Telescope Media Group v. Rebecca Lucero
936 F.3d 740
8th Cir.2019Background
- Carl and Angel Larsen own Telescope Media Group (TMG) and want to offer wedding-video services that express their religious view of marriage as between one man and one woman; they would refuse to create videos celebrating same-sex marriages.
- Minnesota enforces the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), which bars places of public accommodation and businesses from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and requires equal terms and performance of services unless justified by a legitimate business purpose; Minnesota interprets the MHRA to require wedding-video businesses to serve same- and opposite-sex couples equally.
- The Larsens sued Minnesota in federal court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the MHRA as applied to their proposed wedding-video services, alleging violations of the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause (including a hybrid-rights theory), associational freedom, equal protection, unconstitutional-conditions, and vagueness.
- The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied a preliminary injunction; the Larsens appealed from that dismissal.
- The Eighth Circuit majority held that the complaint plausibly alleges the Larsens’ videos are protected speech and that applying the MHRA in the asserted manner would compel speech and operate as a content-based regulation, subject to strict scrutiny; the court reversed dismissal of the free-speech claim and the related free-exercise (hybrid) claim and remanded for consideration of injunctive relief.
- Judge Kelly dissented in part, arguing the MHRA is a content-neutral regulation of conduct (public-accommodations law) that survives intermediate scrutiny (and even strict scrutiny) and that historically and doctrinally public-accommodation laws are valid restraints on commercial discrimination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Larsen) | Defendant's Argument (Minnesota) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the Larsens’ wedding videos speech protected by the First Amendment? | Videos are expressive motion pictures; Larsen exercises editorial control and would convey their viewpoint on marriage. | The videos are commercial conduct/services sold to the public; any expressive elements are incidental. | Majority: Videos are speech entitled to First Amendment protection (pleaded facts accepted). |
| Does applying the MHRA to require TMG to serve same-sex couples compel speech or impose a content-based regulation? | MHRA would force them to create and promote positive representations of same-sex marriage or exit the market—compelled speech and content-based regulation triggering strict scrutiny. | MHRA regulates nondiscriminatory commercial conduct, not content; it is content-neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. | Majority: As pleaded, MHRA application would compel speech and is content-based; strict scrutiny applies. Dissent: MHRA is content-neutral regulation of conduct; intermediate scrutiny applies and is satisfied. |
| Is the Larsens’ Free Exercise claim viable (including hybrid-rights theory)? | Their religious objections to making pro–same-sex-marriage videos are intertwined with their speech claim—hybrid-rights doctrine applies. | MHRA is neutral and generally applicable; Smith controls and no heightened Free Exercise scrutiny is warranted. | Majority: Free-exercise (hybrid) claim may proceed alongside the free-speech claim. Dissent: Hybrid theory is dubious and unnecessary because free-speech claim fails. |
| Do the Larsens’ other constitutional claims (associational freedom, equal protection, vagueness, unconstitutional conditions) survive dismissal? | Various theories: forced association/coercion of message, disparate-treatment of those with religious views, vagueness in "legitimate business purpose," and unconstitutional conditions. | These are mischaracterizations: MHRA targets conduct equally, not viewpoints; no plausible vagueness or unequal enforcement alleged. | Court: Associational, equal-protection, vagueness, and unconstitutional-conditions claims mostly fail; only the speech and related hybrid free-exercise claims survive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (films are protected expression under the First Amendment)
- Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (compelled speech doctrine and protection to refrain from speaking)
- Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (public-accommodations law cannot be applied so as to alter the expressive content of private speakers)
- Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute compelling a newspaper to publish replies was an unconstitutional intrusion on editorial judgment)
- Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (application of the MHRA to an unselective club did not violate expressive-association rights; antidiscrimination laws generally regulate conduct)
- Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (recognizes protection for religious views but states general rule that neutral public-accommodation laws may bar discrimination)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges need only allege credible threat of enforcement)
- United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (incidental-burden doctrine: when speech and nonspeech elements are combined, regulation of the nonspeech element may be upheld if content neutral)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (regulation is content-based if it applies to particular speech because of topic or message)
- Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (neutral regulation of conduct that incidentally burdens speech does not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny)