Texas Campaign for the Environment v. Partners Dewatering International, LLC, 485 S.W.3d 184

PDI (a grease/grit trap processor) had a 2008 operating lease with the City of Rio Hondo to operate a liquid-waste dewatering facility; PDI alleges the contract was cancelled in Feb. 2013.
The Texas Campaign for the Environment (TCE) and its director Robin Schneider campaigned in Rio Hondo opposing PDI’s proposed operations and solicited letters, public participation, and a TCEQ hearing.
After public meetings in January 2013 (including a TCEQ hearing) and local activism, Rio Hondo voted to cancel the contract; TCE publicized the result as a “victory.”
PDI sued TCE and Schneider for tortious interference with an existing contract and business disparagement, seeking > $6.5M in damages.
Defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The trial court denied the motion by operation of law; this interlocutory appeal addresses whether PDI met the TCPA’s prima facie burden to avoid dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether PDI produced clear and specific evidence of intentional interference with its Rio Hondo contract	PDI: TCE’s canvassing, public statements, meeting conduct, website posts, and TCEQ hearing participation intentionally induced Rio Hondo to cancel the contract, causing damages	TCE: Actions are protected petition/speech under the TCPA; even if protected, PDI’s evidence fails to prove intentional interference, proximate causation, and damages with clear and specific evidence	Held: PDI met its TCPA prima facie burden on interference, causation, and damages; denial of dismissal as to tortious interference affirmed
Whether PDI produced clear and specific evidence of business disparagement (including malice)	PDI: TCE’s statements (unsatisfactory compliance, noncompliance with law, acceptance of toxic waste, boil-water claim) were false and TCE acted with malice because information showing truth was publicly available	TCE: Statements were protected opinion/petition and PDI cannot show actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard); statements were not shown to be made with requisite state of mind	Held: PDI failed to show actual malice by clear and specific evidence; business disparagement claim must be dismissed under the TCPA

In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (clarifies TCPA two-step burdens and definition of "clear and specific" evidence)
Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003) (elements of business disparagement and malice standard)
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) (elements of tortious interference with contract)
In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. 2004) (prima facie evidentiary standard discussion)
Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) (evidence that is mere surmise or suspicion is legally insufficient for causation)
Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) (discussion of prima facie proof standard under TCPA)
Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015) (ordinary-meaning definitions of "clear" and "specific" and TCPA application)