Tha Dang Nguyen v. State
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 243
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- Two indictments charging Nguyen with aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault of two daughters; after negotiations, prosecutor added injury-to-a-child counts; Nguyen pled guilty to two injury-to-a-child counts (non-sex offenses) under a plea bargain and received deferred adjudication for five years with terms including no-contact with the daughters; five months later, State moved to revoke, alleging contact with daughters; revocation hearing showed family attended a Buddhist funeral ceremony; a photo was taken with the family; trial court revoked supervision and ordered two 10-year sentences to run consecutively (20 years total); Court of Appeals held due process barred stacking because Nguyen was not convicted of multiple sex offenses; appellate court reformed to concurrent sentences; State sought discretionary review arguing for statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences under 3.03(b)(2)(B).
- The 1997 amendment added 3.03(b)(2)(A) & (B) to authorize cumulation for multiple sex offenses arising from the same episode; (B) covers plea bargains when the accused was charged with more than one sex offense; the statute’s text and legislative history were contested to determine if it also allows cumulation when the plea bargain is for nonsexual offenses.
- Legislative history shows the amendments were intended to treat deferred adjudication for certain sex offenses similarly to formal convictions, and to allow stacking only when the defendant was found guilty of two or more specified sex offenses or entered a plea bargain for two or more such offenses in the same episode.
- Court noted that the bill analyses and proponents framed the change as applying to two or more sex offenses against a child, not to pleas for nonsexual offenses; concluded that the statute does not authorize consecutive sentences where the defendant was not convicted of multiple sex offenses or did not enter a plea bargain for two such offenses.
- Ultimately, the Court affirmed the court of appeals, but on a basis consistent with the legislative history: cumulation is limited to cases where the defendant is found guilty of or pleads to two or more specified sex offenses in the same episode; thus the defendant’s nonsexual plea-bargain sentences may run concurrently.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 3.03(b)(2)(B) authorizes consecutive sentences for nonsexual offenses when originally charged with sex offenses. | State argues statute is unambiguous and permits stacking if charged with sex offenses and pleads to nonsexual offenses under a plea bargain. | Nguyen argues 3.03(b)(2)(B) applies only to pleas for two or more sex offenses or to formal convictions, not to pleas for nonsexual offenses. | Ambiguous language; legislative history shows purpose to apply to deferred adjudication and two sex offenses; not to nonsexual plea bargains. |
| Does the legislative history support stacking only when there is a plea bargain for two or more sex offenses or a formal conviction? | State relies on statute and legislative history supporting plea-bargain-based stacking. | Nguyen emphasizes history limiting 3.03(b)(2)(B) to sex-offense convictions or pleas for sex offenses, not nonsexual pleas. | History supports limiting stacking to cases involving two or more sex offenses or a plea for sex offenses. |
| Would interpreting the statute to allow nonsexual pleas to stack create due process concerns? | State contends no due process bar from allowing stacking in this setting. | Nguyen argued stacking for nonsexual offenses creates due process risk by punishing for offenses not convicted. | Interpreting to reference only sex-offense pleas avoids due process problems. |
| Should the judgment be affirmed to run concurrently based on the proper interpretation of 3.03(b)(2)(B)? | State seeks consecutive sentences under 3.03(b)(2)(B). | Nguyen contends no authority for stacking in this scenario. | Court affirmed concurrent sentences, consistent with legislative history and due-process considerations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parfait v. State, 120 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (disallows stacking for non-convicted or non-sex offenses when not within the statute’s scope)
- Williams v. State, 253 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (statutory interpretation and application principles in 3.03(b) context)
- Yvanez v. State, 991 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (legislative history and ambiguous language considerations)
- Papke v. State, 982 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998) (appeals-level precedent cited regarding 3.03(b) interpretation)
- Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) (constitutional due process principle guiding interpretation of statutes)
- Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (due process and statutory interpretation considerations in sentencing)