THE ERISA INDUSTRY COMMITTEE v. ROBERT ASARO-ANGELO, 3:20-cv-10094

Plaintiff: ERISA Industry Committee, a D.C. trade association representing large employers whose benefit plans are governed by ERISA.
New Jersey amended its WARN Act in 2020: reduced "mass layoff" threshold (500→50), broadened "establishment" across the State, and added employer severance-pay obligations for qualifying events.
Plaintiff sued Robert Asaro-Angelo in his official capacity as NJ Commissioner seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that ERISA expressly preempts the amendments and enjoining enforcement.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing (inter alia) he lacks enforcement authority (so Ex parte Young inapplicable), Plaintiff lacks organizational/associational standing, and the claims are not ripe.
The Court denied the motion to dismiss: (1) Commissioner has sufficient enforcement connection via general enforcement statute and his statutory duty to establish a WARN response team, (2) Plaintiff adequately pled organizational standing by diversion of resources, and (3) the preemption claim is ripe as a purely legal question. Plaintiff later moved for summary judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Commissioner is a proper defendant under Ex parte Young	Commissioner enforces WARN through Dept. duties and response-team role that connects him to enforcement	Commissioner has only remedial/ministerial duties and no authority to enforce the WARN Act against employers	Denied dismissal — Commissioner has sufficient enforcement connection under §34:1-6 and WARN response-team duties to satisfy Ex parte Young
Organizational standing (injury-in-fact & causation)	Committee diverted resources to educate members and address amendments, constituting a concrete organizational injury	Complaint lacks detail on resource diversion and any injury is not fairly traceable to the Commissioner	Denied dismissal — diversion-of-resources allegations satisfy injury-in-fact and causation at motion-to-dismiss stage
Ripeness for declaratory relief	Preemption is a purely legal question; imminent enforcement risk exists given Commissioner’s statutory role	No enforcement or threat of enforcement; Commissioner’s remedial role means interests are not adverse, so claim is premature	Denied dismissal — adversity and imminence sufficiently alleged; legal preemption question is ripe
Associational standing	(Asserted but not necessary)	Argued insufficient	Court did not decide (found direct organizational standing adequate)

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state-official exception to Eleventh Amendment for prospective relief)
Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2016) (distinguishes facial and factual Rule 12(b)(1) attacks and cautions against conflating jurisdiction and merits)
Const. Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 824 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2016) (even ministerial duties can create a sufficient Young connection when they affect enforcement)
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (an organization suffers injury-in-fact when it diverts resources to counteract unlawful conduct)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must plead facts raising a plausible claim)
Plains All Am. Pipeline LP v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (ripeness test for declaratory judgment: adversity, conclusiveness, utility)
Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Governor of N.J., 961 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2020) (statutory obligations can create a sufficiently specific Young connection)