Texas Department of Family and Protective Services; Stephanie Muth, in Her Official Capacity as Dfps Commissioner; Texas Health and Human Services; Cecile Erwin Young, in Her Official Capacity as Hhsc Executive Commissioner; Corrections Corporation of America; And the Geo Group, Inc. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc.; Gloria Valenzuela; E.G.S., for Herself and as Next Friend for A.E.S.G.; F.D.G., for Herself and as Next Friend for N.R.C.D.; Y.E.M.A., for Herself and as Next Friend for A.S.A., 717 S.W.3d 854

The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule authorizing state licenses for two family residential centers (Dilley and Karnes) used by the federal government to detain mothers and children after illegal entry into the U.S.
Plaintiffs—detained mothers, their children, Grassroots Leadership, Inc., and a day-care operator—sought to invalidate the state licensing rule under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act, aiming to prevent detention of children at these facilities.
By the time the litigation reached the court of appeals, all plaintiff mothers and children had been released from detention and were no longer residents at the facilities, leading to questions of mootness.
The court of appeals held the case was moot but applied a “public-interest exception” to reach the merits and struck down the DFPS rule. The state challenged both the use of this exception and the merits ruling.
The Texas Supreme Court focused on whether Texas courts are constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases based on a public-interest exception, reviewing the constitutional doctrine of mootness and its exceptions.

Issue	Plaintiff’s Argument	Defendant’s Argument	Held
Whether the case is moot after the release of all plaintiffs	The risk of re-detention keeps the case live	Plaintiffs’ detention ended; any re-detention is speculative	Case is moot; no non-speculative risk of re-detention shown
Whether the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception applies	Average detention is too brief to be fully litigated; possible recurrence	No evidence plaintiffs are reasonably likely to be re-detained	Does not apply; no reasonable expectation of recurrence for same parties
Whether the “public-interest exception” to mootness exists in Texas law	Texas courts should decide important public issues even if moot case	Constitution bars advisory opinions; only live cases justiciable	No constitutionally valid public-interest exception to mootness
Remedy for mootness	Case should proceed or merits be decided because of importance	Should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction	Dismissal without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC v. ERCOT, Inc., 619 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2021) (affirmed that Texas courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases, as required by the Texas Constitution)
Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1933) (judicial power does not encompass issuing advisory opinions)
Sterling v. Ferguson, 53 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. 1932) (moot cases must be dismissed for lack of justiciability)
In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2021) (any ruling on the merits of a moot case is an advisory opinion and outside court’s jurisdiction)
Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2001) (justiciability and mootness limitations apply throughout the stages of litigation)
Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (open courts provision provides court access only for actual injury)
In re Marriage of Benavides, 2025 WL 1197404 (Tex. Apr. 25, 2025) (case not moot if live property interest remains, after a party's death in divorce context) (Note: This is a WL citation, not official reporter) — EXCLUDE PER INSTRUCTIONS