Technology in Partnership, Inc. v. Rudin
538 F. App'x 38
2d Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiff Technology in Partnership, Inc. (TIP) sued various Rudin defendants asserting claims governed by agreements that contained arbitration clauses.
- The Rudins litigated in federal court for ~15 months before moving to compel arbitration; they raised arbitration after significant discovery and motion practice.
- Prior to requesting arbitration, Rudins participated in two substantive motions to dismiss, took a key TIP witness deposition (Robert Baker), and sought/produced extensive discovery.
- The district court (S.D.N.Y.) denied the Rudins’ motion to compel arbitration on the ground they had waived the right to arbitrate; the Rudins appealed that denial.
- On appeal, the Rudins argued (1) the district court erred in finding waiver, and (2) the Second Circuit’s waiver doctrine conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act and Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Concepcion).
- The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding the Rudins waived arbitration and that the waiver doctrine is consistent with the FAA and Supreme Court precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rudins waived the right to arbitrate by litigating in federal court for 15 months and engaging in discovery | TIP: Rudins litigated, deposed key witness, and pursued extensive discovery despite knowledge of arbitration clause, causing prejudice | Rudins: Delay in invoking arbitration did not constitute waiver; arbitration should be enforced under the FAA | Court: Waiver found—factors (delay, amount of litigation, prejudice) show Rudins waived arbitration; district court affirmed |
| Whether Second Circuit waiver doctrine conflicts with the FAA and Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Concepcion) | TIP: Waiver doctrine is a general forfeiture rule, not a defense targeting arbitration specifically | Rudins: Concepcion shows a strong federal policy favoring arbitration; waiver doctrine is inconsistent with FAA §2 and Concepcion | Court: No conflict—waiver doctrine treats arbitration like other affirmative defenses and does not invalidate arbitration provisions on grounds unique to arbitration; Concepcion not controlling here |
Key Cases Cited
- Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., 226 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (sets factors for arbitration-waiver analysis)
- PPG Industries, Inc. v. Webster Auto Parts, Inc., 128 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (arbitration waiver not lightly inferred; relevant factors)
- Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Corp., S.A., 310 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2002) (focus on prejudice in waiver analysis)
- La. Stadium & Exposition Dist. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 626 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (types of prejudice recognized)
- S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, Inc., 159 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (standard of review for waiver findings)
- Cotton v. Slone, 4 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 1993) (prejudice found where party uses discovery and motions unavailable in arbitration)
- Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2008) (arbitrability can be forfeited if not timely raised)
- Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (ambiguities concerning arbitrability resolved in favor of arbitration)
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (U.S. 2011) (federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements; addressed state-law defenses to arbitration)
