Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. City of Cleveland
102 N.E.3d 101
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Teamsters Local 436 sought SERB recognition as exclusive bargaining representative for Assistant Directors of Law (ADLs) in Cleveland’s Law Department; Cleveland objected and moved to dismiss on jurisdictional and statutory-exclusion grounds.
- SERB ALJ held a three-day hearing, found ADLs fell within the statutory exclusion R.C. 4117.01(C)(9) (employees of a public official who act in a fiduciary capacity and are appointed pursuant to R.C. 124.11), and recommended dismissal.
- SERB adopted the ALJ’s recommended determination on December 13, 2013, dismissed the Union’s request with prejudice, and denied the Union’s motion to withdraw.
- The Union appealed to Franklin County Court of Common Pleas; that court affirmed SERB in September 2016.
- The Tenth District Court of Appeals reviewed the common pleas court’s decision for abuse of discretion (de novo on pure legal interpretation issues, with deference to SERB’s expertise) and affirmed, concluding ADLs meet all three elements of R.C. 4117.01(C)(9).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ADLs are "employees of a public official" under R.C. 4117.01(C)(9) | ADLs are employees of the City (not the Law Director); the Director heads a department, not an "office," so ADLs are Cleveland employees | Director appoints, supervises, and delegates duties to ADLs; ADLs perform tasks that implement the Director’s official duties, so they are employees of a public official | Held: ADLs are employees of a public official (Director appointed and delegated statutory duties) |
| Whether ADLs "act in a fiduciary capacity" | ADLs lack managerial/administrative authority analogous to OCSEA assistant public defenders and thus are not fiduciaries to the employer | ADLs perform sophisticated legal work, exercise discretion, handle sensitive/confidential matters, and the Director places trust and reliance on them; these facts create a fiduciary relationship | Held: ADLs act in a fiduciary capacity to the City and Director (ALJ’s detailed factual findings supported this conclusion) |
| Whether ADLs are "appointed pursuant to R.C. 124.11" | ADLs are appointed under Cleveland’s charter/home-rule authority, not by state statute, so clause does not apply | "Pursuant to" means in accordance with or consistent with R.C. 124.11 classifications; Cleveland’s charter classifies ADLs as unclassified consistent with R.C. 124.11 | Held: ADLs satisfy the clause—Cleveland’s unclassified classification aligns with R.C. 124.11, so the appointment requirement is met |
| Whether SERB’s interpretation of R.C. 4117.01(C)(9) was unreasonable | Alternative statutory readings (e.g., inclusion under a different exclusion or limiting "fiduciary" narrowly) make SERB’s reading dubious | SERB is entitled to deference; its interpretation and factual findings are reasonable and supported | Held: SERB’s interpretation and factual conclusions are reasonable and accorded deference; court affirms dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619 (explains standard of review in administrative appeals)
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (defines abuse of discretion)
- Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257 (courts must defer to SERB’s interpretation of R.C. Chapter 4117)
- Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., AFSCME Local 11 v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 144 Ohio App.3d 96 (10th Dist.2001) (analyzed fiduciary-capacity exclusion for assistant public defenders)
- State ex rel. Charlton v. Corrigan, 36 Ohio St.3d 68 (factors for determining fiduciary relationship)
- State ex rel. Ryan v. Kerr, 126 Ohio St. 26 (1932) (assistant director of law is a position of trust and confidence)
- DeWoody v. Underwood, 136 Ohio St. 575 (1940) (assistant directors occupy a fiduciary relation to director of law)