Texas v. Kleinert
143 F. Supp. 3d 551
W.D. Tex.2015Background
- On July 26, 2013, Austin PD detective Charles Kleinert (assigned full-time to an FBI Central Texas Violent Crime Task Force and specially deputized by the FBI and U.S. Marshals) investigated a possible bank-related offense after bank employees reported a suspicious patron, Larry Jackson.
- Kleinert spoke with Jackson outside the bank; Jackson fled twice. Kleinert pursued on foot, drew his service weapon at about 50 feet, ordered Jackson to the ground, and attempted to detain him.
- A brief struggle ensued under a bridge: Kleinert held Jackson by his shirt with his left hand and held his firearm in his right hand, delivered two hammer‑fist strikes with the firearm in hand, fell during the struggle, and Jackson was killed by a single gunshot from Kleinert’s issued weapon (stipulated accidental/sympathetic discharge).
- Kleinert was indicted in Texas for reckless manslaughter; he removed the case to federal court under federal-officer removal statutes and moved to dismiss under the Supremacy Clause (claiming immunity like Neagle).
- The court held evidentiary hearings, found Kleinert credible, concluded he acted as a federal officer during the entire encounter (authorized to investigate federal bank offenses and make warrantless arrests for offenses committed in his presence), and evaluated both the subjective belief and objective reasonableness prongs of Supremacy Clause immunity.
- The court granted Kleinert’s motion, holding both prongs satisfied and dismissing the state indictment with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Kleinert's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Kleinert a federal officer when the events occurred? | Kleinert acted only as an Austin police officer; task‑force authority didn’t apply outside limited MOU scope. | Kleinert was deputized, on full‑time FBI task‑force duty, with authority to investigate bank robberies and make warrantless arrests for federal offenses in his presence. | Held: Kleinert was a federal officer throughout the encounter; deputations and task‑force assignment conferred federal authority. |
| Were Kleinert’s actions authorized by federal law (connected to federal duties)? | The conduct (pursuit, hands‑on control) was unrelated to federal task‑force duties and thus unauthorized. | Pursuit and detention were directly connected to investigating possible federal bank robbery/fraud committed in Kleinert’s presence. | Held: Actions were objectively connected to federal duties; authority need not be an express statute for the specific tactic. |
| Did Kleinert subjectively believe his actions were necessary and proper? | State suggested Kleinert made objectively unreasonable tactical choices and may not have honestly believed his conduct justified. | Kleinert testified he honestly believed he was effecting a lawful detention/arrest for federal offenses and did not intend to shoot Jackson. | Held: Court found Kleinert credible and concluded he honestly believed his actions were necessary and proper. |
| Was Kleinert’s belief objectively reasonable? | Kleinert violated Austin PD policies (foot‑pursuit guidance, holstering rules) and thus his belief was unreasonable. | Task‑force/FBI training places tactical discretion with the agent; no agency rule forbade pursuit or going hands‑on while holding a firearm in these circumstances. | Held: Given split‑second judgments, training, and absence of binding federal prohibition, the court found Kleinert’s belief objectively reasonable; Supremacy Clause immunity applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (federal officer immune from state prosecution when acting under federal authority and doing no more than necessary)
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Supremacy Clause prevents state obstruction of federal functions)
- New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (task‑force member entitled to Supremacy Clause immunity for hands‑on struggle while holding a firearm)
- Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1988) (Supremacy Clause immunity standard and elements articulated)
- Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899) (establishes that successful immunity bars state court jurisdiction over prosecution)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use‑of‑force reasonableness assessed from perspective of reasonable officer on scene)
- United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 1998) (deputized local detective on federal task force is federal officer)
- Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that hands‑on struggle with firearm in hand can be objectively reasonable)
- Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1982) (federal officer authority may derive from general scope of duties rather than specific statutory authorization)