the City of Austin and Marc A. Ott, in His Official Capacity as City Manager of the City of Austin v. Utility Associates, Inc. And Mr. v. Bruce Evans, a Resident of Austin, Texas, Individually
03-16-00565-CV
Tex. App.Nov 21, 2016Background
- This is the appellants’ reply brief challenging the trial court’s ruling that Utility Associates, Inc. (Utility) has jurisdictional standing to pursue claims under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §252.061. The underlying procurement dispute involved the City of Austin awarding a contract that Utility contends it should have received.
- Chapter 252’s enforcement provision (§252.061) authorizes injunctive relief only to (1) a property tax–paying resident of the municipality, or (2) a person who submitted a bid for a contract for the construction of public works. The parties agree Chapter 252 governs these challenges and that the contract here is not a public‑works construction contract.
- Plaintiffs are Utility and a taxpayer, V. Bruce Evans. Evans conceded taxpayer standing; Utility was found by the trial court to have standing as well and is an appellee on appeal.
- Appellants (City of Austin and the City Manager) argue statutory standing is exclusive and Utility does not fit either statutory category (not a taxpayer and not a public‑works losing bidder).
- Appellants also argue Utility cannot (a) obtain standing by aggregating with Evans’s taxpayer standing, nor (b) use the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) to bypass the standing limits set by §252.061.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statutory standing under §252.061 is exclusive for challenges to municipal procurements | Utility: general/common‑law standing applies; statutory list is not exclusive; Utility has an injury from losing the bid | City: statutory standing controls where legislature has defined standing; general standing cannot override statutory limits | Appellants argue trial court erred; statutory standing is exclusive (appellate resolution sought to reverse trial court) |
| Whether Utility qualifies as a statutorily authorized challenger under §252.061 | Utility: asserts injury from not receiving contract and seeks relief | City: Utility is neither a property tax–paying resident nor a losing bidder in a public‑works contract | Appellants assert Utility lacks statutory standing and should be dismissed |
| Whether Utility can obtain standing by aggregation with a co‑plaintiff (taxpayer Evans) | Utility: can pursue same relief as Evans and thus rely on his standing (aggregate/associational effect) | City: aggregation does not create statutorily required standing; parties are differently situated and seek distinct reliefs | Appellants argue aggregation cannot circumvent clear statutory categories |
| Whether plaintiffs can use the UDJA to circumvent §252.061 standing limits | Utility: UDJA claims allow declaratory relief and should not be constrained by §252.061 standing text | City: UDJA is procedural and cannot enlarge jurisdiction or create extra‑statutory standing | Appellants argue UDJA cannot be used to avoid §252.061; trial court’s reinstatement of Utility’s claims was erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2011) (discusses voter standing and when multiple similarly situated plaintiffs may pursue equal‑protection claims)
- City of El Paso v. Waterblasting Technologies, Inc., 491 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016) (losing bidder lacking §252.061 standing dismissed even where taxpayer co‑plaintiff had standing)
- Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (explains general test for standing and limits of organizational standing)
- Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) (statutory standing controls when legislature has conferred standing)
- S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2007) (addresses standing principles; does not create exception to statutory standing rules)
- Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996) (standing principles for public‑interest plaintiffs)
