Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Cesar Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198

May 19, 2015 at Pam Lychner State Jail: two opposing groups of inmates (each ~13) refused repeated orders to "rack up," threatened each other, and remained noncompliant for nearly an hour.
Lt. Waller and other officers responded; Waller had Sergeant McLaughlin fetch a 37mm tear‑gas gun and two rounds (a muzzle‑blast and an outdoor‑only "skat" shell whose warning label was smeared).
Duty Warden Major Hayes authorized and instructed Waller to use the tear‑gas gun if the inmates refused to comply after two more orders; Waller warned inmates and, after additional orders, fired the skat shell indoors.
Cesar Rangel was hit by the skat shell and suffered burns and a fractured hand; the Department later disciplined Waller and acknowledged handling mistakes.
Rangel sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) alleging negligence under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA); TDCJ filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity.
The court of appeals held TDCJ had "used" tangible personal property (waiving immunity) and found triable fact issues on TTCA exceptions; the Texas Supreme Court agreed TDCJ "used" the weapon but held the riot exception bars waiver and dismissed Rangel's claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a governmental unit "uses" tangible personal property under TTCA §101.021(2) when it authorizes/instructs an employee to employ the property	Rangel: authorizing and instructing Waller to use the tear‑gas gun and shell is a "use" that proximately caused his injury	TDCJ: mere verbal authorization or making property available is not a "use"	Held: Yes. Authorizing and ordering use for a given purpose constitutes "use."
Whether the riot exception (§101.057(1)) bars TTCA waiver given the dormitory incident	Rangel: facts do not amount to a riot; at minimum a fact issue exists for the finder of fact	TDCJ: undisputed facts (two hostile groups of 13, prolonged threats, repeated noncompliance) establish a riot as a matter of law	Held: Riot exception applies as a matter of law; immunity not waived and claims dismissed
Whether other TTCA exceptions (emergency §101.055(2), intentional‑tort §101.057(2)) preclude waiver	Rangel: claims allege Departmental negligence distinct from any intentional tort by Waller; triable fact issues on emergency/riot	TDCJ: exceptions apply (claimed)	Held: Court did not decide emergency or intentional‑tort exceptions; dismissal rests on riot exception

Harris County v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2018) (distinguishes mere availability/authorization from "use" where no specific instruction tied to incident)
Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2019) (defines "use" as employing property for a given purpose)
Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. 2016) (waiver requires government "use" that actually caused the injury)
San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2004) (historical definition of "use" as "to put or bring into action or service")
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for plea to the jurisdiction and resolving jurisdictional fact disputes)
Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Jones, 485 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (ordering or directing use can constitute "use")
Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018) (use of dictionary/plain‑meaning approach to undefined statutory terms)
State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1979) (purpose of riot exception: exclude liability for law‑enforcement responses to riots)
Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001) (governmental "use" must proximately cause injury)