The Estate of Paul Silva v. City of San Diego, 3:18-cv-02282

Plaintiff: Estate of Paul Silva (through successors-in-interest) sued the County of San Diego and Sheriff William Gore, alleging supervisory liability (deliberate indifference in training, supervision, discipline, investigation) after Silva suffered severe injuries and later died while in county jail custody.
Facts: Silva was arrested during a mental-health crisis, spent ~36 hours in custody without adequate medical/mental-health care, was subjected to a forcible cell extraction (pepper spray, water balls, taser, restraint with a body shield), then suffered catastrophic injuries and later died.
Procedural posture: County Defendants moved for a protective order to preclude Plaintiffs from deposing Sheriff Gore, invoking the apex doctrine. Plaintiffs opposed, seeking Gore’s deposition about his knowledge of inmate deaths, notice of unconstitutional practices, and his state of mind.
Legal focus: Whether the apex doctrine bars deposing a high-ranking sheriff and, if so, whether Plaintiffs showed extraordinary circumstances and exhausted less intrusive discovery.
Court’s determination in brief: The court found Gore is a high-ranking official entitled to apex protection, acknowledged Gore has some relevant personal knowledge for supervisory-liability claims, but granted the protective order because Plaintiffs had not exhausted less intrusive discovery (no written discovery to Gore, and they had not completed depositions of other witnesses or 30(b)(6) designees).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sheriff Gore can be deposed under the apex doctrine	Gore’s deposition is necessary to prove his notice of widespread inmate deaths, knowledge/state of mind, and deliberate indifference	Gore is a high-ranking official; Plaintiffs haven’t shown extraordinary circumstances or unique first-hand knowledge	Apex doctrine applies; deposition precluded because Plaintiffs failed to show exhaustion of less intrusive discovery
Whether Gore has unique, first-hand knowledge relevant to supervisory liability	Gore is the only witness who can testify to his own knowledge and state of mind about systemic issues	Gore lacks unique first-hand knowledge of the Silva incident and policies; other witnesses or document discovery can provide the information	Court found Gore does have relevant personal knowledge on supervisory claims but that alone is insufficient to permit deposition absent exhaustion of other discovery
Whether Plaintiffs exhausted less intrusive discovery before noticing the sheriff’s deposition	Plaintiffs asserted public reports and documents suggest Gore’s notice but argued deposition is the only way to get his state of mind	Plaintiffs did not propound written discovery to Gore and have not yet completed depositions of other officials or 30(b)(6) witnesses	Plaintiffs did not attempt less intrusive methods (interrogatories, depositions of others); court required exhaustion and denied the deposition request

Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975) (absent extraordinary circumstances, deposition disallowance is rare)
In re United States, 985 F.2d 510 (11th Cir. 1993) (apex protection for high-level officials)
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1941) (courts protect executive decisionmaking and deliberative process)
Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417 (1st Cir. 2007) (extraordinary-circumstances test for high-ranking officials)
Kyle Eng’g Co. v. Kleppe, 600 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1979) (agency heads not normally subject to deposition)
Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard for failure-to-train supervisory liability)
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (supervisory acquiescence / knowledge requirement)
Estate of Levingston v. County of Kern, 320 F.R.D. 520 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (sheriffs treated as apex witnesses)
Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (apex doctrine protects heads of government agencies)