the City of Houston, Texas v. Roger Bates, Michael L. Spratt and Douglas Springer
406 S.W.3d 539
| Tex. | 2013Background
- Retired Houston Fire Department firefighters alleged two pay scheme violations in the City’s termination pay: debit dock overtime and termination pay calculation.
- Debit dock: since 2001 HFD added a debit day increasing weekly hours to 49, creating overtime eligibility; eight hours of debit-day overtime were designated but only paid if the firefighter was present, with unpaid leave not charged.
- Termination pay: ordinances excluded certain premium pays from salary used to calculate unused sick/vacation leave upon retirement; plaintiffs argued premiums should be included per statutory scheme.
- Trial court found for plaintiffs on both claims; appellate court affirmed in part, granting overtime reimbursement and all termination-pay-related leave, subject to severability.
- Court of Appeals reversed on the debit dock claim but affirmed on the termination-pay claim; Supreme Court reversed as to overtime but affirmed as to additional termination pay, rendering a mixed victory.
- Concurrences dissent discuss whether overtime must include unpaid authorized leave and whether the Legislature’s recodification changed substantive rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether unpaid authorized leave counts for overtime under §142.0017(e)(2). | Spratt/Springer: include unpaid leave per statute. | City: include only paid leave under §142.0017(e)(2). | Ongoing: overtime includes unpaid authorized leave; debit dock claim reversed |
| Whether the City’s termination-pay definitions are preempted by the Local Government Code sections 143.115–143.116. | Firefighters: salary includes base pay plus premium pay; ordinances unenforceable. | City: salary not defined; ordinances survive; no preemption. | Preemption found; termination-pay premium pay must be included; ordinances unenforceable to the extent they exclude premiums |
Key Cases Cited
- Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) (principal interpretive authority for statutory text and legislative intent)
- Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K-2, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 2010) (interpreting statutory terms in context; plain meaning first)
- Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) (undefined terms given plain meaning unless context dictates otherwise)
- City of San Antonio v. Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2003) (ejusdem generis and statutory construction respect to context)
- In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. 2009) (undefined terms interpreted in statutory context; context matters)
- Combs v. Geophysical Co., 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) (words’ meanings drawn from statute-wide context)