Taylor v. State, 262 P.3d 232

Taylor was convicted of second-degree theft for a bicycle valued at $500 or more.
On prior appeal, this court held the evidence minimally supported a $500 valuation and remanded for Rule 33 weight-of-the-evidence review.
Superior Court Judge Carey reviewed the trial record and found he would have reasonable doubt about value if he were a juror.
Judge Carey concluded the evidence was reasonably debatable and did not show the verdict was plainly unjust.
The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Taylor’s motion for a new trial, holding Rule 33 does not grant a veto to the judge’s personal view and the decision was properly grounded in the “weight of the evidence” standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial judge properly denied a new trial under Rule 33.	Taylor argues the judge acted as a thirteenth juror and should grant a new trial.	Carey independently weighed the evidence and found the verdict not plainly unjust.	No; denial was proper, as the evidence did not preponderate so heavily against the verdict.
Whether a judge may reject the jury’s verdict merely because the judge would have decided differently.	Taylor asserts the judge’s personal disagreement warrants new trial.	Rule 33 requires exceptional circumstances; not every personal disagreement suffices.	Correct; a new trial requires the evidence to be plainly unreasonable and unjust, not simply a different result.
Whether the “thirteenth juror” concept governs Rule 33 review in Alaska.	Taylor emphasizes the independent weighing by the judge without deference.	Rule 33 governs independently, with cautious use; not a veto of juror verdicts.	Yes; the rule allows independent weighing but not a veto of jury verdicts.
Whether the superior court’s findings were supported by the record.			Judge Carey correctly found the evidence could reasonably support the jury’s verdict and was not plainly unjust.

Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1981) (thirteenth juror concept and cautionary use of Rule 33)
Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska App.1996) (vacating verdict only when evidence is plainly unreasonable and unjust)
In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (Md. 1988) (weighing evidence admissible; not use of a formal 'thirteenth juror' label)
United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.2001) (weight-of-the-evidence considerations in post-verdict review)
United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409 (2d Cir.1992) (independent assessment required in Rule 33-like contexts)
State v. Spinale, 156 N.H. 456, 937 A.2d 938 (2007) (exceptional-case standard for weight-of-evidence review)
State v. Baird, 180 Vt. 243, 908 A.2d 475 (2006) (caution against overreaching weight-of-evidence review)
State v. Ladabouche, 146 Vt. 279, 502 A.2d 852 (1985) (weight-of-evidence review principles)