to quash the appeal.
- The Commonwealth Court denied the motion to quash and affirmed the trial court, holding the Board capriciously disregarded competent, material evidence and that its finding that the Mayor (rather than Geffken) hired the employees was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Spencer) | Defendant's Argument (Charter Board) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to appeal | Board lacks standing because an adjudicatory tribunal cannot be aggrieved by reversal | Board has legislatively conferred prosecutorial/enforcement powers and a direct interest in appeals | Denied motion to quash: Board has a direct, substantial interest and may appeal |
| Commingling prosecutorial & adjudicatory roles | Appeal prosecuted by Board solicitor who advised Board; violates Lyness | Board contends functions were properly separated during investigation/hearing | Lyness inapposite; no fair‑tribunal violation shown; issue waived when framed as constitutional and not raised below |
| Standard of review re: credibility (capricious disregard) | Board capriciously disregarded Geffken Declaration by dismissing it without explanation | Board argues it considered and reasonably rejected the Declaration as not credible | Court applied capricious‑disregard standard correctly; Board gave no adequate reason to reject crucial evidence |
| Sufficiency of evidence supporting finding Mayor hired employees | Stipulation and Geffken Declaration show Geffken alone made offers prior to Spencer taking office | Board points to Mayor’s desire/meetings and treats Geffken as subordinate/agent; factfinder may disbelieve stipulation | Finding that Mayor hired employees not supported by substantial evidence; Board failed to cite affirmative evidence contradicting Geffken and capriciously disregarded the Declaration |
Key Cases Cited
- Republic Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 421 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (scope of review for substantial evidence in agency adjudication)
- Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002) (review for capricious disregard of material evidence)
- Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992) (prohibition on commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions)
- Pennsylvania Game Comm’n v. Dep’t of Environmental Resources, 555 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1989) (agency has legislatively conferred interest when assigned duties)
- William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975) (standing requires direct and substantial interest)
- Arena v. Packaging Systems Corp., 507 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1986) (definition of capricious disregard)
- Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 828 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 2003) (requirement to articulate objective basis for credibility findings when demeanor not observed)
- Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (trier of fact may disbelieve testimony but disbelief alone does not supply contrary proof)