Taylor v. State
304 Ga. 41
| Ga. | 2018Background
- On May 11, 2010 Javarus Dupree was shot and later died; Brandon Lamar Taylor and three co-defendants were indicted for malice murder, three counts of felony murder (predicated on attempted armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances Act), and related offenses. Taylor was tried jointly with Finley; Cushenberry was tried separately.
- Trial evidence showed Finley and Cushenberry planned to rob a known drug dealer to fund partying; Taylor met with them and Jordan under the pretext of a drug buy; Jordan shot the victim during the encounter.
- Taylor testified he believed he was buying marijuana, denied knowledge of a robbery plan, and claimed he fled after Jordan unexpectedly shot the victim; cell phone records and witness testimony placed Taylor with the group before the shooting.
- Evidence of Taylor’s gang-affiliated tattoos and red bandana, and similar affiliations of co-defendants, was admitted to show motive and affiliation. A prior similar-transaction incident from 2008 was also admitted.
- The jury convicted Taylor of two counts of felony murder (based on attempted armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery), conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery; he was sentenced to life plus ten years. Taylor’s motion for new trial was denied; he appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Taylor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for convictions | Evidence (calls, movements, tattoos, post-shooting conduct) supports inference Taylor shared criminal intent and participated in robbery plan | Taylor claimed he only went to buy marijuana and was surprised by Jordan’s shooting; argued directed verdict was warranted | Affirmed: evidence sufficient to allow jury to reject Taylor’s innocent-hypothesis and infer shared intent (Jackson standard) |
| Bruton challenge to admission of Finley’s custodial statement | Statement was redacted and did not directly refer to Taylor | Taylor argued statement inculpated him via context and other evidence | No Bruton violation: statement did not clearly inculpate Taylor on its face; became incriminating only when linked with other evidence |
| Admission of gang-evidence | Gang evidence relevant to show affiliation, motive, and explain coordinated conduct among the four men | Taylor argued gang evidence was unfairly prejudicial and unnecessary because he wasn’t charged under gang statute | Admission proper: trial court did not abuse discretion; gang evidence admissible to show motive and affiliation |
| Suppression / invocation of counsel during second custodial interview | State: Taylor waived Miranda in writing and never unambiguously invoked counsel; officer’s testimony and waiver forms support admissibility | Taylor contended he unambiguously invoked counsel by saying “she told me not to talk” after bond hearing | Denied: remark was ambiguous; no clear invocation of right to counsel; written waiver and lack of explicit assertion support admissibility |
| Foundational Miranda issue (warning given) | Officer authenticated waiver forms and testified warnings were given; recordings and forms admitted | Taylor claimed State failed to prove warnings were given | Denied: State met foundational requirement; recordings admissible |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to timely discover detective report; failure to request theft-by-taking instruction) | State: counsel’s omissions did not prejudice Taylor; even if counsel missed report, Taylor had waived counsel and statements remained admissible; theft instruction claim procedurally defaulted | Taylor argued counsel’s failure to use Hickman’s report and not requesting instruction prejudiced defense | Denied: no prejudice shown from late report discovery; attempted impeachment was blocked by trial court; theft-instruction claim waived for appeal |
| Sentencing merger error | N/A (Court noticed error) | Taylor sought correction | Remanded: ten-year consecutive sentence vacated because conspiracy count merged into felony-murder predicate; remand for correction |
Key Cases Cited
- Finley v. State, 298 Ga. 451, 782 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 2016) (summary of facts and prior affirmance of co-defendant’s convictions relied on for factual context)
- Cushenberry v. State, 300 Ga. 190, 794 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 2016) (co-defendant conviction affirmed; cited on gang-evidence and related rulings)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (co-defendant’s extrajudicial statements may violate confrontation right if they clearly inculpate defendant)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation warnings and waiver requirements)
- Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009) (a represented defendant may validly waive the right to counsel at a custodial interrogation)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)