79 Cal.App.5th 503
Cal. Ct. App.2022Background:
- In December 2020 Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón issued Special Directives (20-08, 20-08.1, 20-08.2) limiting pursuit of many sentence enhancements and directing deputies to move to dismiss or withdraw prior “strike” convictions and certain enhancements in pending cases.
- The Association of Deputy District Attorneys (ADDA) sued for writ and preliminary injunction, arguing the Directives conflicted with statutory duties (notably the Three Strikes provisions) and exposed deputies to ethical or court sanctions.
- The trial court largely granted preliminary relief: it enjoined the DA from forbidding deputies to plead and prove prior serious/violent felony convictions, from requiring dismissal of strikes based only on the Directives, and from forcing withdrawal of certain special‑circumstance allegations.
- The DA appealed, contesting ADDA’s standing, the availability of mandamus to constrain prosecutorial discretion, and separation‑of‑powers concerns; the parties did not contest the injunction’s application to special‑circumstances allegations.
- The Court of Appeal held ADDA has associational standing; it affirmed that the Three Strikes law creates a ministerial duty to plead prior qualifying convictions (mandamus available to compel pleading), but held mandamus cannot compel a prosecutor to prove priors or to exercise discretion in a particular way when moving to dismiss or amend charges.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutors can be required to plead prior serious/violent convictions under the Three Strikes law | ADDA: §667(f)(1) imposes a mandatory duty—"shall plead and prove"—so deputies must plead known strikes | DA: charging/pleading is discretionary; mandamus cannot compel charging choices; separation of powers | Held: statute creates a ministerial duty to plead qualifying priors; mandamus may compel pleading when probable cause exists |
| Whether prosecutors can be compelled to prove prior strikes (i.e., mandamus to force proof) | ADDA: statute’s “prove” language requires proof once alleged | DA: proof is part of trial discretion and cannot be mandated; constitutional and practical limits | Held: mandamus cannot compel proof; decision to prove or to move to dismiss is discretionary and not mandatable |
| Whether courts (or statute) can force prosecutors to use individualized, case‑by‑case factors when moving to dismiss priors/enhancements under §1385 | ADDA: Special Directives improperly substitute blanket policy for individualized §1385 analysis, risking ethics/sanctions | DA: office policy reflecting prosecutorial assessment is permissible; no ministerial duty to particularize motions | Held: Mandamus cannot control prosecutorial discretion about the content or basis of §1385 motions; courts need not grant such motions but prosecutors retain discretion in arguments |
| Whether ADDA has standing to seek writ/injunction on behalf of deputies | ADDA: associational standing—members would be directly harmed (ethical risk, contempt, discipline); interests germane to union’s purpose | DA: claims concern managerial policy decisions outside ADDA’s representational scope under MMBA | Held: ADDA has associational standing; Special Directives affect deputies’ working conditions and create concrete risk of sanction |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Romero, 13 Cal.4th 497 (Cal. 1996) (explains Three Strikes statutory scheme and interplay between pleading priors and court authority under §1385)
- People v. Williams, 17 Cal.4th 148 (Cal. 1998) (limits factors a court may consider when striking priors on its own motion; identifies focus on defendant‑specific factors)
- Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 (Cal. 2002) (clarifies separation‑of‑powers boundaries when initiative or statute circumscribes prosecutorial discretion)
- Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal.5th 808 (Cal. 2017) (statutory mandates may be “aspirational” and unenforceable where no workable means of judicial enforcement exist)
- People v. Birks, 19 Cal.4th 108 (Cal. 1998) (recognizes core prosecutorial discretion in charging and conducting prosecutions but distinguishes legislative power to define punishments)
- Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Cal.3d 432 (Cal. 1989) (framework for weighing likelihood of success and interim harms when issuing preliminary injunctions involving public officials)