906 F.3d 260
2d Cir.2018Background
- Teamsters Local 404 Health Services & Insurance Plan filed a CPLR § 3102(c) petition in New York Supreme Court seeking pre-action disclosure of settlement and licensing agreements resolving patent litigation over the EpiPen (alleged "pay-for-delay" arrangements with Teva) to investigate potential antitrust and consumer-protection claims.
- Respondents (King, Meridian, Pfizer) removed the petition to federal district court, arguing federal jurisdiction and moving to dismiss on grounds that comparable federal pre-action discovery is unavailable under the Federal Rules.
- The district court remanded the matter to state court, concluding it lacked federal-question jurisdiction and that diversity removal was improper under § 1441(b)'s forum-defendant rule.
- The Second Circuit accepted appeal of the remand order and reviewed de novo whether the CPLR § 3102(c) petition is a removable "civil action" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.
- The court analyzed statutory text, the timing/function of § 3102(c) (pre-action discovery before any action is commenced), and precedent interpreting § 1441/§ 1446, finding § 3102(c) is a procedural device, not a substantive cause of action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a CPLR § 3102(c) pre-action disclosure petition is a "civil action" removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 | §3102(c) petitions seek discovery to frame a future complaint and thus implicate federal or diversity jurisdiction, so removal is proper | §3102(c) is a pre-action special proceeding brought before any complaint; §1441 authorizes removal only of a "civil action," so §3102(c) petitions are not removable | A §3102(c) petition is not a removable "civil action" under §1441; remand affirmed |
| Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)'s reference to "proceeding" expands removability beyond §1441 | The reference to "proceeding" in §1446(b) broadens removability to include petitions like §3102(c) | §1446 is procedural and cannot expand the substantive scope of removability defined by §1441; stray uses of "proceeding" do not alter §1441's reach | §1446 does not expand the class of removable matters beyond what §1441 permits |
| Whether permitting removal would conflict with state pre-action discovery policy or Federal Rule 27 | Petitioner needs state forum to obtain information to decide whether and how to sue; federal rules do not provide a parallel remedy | Defendants argued federal jurisdiction should be available if federal or diversity claims are implicated | Court found removal would undermine New York's policy and likely cause dismissal in federal court; resolved doubts against removability |
Key Cases Cited
- Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 585 F.3d 639 (2d Cir. 2009) (appellate standard permitting affirmation on any ground in the record)
- Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (U.S. 2005) (removability requires case could have been brought in federal court originally)
- In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2007) (removal statute construed narrowly; doubts resolved against removability)
- Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (U.S. 2002) (strict construction of removal statutes)
- Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (U.S. 1941) (principle that removal procedures are to be strictly construed)
- Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2006) (standard of review for remand decisions)
