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Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
812 A.2d 478
Pa.
2002
Check Treatment

*1 812 A.2d 478 WINTERMYER, and American LEON E. INC. Group, Appellants

General

v. APPEAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (MARLOWE), Appellees BOARD Co., Intervenor. Penn National Insurance Supreme Pennsylvania. Court

Argued 2001. Nov. Dec. 2002. Decided *2 Fleischauer, MD, Valley, Alan Hunt for Lome G. Scott Group, and PMA defendant. Seifert McLemore, Harrisburg, Wintermyer, for Inc. Robert Burke Group, Appellants. and American General Holzman, Harrisburg, Kenger, A. James Amber Marie Me- W.C.A.B., chanicsburg, appellee. for Hanes, Marlowe, Philadelphia, appel- David for Linda Bruce lee.

Mary Uhlig, Philadelphia, Tregea, T. Steven R. State Col- Co., lege, for Penn Nat. Ins. Intervenor. FLAHERTY, C.J., ZAPPALA, CAPPY,

Before CASTILLE, NIGRO, SAYLOR, NEWMAN and JJ.

OPINION SAYLOR, Justice. application, in the administrative appeal

This concerns the setting, law of what has been termed the of appellate review. (“Claimant”) Linda filed a November of Marlowe petition seeking against Wintermyer, claim E. benefits Leon insurer, (“Employer”), Group, and its American Inc. General al- pursuant Compensation to the Workers’ Act.1 Claimant that, leged injury— in March of she sustained (“CTS”) carpal syndrome bilateral tunnel the course and —in scope employment primarily bookkeeper. of her as a On the day, against also a claim previous same Claimant asserted her Seifert, (“Seifert”), employer, alleging G. Inc. that her Lome company injury. clerical duties at that to her contributed Employer joinder petitiоn against filed a Seifert the same and, subsequently, *3 joinder petition, reason filed a second contending any injury that worked occurred while Claimant Block, for H company, preparer.2 another & R as a tax a petitions WCJ treated the on consolidated basis for purposes hearing parties stipulated and decision. The that Employer spanned Claimant’s work with the fall of 1991 mid-1993; through job through her with from 1987 Seifert 1990; and employment her seasonal with H & R Block several (full time), months in 1991 as in through well time). (part that for employ- Claimant testified her duties all motion, periods ers included substantial of repetitive hand particularly typing computer and keyboarding; experi- she tingling enced and in fingers right numbness her and arm in Seifert; employed by December of while she was treated by chiropractor ultimately physi- 1990 and to a referred cian, CTS; who diagnosed working Employer, while for she spent seventy percent of her typing computer time at a 2, 1915, (as amended, 1041.4) (the 1. §§ Act of June P.L. 736 77 P.S. 1— "Act”). joinder petition eventually 2. This second was dismissed because Claim- provide timely pursuant ant failed to H R& Block with notice Act, Section 311 of the P.S. 631. Employer, symptoms full keyboard; working time her increased; Yates, M.D., A. she came under care James 1992; February and it was аt such time that she learned that her was work related. CTS Dr. presented testimony deposition also Yates’ via

Claimant description concerning and transcript. His onset treatment Claimant’s; further, explained the CTS was consistent he surgical procedures that several in 1992 and performed he Yates, symptoms. According 1993 to alleviate the to Dr. injury permanent damage, caused nerve and her Claimant’s employment condition was to her and caused related motion, repetitive including typing, keyboarding, writing. cross-examination, Dr. opinion On Yates indicated his predicated concerning work-relatedness was the work Claimant, history provided by and medical and that such Dr. history generalized was nature.3 Yates also identified a CTS, although emphasized causes for he series other repetitive motion activities were the most common source.

Employer presented testimony from its of human director Claimant, accounting employee replaced services and the who substantially both of whom contradicted Claimant’s assertions concerning spent performing the amount time that she data entry daily supervisor on a basis. The testified majority working of Claimant’s work involved with invoices documents, spend great and thаt she did not other deal computer of time at a terminal. The clerical worker stated that, duties, than performing spent Claimant’s she no more day entry; on data per two hours the remainder of the tasks; workday non-repetitive many days involved she did *4 example, following interchange 3. For occurred: Doctor, Specifically, you any specific Q. ... do have clear-cut and occupational history any given as to what did for [Claimant] point employer any particular in time? was, Only job description A. what she has told me and what her bookkeeping, et cetera. Q. day spent doing ... know how much [Y]ou don’t of she X activity activity, anything Y versus whether there were breaks or that nature? No, A. I not. do present did not any keyboard. Employer at a spend not time witness, present nor did evidence. expert an medical Seifert inconsistencies, emphasized con- findings, the WCJ her flicts, example, in For she vagaries and Claimant’s evidence. evidence to the effect that Claimant’s contrasted the extensive in longstanding clearly and evident difficulties with CTS were to Em- disability claim form submitted June of indicating appeared that first in ployer by Claimant her CTS 1992; wit- August testimony Employer’s credited the concerning repetitive the extent of nesses over Claimant’s and that Dr. activity performed; emphasized motion she Yates to or specify any particular leading was unable to event time injury. aggravation of an onset or of Claimant’s The WCJ specifically testimony stated that of Claimant Dr. Therefore, that Yates was not credible. the WCJ concluded proving to sustain Claimant failed her burden her injury dismissing work was related entered order Seifert, petitions against claim as well as Em- Employer joinder ployer’s petition. (“WCAB”), Compensation Appeal

The Workers’ Board how- ever, Preliminarily, acknowledged reversed. it that its review appellate capacity, was in an and it was not its therefore conflicts, weigh function to the evidence and resolve but rather, Further, assigned such role was to the WCJ. it accept WCAB noted that was within the WCJ’s discretion to reject, witness, in part, testimony any whole or Nevertheless, including that, an expert. the WCAB indicated party bearing instances which the burden of denied, proof presents evidence and relief is it is for an tribunal to adjudica- review an administrative tion to any capricious disregard ensure that is free from competent Although acknowledging Employer evidence. presented fact testimony, witnesses rebuttal to Claimant’s emphasized Employer the WCAB presented had not expert challenge Dr. testimony. Yates’ The WCAB invoked traditional definition of willful, apparently as “a of an trustworthy deliberate disbelief witness, testimony challenge.” whose has no basis to one *5 extensively testimony from Dr. Yates’ quoted

WCAB then injury and his conclusion as to its work concerning Claimant’s relatedness; testimony unequivocal; such characterized it, rejecting that the erred in at least to concluded WCJ supported aggravation pre-existing that it of a the extent repetitive injury. condition a trauma The WCAB and/or WCJ, a requiring remanded the matter to the therefore injury of the date of and identification of determination the remand, employer. granted liable On the WCJ the claim 21, 1993, petition period through work from the June June 1, 1994, Employer party. and identified as the liable subsequently period by WCAB months. extended fifteen Court, a panel Employer Before the Commonwealth alia, in initial argued, opinion, inter that the WCAB improperly applied capricious disregard appel- standard of review, thereby usurping late WCJ’s determinations WCAB, credibility evidentiary weight. Like the majority emphasized Employer Commonwealth Court and, accordingly, had not presented medical evidence also a capriсious disregard invoked what termed standard of basis, rejected such review. On the Commonwealth Court Employer’s argument, reasoning: [concerning capricious order to make such determination

disregard], testimony [WCAB] reviewed medical if it equivocal unequivo- record order determine was required cal. a review Such the Board’s assessment evidence, Thus, not its Em- competency credibility. ployer in its is mistaken assertion assess- [WCAB’s] competency ment of the medical evidence record credibility evidentiary weight, was an of its evaluation (emphasis original). questions resolving After additional by Employer, raised the Commonwealth Court affirmed the opinion, in a remanding WCAB’s order memorandum present appeal. matter for reasons unrelated to the Judge separate- but Friedman concurred the result wrote ly express her belief that should not have WCAB standard, rather, applied but should employed have substantial evidence test. She rea- precedent clearly soned that the court’s established re circum applied view for the limited party prevail stance in which the burdened does not and was presenter Judge the sole of evidence. Friedman noted a *6 authority concerning applicatiоn conflict in of the review only party presents standard in in which cases the burdened parties present lay testimony medical evidence but both or Compare other non-medical evidence. Iacono v. WCAB (Chester Auth.), 234, Housing 155 624 A.2d 814 Pa.Cmwlth. (1993), curiam, (1994), 535, per 536 Pa. 640 A.2d 408 aff'd (Pro-Aire Inc.), Transport, Tomczak v. WCAB 150 Pa. (1992). Iacono, 431, Citing Judge 615 A.2d 993 to Cmwlth. that, controlling position Friedman concluded that when factfinder, parties present both evidence before the however (there being requirement proof limited no that such include evidence), appellate court substan apply medical an must tial standard to of for evidence the exclusion Iacono, 240, disregard. See Pa.Cmwlth. at A.2d at Friedman, According Judge Employer’s presenta 816-17.4 testimony concerning tion of factual the nature Claimant’s job purview capricious duties removed the from matter Judge majori review. Friedman also chastised the ty taking position unnecessarily for a what confused she legal determination,” adopting viewed as “clear-cut and an analysis that was both unnecessary impractical. and this regard, Judge explained: Friedman majority’s opinion

The effect of the is that standard of review must separately be decided for each issue raised single within a Judge Craig point- cаse. Former President ed out the burdensome in approach nature Herbert v. (Pa. [UCBR], 601, 571 A.2d 526 Cmwlth. Cmwlth.[1990)], if stating apply this court had to differ- Judge 4. in Friedman also referred to other cases which inconsistent applied, including (Hussey Copper), standards were Crenshaw v. WCAB 696, (1994), applied 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 645 A.2d 957 in which the court Iacono, (Associated Tynan in standard as articulated v. WCAB Services, Inc.), ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‍Cleaning Consultant and 162 Pa.Cmwlth. A.2d UCBR, (1994), and Van Duser v. 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 642 A.2d 544 (1994), consistently apply in which the court did not Iacono’s formula- tion. depending standards or

ent whether one more parties case, on a produced specific issue within complications unworkable would result.... Because testi- can, does, mony on impact one issue often some issue, case, issues, on a extent different the same parties up battling pieces could end over of evidence and require their to individual issues. This could us relevance perform analysis extensive the evidence question decide several single in a times case before we could address the issues no raised the-case. There is need for this court to invite difficulties, such I hope and would that we could avoid such inquiries the future.

Finally, Judge Friedman referenced the reasoned decision 422(a) Act, 834,5 requirement Section P.S. which, view, аpplication of her would eliminate the need *7 separate inquiry concerning capricious disregard. a granted

This of aspects Court limited review to revisit standard governing appellate agency review of administrative in adjudications light continuing among jurists of differences concerning its appropriate composition. 422(a)

5. Section states: any any compen- Neither the board nor of its members nor workers’ judge by statutory sation shall be bound the common law or of rules conducting any hearing investigation, evidence in or but all upon competent justify of fact shall be based sufficient evidence to adjudicatory parties proceeding same. All to an are entitled to a containing findings reasoned of decision fact and conclusions of law upon clearly concisely based the evidence as a whole which and explains for states rationale the decisions so that all can why particular determine and how a result was reached. The work- compensation judge specify ers' shall the evidence which [he] accepting conformity relies and state the reasons for it in with this evidence, conflicting compen- section. When faced with the workers’ judge adеquately explain rejecting sation must the reasons for discrediting competent may evidence. Uncontroverted evidence not reason; rejected be for no reason or for an irrational the workers’ compensation judge identify explain must that evidence and ade- quately rejection. provide the reasons for its shall meaningful appellate for basis review. 77 P.S. 834. Preliminarily, rigidly employ we note that courts do not review, precise verbiage applying governing in standards of rather, terms, frequently differing but since the use effort is capture conceptual generally Jeffrey manner of review. See Bauman, Scopes P. Standards Review and Review in of of Duq. L. Pennsylvania Proposal, Primer Rev. —A 2001). Nevertheless, (Spring in the area of administrative review, judges have sometimes described fundamental- ly concepts, as illustrated different irreconcilable panel present division of the Commonwealth in the Court case. Indeed, arena, unfortunately, in a form few instances this substance, causing emphasize, has overcome confusion. We outset, that the courts cannot intermediate be greatly regard, faulted of this Court’s own since several decisions reflect such fundamental inconsistenciеs. re- While Newman, cently, writing Madame Justice for a unanimous Court, concepts, see articulated essential Fraternal Order PLRB, 593-94, 96, Police v. A.2d Pa. 99-100 of (1999), apparent vestiges prior it is of difficulties remain. A critical development Pennsylvania review the historical capricious disregard what is now termed the standard of difficulty, review serves illustrate the but more affirmative- ly, conjunction Police, provide with Fraternal Order alignment. framework for many years, general

For governing appellate standards review in the setting component administrative included a evidence,6 review for in addition to the equally well established of law and errors manifest Gaudenzia, abuse of discretion. Inc. v. Zoning See Bd. of Phila., 355, 363-64, Adjustment 287 A.2d Pa.Cmwlth. *8 See, e.g., Cairgle Sanitary Corp., 6. v. American & Standard Radiator 366 249, 252, 439, (1951) 77 (explaining Pa. A.2d 440 that "unless there is a relevant, capricious testimony, findings of the credible of fact referee, Board, by adopted by upon the or affirmed the if based evidence, (cita- adequate competent appeal” and will be on sustained omitted)); 153, 157-58, Greap Oberdorff, Pa.Super. tions v. 178 113 339, (1955) (“The credibility weight A.2d 341 of and the be witnesses to testimony compensation attached to their is for the authorities and not court[;] may capricious disregard for [o]f course there not be a of evidence.”). competent

198 (1972) v. (citing Pittsburgh Housing 702-03 Blumemchein 331, (1954)). Auth., 566, 572-73, 379 Pa. 109 A.2d 334 Review in in disregard clearly applied cases which for by respective parties to both presented evidence was defenses, see, 157-58, Pa.Super. 178 e.g., Greap, a claim and 341, circumstances, in although A.2d at such relief would 113 warranted, accord- since the was to be infrequently be in of conflicts in great terms of its resolution ed deference regards credibility determinations.7 As deci- party, to sions unfavorable the burdened role, since, matters, in such disregard assumed a more visible necessarily not rest affirmative need rather, findings, predicated upon could also be factual but (i.e., negative agency’s disbelief of the claimant’s evidence conclusion).8 instances, Pennsylvania ap- In finding or such Court has observed: 7. As the Commonwealth role; finding critical fact he alone hears the referee has a [T]he proceedings testimony and the witnesses firsthand. In observes benefits, therefore, pertaining referee to determine the to is for the weight exercising credibility discretion, In that broad evidence. may accept reject testimony any he of witness testimony expert part. This includes the medical whole or witnesses. WCAB, 367, 372, Corp. America v. 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 429 A.2d Container 1264, Steel), (1981); (Century Phillips also v. WCAB 1265 see 1091, finder, 504, 507, (1999) (as 721 A.2d 1092 fact the WCJ is free to witness, witness, testimony any including reject a medical uncontradicted). testimony part, where whole or in even remains UCBR, 18, 21, Tyrone generally Borough Pa.Cmwlth. 415 See v. 52 146, (1980) greater credibility (explaining that accord "[t]o A.2d 148 simply testimony presented others is one witness’ than fact-finding the Board's role and does not constitute a manifestation of evidence”); WCAB, v. Aluminum Co. America 33, 38, 941, (1977). 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 380 A.2d 943 regard, party obligation 8. we note that the unburdened has no this evidence, any proof, may prevail party's if present the burdened credible, (Reedy), Inglis House v. WCAB while is insufficient. See 141, 592, 135, (1993). generally Barrett v. Otis Pa. 634 A.2d See 450, 668, Co., (1968); Pa. 246 A.2d 670-71 Walsh v. Elevator Co., 328, 333, Mining Pa.Super. A.2d Penn Anthracite “[wjhere (1942) against (stating of the board is decision case, bearing party having proof the burden of claimant — —in accept required fact is not even uncontradicted mind that a trier of true, testimony question whether the board's before the court is with each other and with its conclusions of fact are consistent

199 pellate emphasized courts often their task was not to determine whether competent there was evidence that would (since denied), requested rather, relief it was but See, if there was in e.g., the refusal. Fund, 182, v. Pa.Super. State Workmen’s Ins. 174 Yanofchick 187,100 (1953). 387, A.2d 389 promulgation

With the Agency the Administrative Law in 1978,9 Assembly the General express identified criteria for generally govern review which directed would appeals from agency adjudications. 701, §§ See 704. Pa.C.S. Section 704 Law, Agency the Administrative governing disposition alia, appeals, provides, inter as follows: hearing,

After court shall adjudication affirm the unless it shall find that adjudication is in violation of the rights constitutional appellant, of the or is not in accordance law, provisions or that of Subchapter Chapter A of 5 (relating practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies) have been proceedings violated before the agency, any finding or that agency of fact made necessary to support is not supported by substantial evidence.

2 Pa.C.S. 704. Subsequently, in light statutory formulation, of such Court criticized the Commonwealth Court’s to a adherence traditional appellate statement of the standard of review an included, administrative context that as a component, review for capricious disregard. See McGovern’s Estate v. State Bd., Employees’ 377, 381-82, 523, Retirement 517 A.2d (1986). Further, terms, fairly cryptic McGovern direct- ed that it was longer no ever courts аpply capricious a disregard component review.10 order,

of law and its and can be sustained without a (citation omitted)). competent evidence” 28, 1978, 202, (as April 9. Act of P.L. §§ No. 53 amended 2 Pa.C.S. 501- 508, 701-704). McGovern, 10. appeal the Court framed the issue on as follows: Board, holding Commonwealth Court reversed the capricious- that it ly disregarded granted .... We allocatur to examine Nevertheless, year, again this Court described within dis- subsuming examination for of review unfa- agency adjudications applicable to review regard UCBR, Pa. v. party. Odgers See vorable to the burdened (1987) (“The 359, standard of review A.2d *10 with party the the apply court must where any appellate the [agency], the whether proof lost before burden disregarded or capriciously a matter of law [agency] erred as evidence.”). competent America), 121 Pa. (Volkswagen

In Russell v. WCAB (1988), 436, Court 550 A.2d 1364 the Commonwealth Cmwlth. Odgers and other to McGovern undertook reconcile to attempted The court remain statements. this Court’s later McGovern, reading of indicating that its Section faithful to applied agency proceedings unquestionably must be Russell, 121 Pa. present evidence. See parties which both 438, Russell is not Although 550 A.2d at 1365. at Cmwlth. appears that the regard, in this also Commonwealth explicit applied had to interpretation that the also be believed Court against was to cases in which generally paradigm. fact since that was McGovern’s party, burdened Nevertheless, was concerned that Court the Commonwealth where to the discrete situation application strict of McGovern evidence and party party present is the a burdened a substantial agency would leave prevail not before does matters, In Russell noted process. review such void applied Court standard whether Commonwealth .... McGovern, quoted then at 517 A.2d at 525. McGovern Court's traditional statement Commonwealth agency’s adjudication reflects a determi- in which the of review in cases it, carry bearing proof failed to party the burden of has nation that the quotation disregard component, including followed Without further id. at 517 A.2d at 525. 704. See Section analysis, the Court concluded: by the Commonwealth of review articulated Because the standard Law], Agency support we hold [Administrative no in the Court finds present case was conduct- Court’s review of the that Commonwealth illegal pursuant improper and standard. ed to an Id. component of evidence of the substantial application inapt: 704 was Section prevailing presented support was

If no evidence “sub- apply which to is no there party, i.e., test; to find substan- impossible it is stantial evidence” was position for which no evidence tial evidence therefore, cases, appropriate scope such introduced. review, Odgers, forth in ... is whether as set compe- capriciously disregarded a matter of law erred as evidence. tent 438-39, 1365. The

Russell, 550 A.2d at 121 Pa.Cmwlth. this review subsequently characterized Court Commonwealth in this applicable strictly standard, it has deemed which of review. capricious disregard standard setting, as its discrete ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‍Inc.), 153 Pa. See, (Roadway Express, Linko v. WCAB e.g., (1993). 1188, 1190 552, 557, A.2d Cmwlth. salutary was in Russell Court’s effort Commonwealth disre- judicial review preserved

that it essential *11 cases, has and the formulation category of gard in at least one difficulty ap- with the regularly. See id. The applied been however, from agencies are not foreclosed is that proach, against in matters decided factual making affirmative many agencies in which are instances the claimant. There (for party that a failed example, predicate negative conclusions facts adduced proof) upon of affirmative to meet his burden evidence, cross- testimony and to include claimant’s from the cases, substantial In 704 review for such Section examination. necessary findings that are to all affirmative applies (“the court 2 704 adjudication. See Pa.C.S. support to ... any find that unless shall affirm the shall necessary agency finding by of fact made evidence”). supported by substantial adjudication is not its suggest that the General Assem- Conversely, troubling it is in an simply unavailable judicial for review be bly intended supported agency’s in which substantial evidence instance beyond doubt that its it was clear findings, factual but where disregard of other upon capricious were based conclusions occur, example, if would for a situation evidence. Such 202

agency expressly refused to resolve conflicts the evidence credibility make essential Additionally, determinations.11 given inadequate foundation which exception allowing crafted, for review was frac- opinions tured developed have concerning manner of application, again illustrated this case. noted,

As Fraternal Order Police appellate clarified the of applicable of review in the administrative agency setting. Police, 593, See Fraternal Order Pa. A.2d at 99-100. Although its focus was directed to the compоnent of requiring agency Section conclu- law,” sions must “in be accordance with Justice Newman’s core explanation highly relevant:

While [the standard has in-accordance-with-law] been de- in a ways, scribed number of import its essential is to establish limited review of conclusions to they adequately ensure are supported by competent findings, factual are from, arbitrary free and, making, relevant, decision represent the extent proper agency’s exercise discretion. Commonwealth, Id. at 735 A.2d at (citing v. Slawek Licensure, 316, 322, State Bd. Med. Educ. and (1991)). A.2d emphasizing further the deferential process, character of the explained the Court that appellate courts are not free to a generalized conception invoke reasonableness in order to judgment substitute their for that agency. Nevertheless, id. recognition See was also given discretion, to the boundaries such as the Court explained that it remains within purview of reviewing courts to consider whether reasonable mind might make the same decision on agency. the evidence before See id. at *12 593, (citing Commonwealth, 735 A.2d at 100 Williams v. State Procon, Inc., 90, 99, 601, 11. Hamilton v. 434 Pa. 252 A.2d Cf. (1969) (stating, general proposition, findings as a that factual can be disturbed “if there has been а competent of evidence if support finding”); there is no evidence at all to In re Estate, 92, 93, 320, (1939) (characteriz- Patterson's 333 Pa. 3 A.2d ing findings a trial court's as capricious "worthless” where there is a evidence). disbelief of (1974)). 70, Comm’n, 470, 473, 327 A.2d 457 Pa. Civil Serv. indeed, and, course, subsumes the This, overlaps with disregard” facet of description “capricious of the traditional capri- has a Indeed, in which there been in cases review.12 evidence, is material the error disregard competent, cious and, legislative pursuant legal but structural only not principles, requires correction. design long-standing be in accordance adjudication cannot Since an properly of law and facts if on the basis law it is not decided disregard of adduced, capricious hold that we component of material, is an competent evidence question in which such is every case appellate consideration law, this court.13 As at common brought before the properly visible role on consider generally assume a more review will in such findings and conclusions.14 Even negative ation of 34, 38, See, Sys. Corp., Packaging 507 A.2d e.g., Arena v. 12. (1986) disregard disregard (describing capricious as a deliberate intelligence possi- ordinary could not cоmpetent which one of evidence result); Ebensburg bly reaching v. State Sch. have a Kania avoided 136, 138, (1980) ("A DPW, Hasp., 410 A.2d 49 Pa.Cmwlth. ignorance capricious disregard to a willful or deliberate amounts important.”). person consider which a reasonable would acknowledge capricious Although review for McGovern failed to disregard merely sub-component review for whether an is one law, disposition in accordance with the soundness There, the Commonwealth Court errone- of the case is not in doubt. disregard adjudica- ously of the evidence an discerned a which, finding negative a one in the tion in not was the central proof, claimant had failed to sustain his burden of but sense that also, appears been substantial evidence of record offered there to have contrary agency opposing party support determination. 383-84, McGovern, (detailing 517 A.2d at 525-26 such See 512 Pa. at nonetheless, evidence). say quite thing, different It is is not met than that it should not be suggested applied, should not have the latter. and McGovern above, light exception in Russell and reconcilia- ihe crafted 13. Indeed, longer necessary. permutations of its various is no tion noted, Assembly's emphasis upon Judge General a rea- Friedman 422(a) of the Act evi- in the amendments to Section soned decision an court must conduct its review dences its intention that fact-finding has not exceeded manner that ensures limits of its discretion. role or the outer that, sup- repeating there is substantial evidence to It bears where 14. findings, in turn port agency's and those factual *13 context, however, aspect only this limited serves the review particular adjudication one check assure has been conducted within lawful boundaries —it is not to be in applied upon agency’s such manner as would intrude fact-finding discretionary decision-making authority. role and

Since review for was an function of the in Commonwealth Court the WCAB the case, present remains consider whether those tribu- nals in were correct their conclusion that had WCJ decision-making authority. exceeded the boundaries her testimony, After extensive recitation of Dr. Yates’ that, summarily testimony WCAB concluded because such unequivocal, was capriciously disregarded the WCJ must have decision, it in denying reaching benefits. this the WCAB to acknowledge failed that the WCJ based disbelief her countervailing presented by Employer pertaining evidence degree to the nature of Claimant’s work and which she engaged repetitive in motion on daily activities basis. Dr. acknowledged Yates that his assessment work relatedness dependent upon intensity was the character and of Claimant’s work, Therefore, him by activities as related to Claimant. Employer present the fact that did not in testimony medical Moreover, necessarily dispositive. rebuttal is not while the majority concluding Commonwealth Court was correct in competency credibility, the WCAB addressed and not it erred treating this controlling. distinction as To determination of the circumstance of a negative finding, the Commonwealth Court should con have impact Employer’s sidered the non-medical evidence. that, acknowledge do vagaries proofs, We due to this case, uncontradicted, is a competent close since was injury offered to establish the fact of as well as Claimant’s performance potentially aggravating during activities her Employer. Nevertheless, tenure with the conflicts in the reasonably evidence were substantial and could have been conclusions, it should remain a rare instance in which an upon capricious disregard. court would disturb an based WCJ, explanation, consistent with her as detri- viewed credibility. significant overall It is most mental Claimant’s case, then, injury of times of the sole evidence aggravation derived from Claimant’s accounts and onset testimony, credibility and that was therefore an Claimant’s linchpin question essential to the central work relatedness. *14 of capricious disregard Since a determination was unwar- case, ranted this the orders of the and Common- WCAB reversed, wealth Court are and the matter remanded for initial reinstatement the order the WCJ.

Former FLAHERTY not participate Chief Justice did of this the decision case. ZAPPALA,

Chief Justice and MADAME Justice concurring opinions. NEWMAN file concurring opinion Justice CAPPY files a in which Justice joins. NIGRO

ZAPPALA, Justice, concurring. Chief I concur in majority. Simply put, the result reached the (WCJ) Compensation the Workers’ Judge credited the testi- mony by Employer regarding offered the nature Claimant’s duties and found testimony of Claimant and her medical expert Having Employer’s incredible. found that predicate rebutted the factual upon which Claimant’s medical expert his opinion, based that WCJ concluded Claimant to failed sustain her of proving carpal burden that she suffered syndrome tunnel during the course and her scope employ- Thus, ment. the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and awarding Commonwealth Court compen- еrred workers’ sation ground benefits based on the capriciously the WCJ disregarded Claimant’s medical fact evidence. The that Em- ployer presented opposed factual evidence as to medical evi- analysis. dence does not alter application

As to capricious disregard of the standard in case, I holding would adhere to the case law that such applies only party where the evidence, present yet to does proof party is the sole

burden fact finder. Russel v. Workmen’s prevail not before the See Board, 550 A.2d Appeal Pa.Cmwlth. Compensation (1988) (holding presented if no evidence was upon which party, there is no evidence support prevailing test and therefore the apply the “substantial evidence” applies). majority finds disregard” standard “capricious troubling that “it is difficulty approach with this states judicial Assembly intended for re- suggest the General in an in which substan- simply to be unavailable instance view agency’s findings, factual but supported tial evidence beyond doubt that its conclusions were where was clear Majority of other evidence.” based if 13. I do not share this concern because substan- opinion at WCJ, the factual tial evidence exists not аppellate tribunal should delve into whether the WCJ disregarded “other evidence.” capriciously decision in Fraternal Order I also do not view Court’s PLRB, (1999), *15 altering Police v. 735 A.2d 96 of majority capricious disregard standard. The concedes the standard, Police did not such that Fraternal Order involve of “in of addressed the accordance with law” standard but rather Majority at 14. opinion of administrative decisions. review of Finally, expanding application I would refrain from the the standard, basis, in a even on limited factual not warrant it.1 predicate where the does case CAPPY, Justice, concurring. I join majority opinion. separately

I write for two the first, clarify my understanding proper place to reasons: in disregard overarching the statu- capricious for the tory governs appellate agency’s review of an framework disregard majority specifically 1. The holds that "review for material, component appel- competent evidence is an of of every question properly late consideration in case in which such is brought Majority opinion I before the court.” at 15. believe that such party questions “properly before the court” when the with the are evidence, yet proof party present thе loses before burden of is sole the fact finder. second, narrow circum- adjudication, emphasize and the in of stances which review for a the of an agency’s evidence will lead to the reversal decision. my understanding forth of review for a To set where spectrum within capricious disregard of the evidence fits the review, statutory appellate of a brief discussion of the frame- appellate agency adjudication of an is governing work review required. legislature sphere has narrowed the appellate agency’s court’s of an to four distinct decision separate and for reversal: bases affirm hearing, adjudication

After court shall unless adjudication shall find that is violation of the constitutional rights appellant, or is not accordance law, A provisions Subchapter Chapter that the [relating practice procedure of Commonwealth agencies] proceedings have been violated before the agency, any finding by agency or that of fact made necessary by supported is not substantial evidence. Thus, statute, (explanation § 704 supplied). Pa.C.S. setting overarching

viewed as forth an in which to framework review, conduct appellate agеn- limits review of an (1) (2) cy’s determinations; adjudication to: constitutional (3) conclusions; (4) legal procedural regularity; of fact.1 appeal there neither an assertion that the rights Appellant

violated the constitutional nor a claim Therefore, irregular procedure agency proceedings. only two of four these areas of review have been raised. regarding legal Assertions have been raised conclusions compensation judge reached the workers’ and it has been *16 suggested regarding findings implicated issues of fact are as well. Davis, generally,

1. See Martha S. Standards Review: Judicial Review ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‍of Discretionary Decisionmaking, App. 2 J. Prac. & Process 47-49 of facts, (2000)(dividing appellate parts: review into three review of re- law, discretion, varying view of and review of each with level of review). deference to the action or decision under conclusions, appellate that an legal As to section states may agency court decision to determine whether review Recently, is “in with law.” our adjudication accordance court has clarified the contours of an “in accordance with law” PLRB, Fraternal Order Police v. review. (1999). import

A.2d 96 “essential is to establish limited thеy appellate agency review of conclusions ensure that are by competent findings, factual are adequately supported free arbitrary making, from decision relevant, proper agency’s represent extent exercise (emphasis supplied). at 99 discretion.” Id.

Thus, an conclusions agency’s legal review for whether are “in with law” consists of at three distinct accordance least way, inquiries FOP sets forth facets. Stated another certain (1) situation: applied appropriate to be whether the supported by findings; factual legal competent conclusions are (2) arbitrary in an legal whether the conclusions were made (3) fashion; legal whether the conclu- and/or an sions were abuse of discretion. fact, findings

As to section 704 offers that an agency’s adjudication, appel- affirm court must unless the “any findings by court made late determines of fact necessary sup- is not (emphasis ported substantial evidence.” Pa.C.S. added). provides itself the standard of The statute review findings regarding of fact: an inquiry for findings they sup- factual agency’s affirmative whether are ported by substantial evidence. clarify my I background, understanding

With this write to placement capricious disregard of review of the I within this framework because believe there to be disagreement statutory confusion or into which area a some falls. I capricious disregard persuaded review am while a component review has as a consideration hearing, inquiry at a it is not an the evidence offered Rather, regarding agency’s fact. affirmative agency’s legal is a conclusions to determine conclusions, legal agency capri- in making whether those *17 clearly that would have disregarded evidence of record ciously Being a different result. beyond doubt commanded and conclusions, of a tribunal consideration whether legal of review component of in disregarded is a capriciously evidence with accordance law review. with, by, our supported and

This conclusion is consistent FOP, appellate court will As stated decision FOP. alia, are, inter agency’s if the conclusions review determine FOP, making. arbitrary from and decision free majority appeal explains, in this A.2d at 99. As the being arbitrary free from concept legal of conclusions making, concept of the capricious decision the related reasonable, and, indeed, being “overlaps conclusions with legal desсription ‘capricious traditional of the disre- subsumes the Majority (emphasis sup- gard’ Op. facet of review.” disregard sub-component of in plied); (capricious id. n. 13 law). stated, Simply agency capriciously if an accordance with conclusions, disregards reaching legal adju- its thus, law. It capricious, dication is not accordance with cannot affirmed. 2 Pa.C.S. 704.2 therefore be sum, my understanding it is for a review evidence, core, disregard of at its not does entail consider- facts, agency’s finding ation of the affirmative of but instead goes agency’s legal to a of conclusions.3 It “is not review the agree It for this that I New- is reason cannot Madame Justice 2. man’s contention that review for a of evidence is review, legal application of but a I not the standard conclusion. conceptualized Specifically, believe that it can be as both. while not all (see legal standards of review describe a standard and a conclusion law), applicable pure questions de novo standard of review other meaning. The of review standards do have a dual described sharpens point. appellate may an “abuse of discretion’’ An court if the trial review a trial court’s admission of evidеnce to determine court committed an abuse of discretion. The standard review is the appellate If the court determines the "abuse discretion” standard. erred, legal court conclusion is that the trial court "abused its trial discretion.” agency’s concept 3. The review for whether an conclusions part appel- supported are “substantial evidence” has become of the Hospital, Area School District v. late court lexicon. See Wilson Easton (2000) (decision supported by A.2d substan- Police, evidence); Liquor tial Mallios v. Pa. State Bureau Control and, only legal pursuant but structural to legislative design and long-standing principles, requires Majority correction.” at Op. 487.

Second, agency’s while I believe that whether the legal by a capricious disregard conclusions were made function, I, appropriate appellate evidence is an like the *18 majority, recognize potential that such review has the for Thus, emphasize I an by appellate abuse. reversal court agency’s by of an application capricious determination disregard exceptional will by be the case. As stated majority, “where there is substantial to support evidence 704], an agеncy’s findings factual accord with section and [in findings [legal] those in turn conclusions [in FOP], it accord with should remain a rare instance in which an upon court would disturb an based (comments capricious disregard.” Majority Op. at n. 14 added). precisely, on type More reversal based this only beyond should occur where is “clear doubt” that an agency’s legal upon capricious conclusions were based disre Id. gard very high bar. suggested evidence—a 486. As by majority, might agency expressly occur if “the refused to resolve conflicts in the evidence make essential Id. It credibility might determinations.” also be the case agency completely ignores overwhelming where evidence (1993)(whether Enforcement, Pa. 633 A.2d order of evidence). supported by Board is substantial Use of the "substantial verbiage agency’s evidence” to describe both review of an affirmative findings legal agency’s of fact and review of an conclusions unnecessar- ily keep I inquiry confuses matters. believe it far more desirable to regarding findings inquiry regarding of fact distinct from the conclu- respect sions of law and to use distinct terms with to each area. To lexicon, keep inquiries separate, and to create a common I would suggest using terminolоgy respect "substantial evidence” agency’s findings position to the deferential review of an of fact. This course, (whether grounded in section 704. 2 Pa.C.S. evidence). by supported of fact are substantial For review of an conclusions, i.e., agency's legal whether the conclusions are accor- law, dance with I would advocate use terms articulated FOP. review, appropriate, agency’s legal That is where to determine if the adequately supported by competent findings, conclusions are factual FOP, arbitrary capricious, are an constitute abuse of discretion. 735 A.2d at 99. for a Thus, upon review reversal based comment. without exceedingly would be disregard of the evidence rare event.4 reversal for a

Finally, I envision for an additional reason. exception evidence to be 422(a) of the of fact is bound section agency’s finder (the “Act”). § 1 seq. et Act P.S. Compensation Workers’ alia, con- inter decision requires, reasoned provision This upon law based of fact and conclusions of taining findings Specifically: as a whole. adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to parties to an All containing findings of fact and decision a reasoned upon as a whole bаsed the evidence conclusions of law the rationale concisely explains states and clearly which why and how a so that all can determine for the decisions compensation workers’ particular result was reached. The relies and specify the evidence which he judge shall conformity it in with this accepting state the reasons conflicting evidence, the work- faced with section. When *19 adequately explain compensation judge must ers’ discrediting competent rejecting or evidence. reasons for rejected may for no not be Uncontroverted compen- reason; an irrational the workers’ reason or for explain judge identify must that evidence sation adequately rejection. the reasons for its Thus, if a workers’ com- (emphasis supplied). § P.S. by all offered pensation judge considers the evidence determinations, making forth reasons for factual parties, sets rejection rational for the of uncontroverted including reasons for evidence, likely grounds it is there will be no an then position Zappala's I this reason that believe that Chief Jusüce 4. It is for I, appellate majority, unnecessarily review. like the circumscribes disregards overwhelming evi a situation in whiсh a tribunal envision which, considered, com without comment if would dence of record review for a mand a different result. Without the tool of evidence, appellate to a an court would be limited of the by judge of fact made ihe review of whether the affirmative by supported the substantial evidence. Consideration were facts, contra-evidence, by agency overwhelming not found would precluded. be appellate legal court to overturn his or her conclusions on the of a capricious disregard basis of the evidence. sum, a place there is review of whether

agency capriciously disregarded reaching the evidence in legal part conclusions and this review is of the “in accordance sphere Furthermore, with law” of review. I believe agency’s adjudication reversal of an on this basis must be the so, exception, part, rare will be because of the dictates 422(a) of section Act. joins concurring opinion.

Justice NIGRO this MADAME, Newman, concurring. Justice agree I Majority While that a determination of case, capricious disregard was I unwarranted this write separately to further make it clear that I believe there is no agency review of decisions. appeals standard of review in from decisions, Court, which previously by has been articulated Law, is set forth in 5 of Agency Section the Administrative See, § 704. e.g., Pa.C.S. Fraternal Order Police v. Penn- Board, sylvania Labor Relations 557 Pa. 735 A.2d 96 (1999) (hereinafter FOP)-, Estate McGovern v. Em- State Board, (1986). ployees’ Retirement 517 A.2d 523 Law, Agency Section 5 of the Administrative Pa.C.S. (Disposition of Appeal), by Majority, as indicated states: appeal

The court shall hear jury without a on the record certified agency. hearing, the Commonwealth After court adjudication shall affirm the unless shall find that is in violation of rights the constitutional appellant, law, or is not in accordance with or that the *20 provisions Subchapter Chapter A of (relating prac- 5 to procedure tice and agencies) Commonwealth have been , any proceedings agency, violated that before the or finding by agency necessary of fact made and support adjudication supported by is not substantial affirmed, If may evidence. is not the court

213 any by (relating § enter order authorized Pa.C.S. disposition appeals). added). FOP, 704 (emphasis expressed Pa.C.S. As import essential

“[The] [of is to establish limited standard] appellate review of they conclusions ensure that arе adequately supported by competent findings, are free factual and, from arbitrary making, or decision to the relevant, represent extent a proper agency’s exercise of the FOP, added). discretion.” 735 A.2d (emphasis at 99 As recognized by majority, inherent as an element process, review is an produced examination of the evidence findings relative to the toWCJ see whether the WCJ capriciously disregarded competent It only evidence. performing a analysis substantial evidence court, alia, inter looks to adequately see conclusions are supported, rights protected, constitutional legal precepts were properly applied, were invoked and findings factual are arbitrary free from making. decision But FOP. any agency the touchstone of adjudication remains that sub- findings stantial evidence must made WCJ. developed Commonwealth Court has line cases that,

holding party where the burdened is the one to produce WCJ, evidence loses before the the substantial evidence standard of is inapplicable because is no there ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‍substantial evidence on which to base the of the lower See, tribunal. e.g., Cerasaro v. Workers’ Compensation Ap- (Pocono Medical, peal Ltd.), Board Mountain 717 A.2d 1111 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Maryland CRL v. Compen- Workmen’s Appeal Pa.Cmwlth.441, sation Board (Hopkins), 156 627 A.2d (1993); Butler v. Compensation Workmen’s Appeal (Commercial Inc.), Board Laundry, Pa.Cmwlth.393, (1982). A.2d 683 That court reasoning articulated its follows: the burdened party only party present

[W]here is the prevail evidence does not agency, before the the “sub- stantial evidence” test If presented falters. no evidence was to support prevailing party, there is no *21 test; i.e., it is evidence” apply the “substantial

which position to find substantial evidence impossible cases, was introduced. such no evidence for which ... therefore, of review appropriate [standard] capriciously of law or erred as a matter whether competent evidence. disregarded (Volks- Board Appeal Compensation v. Russell Workmen’s 436, 1364, America), 550 A.2d 121 Pa.Cmwlth. wagen of (1988). disregard standard Court’s

The Commonwealth Court departure previous from Commonwealth represented Estate the decision of Court applied cases Board, Pa. Retirement Employees’ v. State McGovern (1986). Compen- Unemployment In Kirkwood v. A.2d 523 Review, 525 A.2d 106 Pa.Cmwlth. sation Board of (1987), examined the standard Court the Commonwealth McGovern, within the context of whether articulated in evidence, and reasoned: parties presented one or both bur- present themselves when the possible scenarios Two (a) evidence of the prevail: fails to where the party dened believed, substantially support- if party, even burdened sufficient, as a asserted, is not nonetheless ing the facts (b) burden, and, law, where imposed meet the matter and sufficient party present does substantial burdened law, but factfinder nonetheless as a matter of evidence prevail, the burdened against party.... [T]o finds (i.e., production burden of must meet both party [her] evidence) persuasion burden of and [her] sufficient present evidence).... the burdened (i.e., present [W]here credible agency, we must assess prevail not before the party did (1) legal is due to: prevail failure to below whether [her] (2) or, credibility the lack of insufficiency of the evidence the evidence.... (footnotes omitted).

Kirkwood, 525 A.2d at 844 disregard nothing about a analysis says This properly focuses on the The review competent evidence. party of that success or failure party burdened requisite meet her of proof. burden The Commonwealth say: Court went on to

When, however, party present burdened did sufficient evidence as a yet below, matter law and prevаil failed to we then must determine whether the reason for the adverse determination stems from the factfinder’s opinion that the presented credible, or, was not whether instead the *22 factfinder committed an error of law in applying proper the principle of law to presented.... the facts specific If credi- bility appear determinations the result of the adjudication, then may we affirm the decision on below the basis that party the burdened failed [her] burden to persuade the factfinder. omitted.) (Emphasis

Id. appears This a articulate clear understanding of appropriate review, the standard of regard- less of party whether one or parties both produce evidence. Thus, a party, where with the of proof, burden party to present evidence and does not prevail, that party has either failed to meet production her burden of or her burden persuasion. Because a defendant has no produc- burden of tion persuasion, or at plaintiff least until the sufficiently has burdens, met both of her persuasion the burden of may not shift to the defendant to produce sufficient credible evidence lose, or plaintiff before has satisfied both those burdens. majority cites to Odgers v. Unemployment Compensa Review, tion Board 378, (1987), 514 Pa. 525 A.2d 359 as a case in which this emphasized court “capricious disregard as applicable to review of adjudications unfavorable 485.) party.” burdened (Majority opinion, page However, a review of Odgers indicates that this Court was concentrating on an error of analysis, law “capricious rather than one of disregard.” later, A few months this Court opinion issued its in Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board Works), (Corning 315, Glass (1987), 515 Pa. 528 A.2d 580 one in which employer presented witnesses, no testimony or other evidence. indicating While that the standard of had expressed been in varying language, that, we stated “At very least and conclusions of the fact finder have rational basis the evidence of record

must a application of under- appreciation and correct demonstrate an Id. law to that lying principles of substantive evidence.” later, Court, in v. years Pieper Barely 584-85. three Div., 584 A.2d 301 Instruments Ametek-Thermox (1990), that a upon Odgers proposition Section relied evidence, standard of review was the substantial Moreover, compensa- a Pieper involved workers’ standard. expert employer presented claim no medical tion in which testimony. analysis origins

A of a review of the believe, on context and manner light, sheds I 1800s, published as In the late at least far application. reveal, submit- opinions improperly cases were that era jury judgment a in which rendered a jury ted to (JNOV), non obstante veredicto were judgment resulted finding jury capriciously that the disre- often reversed or lack of evidence their determina- garded the evidence adage orphans This that widows and gave tions. rise See, i.e., Beale, v. Pennsylvania bad law. Railroad Co. make *23 (1873) (reversing jury Pa. 504 award favor of widow and 73 disregarded jury capriciously children of where the deceased stop immediately failure to before cross- fact decedent’s se); negligence per Pennsylvania a track was ing railroad (1889) (revers- 244, 126 Pa. 17 A. Mooney, Railroad Co. v. 590 $8,000 for widow of a man struck and ing judgment a of the granted by a where the lower court should have a killed train Co., JNOV); 184, Pa. 18 A. Pittsburgh McNeal v. & W.R. 131 (1890) jury damages of for widow and (reversing award accident). In railway crossing of cases children man killed these, repeatedly that: this Court said such testimony of an is a action mere [W]here overwhelming that no real opposed scintilla and that so raised, jury not find for controversy is where the could disregard plаintiff capricious apparently a of without testimony, probable truthful in itself and not variance facts, any proved may or a verdict be directed admitted defendant. Co., 429, 60 A. 1007 R. 211 Pa. v. Cromley Pennsylvania Co., 196 Pa. (1905) Valley Railroad (citing Lehigh Lonzer v. added). v. (1900)) See also Holland 610, (emphasis 46 A. 937 (1893). 156, operative 25 A. 155 Pa. Kindregan, of meaning The clear analysis “capricious.” in this word early from these cases is gleaned that is willfully over- intentionally and overlooked that the fact finder contrary to law or evidence to the arrive whelming controlling a application This is not an of at its intended result. Moreover, review, is no legal but conclusion. there a intentionally judice sub that the WCJ in the matter law, contrary, controlling or evidence

overlooked a desired outcome. achieve that, [Lonzer], has also said rule stated “[t]he

This Court a conclusion may be where different verdict directed without a disre- jury not be could reached apply ... not where there is a conflict of gard of does [facts] ” Co., testimony .... Heh v. Consolidated Gas (1902) added). matter, In the instant (emphasis A. testimony that the of Claimant was less the WCJ determined Wintermyer in went to work for than credible. Claimant fact, had she informed after she was aware that she CTS. was Wintеrmyer that she had CTS when she hired. The deny benefits was a direct result determination the WCJ testimony Employer’s repetitive as to the witnesses requirements job directly task and went to the Claimant’s injury. is not bound to work-relatedness The WCJ every story willingly believe witness witnesses to, simply no other witness contradicts it. swears because Having testimony concerning cau- discredited Claimant’s underlying relationship sation of her CTS and its direct to her job, important aspects testimony, as well as of her other testimony of Dr. Yates because Dr. WCJ discredited *24 opinion injury that CTS was a work-related Yates’ Claimant’s testimony entirely upon was based the discredited of Claim- testimony of Dr. ant. The WCJ did not discredit the Yates credibility, it was The sole issue here was equivocal. because unequivocality not rejected “capri-

I would that this has the reiterate Court disregard” applied by cious standard as the Commonwealth beginning continuing pres- with to Court McGovern ent, Moreover, party produced even where one evidence. that required it must be remembered the defendant is not evidence, evidence, any including produce medical because proof. compensation juris- bears no burden of Our workers’ that, prudence irrespective credibility has not hеld claimant, lay of the and of the if a determinations witnesses work, then, injured that claimant was physician testifies despite testimony, a lack of factual foundation for that testimony physician accepted must be and the claim matter, granted. In the instant the decision the Common- precedent wealth Court and the Board would set an untenable testimony of requiring production by of medical the de- imposition liability. Regardless fense face the of how evidence, many parties present findings must issue WCJ It findings supported by fact. is these of fact that must be evidence, substantial whether or not the evidence ‍​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‍is contro- necessary If the of fact that to support verted. are supported by adjudication are substantial evidence record, supported by then the will be substantial evidence, if that party even evidence demonstrates proof carry with has the burden failed its burden. support negative finding by Substantial evidence can a charged deciding particular tribunal of a outcome presented by cause of action. Insufficient evidence the bur- party provides dened is ascertainable and substantial evidence support finding plaintiff carry that the failed to his or her production plaintiffs burden of and the case has Suffi- failed. presented by cient party evidence the burdened is not provides credited the fact finder is also ascertainable substantial party the burdened has failed to sustain his or of persuasion. her burden When the Common- that, opined wealth presented Court where “no evidence was prevailing party, there no evidence test,” Russell, apply which to the ‘substantial evidence’ A.2d at the focus the court’s review was misdirected. *25 focus capricious disregard analysis That is because a shifts the finder, actions of fact rather than remain attentive credibility presented. As sufficiency to the the evidence discerns, majority capricious disregard analysis is an “appropriate component” consideration when un- dertaking pursuant a review the substantial evidence stan- dard of But it is review. mechanism facilitate capricious disregard analysis applied review. Because the fact, credibility to the determinations eviden- issue, tiary weight of it is not a proceedings standard of in determining review but a tool to be utilized that substantial supports the ultimate determination. substan- tial evidence standard is set forth in 5 of Section the Adminis- Law, Agency trative Pa.C.S. 704 and that is the standard must apply. we

812 A.2d 497 Pennsylvania, Appellee v. COMMONWEALTH of ABDUL-SALAAM, Appellant. Seifullah Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued 2002. Dec.

Decided Dec. 2002.

Case Details

Case Name: Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Dec 10, 2002
Citation: 812 A.2d 478
Docket Number: 41 MAP 2001
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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