Ten Persons of the Commonwealth v. Fellsway Development LLC, 951 N.E.2d 648

Ten nearby residents and the city of Medford sue for declaratory and injunctive relief under MEPA against Fellsway Development, Langwood Commons, the Secretary, and the DCR Commissioner over redevelopment of a 40-acre parcel within Middlesex Fells Reservation.
The Reservation is a 2,575-acre park system controlled by DCR, with critical parkway corridors and historic roads, notably Woodland Road which would host access to the site.
MEPA triggers include ENF and EIR requirements, with anti-segmentation provisions prohibiting splitting projects to evade MEPA review.
Between 2000 and 2007, multiple redevelopment iterations reduced scope and altered traffic implications, with DCR traffic mitigation considerations and government permits implicated.
In 2008 the Secretary advised MEPA jurisdiction would still apply due to the TSIP and MOU linking DCR and developers; the MOU asserted no DCR permit or indirect financial assistance, but the Secretary found future TSIP review would trigger MEPA; plaintiffs sought to invalidate the advisory opinion and challenge segmentation; the Superior Court dismissed claims against the Secretary but allowed a §7A challenge against DCR and the developers, leading to appellate review and remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §7A permits a suit against the Secretary	Cummings-based rule applies; Secretary's non-reviewable decision is reviewable.	Cummings bars §7A claims against the Secretary for decisions not to require an EIR.	§7A claim against Secretary dismissed
Whether §7A confers jurisdiction over DCR and developers for antisegmentation claim	DCR and developers are proper 'persons' causing segmentation harming environment.	MEPA segmentation claims fall outside §7A or lack proper party status.	Yes; §7A jurisdiction exists against DCR and developers for antisegmentation claim
Whether plaintiffs have standing under G. L. c. 231A	Nearby residents and Medford have standing due to proximity and environmental interests.	Standing would be generalized environmental harms; not proper under §231A.	Standing not established for §231A claims
Whether the MOU constitutes a MEPA 'permit' triggering ENF/EIR	MOU functions as a de facto permit; MEPA review required.	MOU is not a permit; MEPA review not triggered by an agreement between parties.	MOU not a permit; no MEPA permit trigger
Whether plaintiffs state a MEPA violation based on antisegmentation	Allegations show phased, project-specific traffic mitigation to evade MEPA review.	Secretary's opinion resolved segmentation issues; no factual showing of violation.	Plaintiffs pleaded facts sufficient to support antisegmentation claim; remand for further proceedings

Cummings v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, 402 Mass. 611 (Mass. 1988) (§7A actions generally do not lie against Secretary challenging EIR decisions)
Walpole v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, 405 Mass. 67 (Mass. 1989) (limits §7A to the environment-damaging actor, not the Secretary)
Allen v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 450 Mass. 242 (Mass. 2007) (Secretary's EIR certification is not project approval; scope for MEPA review remains)
Sierra Club v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Management, 439 Mass. 738 (Mass. 2003) (12(b)(1) dismissal of Secretary; jurisdiction remains in challengers against permitting authority)
Villages Dev. Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, 410 Mass. 100 (Mass. 1991) (standing and MEPA scope for challenges to EIR scope against developer and project proponent)
Boston Invs. Ltd. v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (MEPA challenge against Secretary-related action; Secretary dismissed but jurisdiction noted against others)
Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, 432 Mass. 132 (Mass. 2000) (standing and MEPA claims; public comment and advisory opinions discussed)