895 F.3d 56
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (the Modernization Act) directing integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and creating: §332 (comprehensive plan/rulemaking), §333 (expedited rules for certain UAS), and §336 (a statutory "Special Rule for Model Aircraft" safe harbor).
- Section 336 defines "model aircraft" and provides a five-part operational safe harbor that bars FAA rulemaking for model aircraft that meet those criteria, except FAA may enforce against operations that endanger the national airspace.
- The FAA issued the 2016 Small UAS Rule: it created 14 C.F.R. Part 107 (operational rules for small UAS) and codified §336’s safe-harbor criteria in new Part 101 subpart E (§§101.41, 101.43) while exempting qualifying model aircraft from Part 107.
- Petitioner John Taylor (a hobbyist) challenged the Small UAS Rule, arguing it exceeds statutory authority, unlawfully regulates section 336 model aircraft (and exposes them to pre-existing rules), lacks authority to regulate non‑section 336 recreational model aircraft, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates the Paperwork Reduction Act.
- The D.C. Circuit considered whether the Rule: (a) unlawfully regulates section 336 model aircraft; (b) permissibly regulates non‑section 336 recreational model aircraft under §333; (c) was arbitrary and capricious; and (d) violated the PRA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (FAA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §101.41 (codifying §336 criteria) is an unlawful regulation of §336 model aircraft | §101.41 is a rule "regarding a model aircraft" and thus barred by §336(a) | §101.41 merely mirrors Congress’s five statutory criteria and does not impose new regulation | Denied — §101.41 defines the safe‑harbor class and does not unlawfully regulate those aircraft |
| Whether §107.1/Part 107 exposes §336 model aircraft to pre‑existing aircraft regulations | The Rule treats §336 model aircraft as "civil small UAS" subject to the full body of aviation statutes/regulations (pilot licenses, maintenance, altitudes) | Part 107 explicitly exempts aircraft subject to Part 101; FAA stated (in preamble and at argument) it did not change pre‑existing rules with respect to §336 operations | Denied — the Rule does not apply Part 107 or other pre‑existing regulations to §336 model aircraft (except anti‑endangerment) |
| Whether FAA has statutory authority to regulate non‑§336 recreational model aircraft | Congress intended to codify a hands‑off approach and did not authorize FAA to regulate recreational model aircraft | §333 directs FAA to determine which UAS may operate safely and to establish safety requirements; §336’s safe harbor is limited and implies FAA authority over model aircraft not meeting its criteria | Denied — FAA may regulate non‑§336 recreational model aircraft under §333 and the Act’s structure supports regulation outside the safe harbor |
| Whether the Small UAS Rule is arbitrary and capricious (including notice, definitional gaps, and scope of regulation) | The rule produces absurd results, departs from prior position without reasoned explanation, imposes arbitrary five‑mile notice for §336 operators, and leaves key terms undefined | The rule targets safety risks; part 107 was tailored minimally; notice and definitional issues track statutory text or are being addressed in a separate interpretive rule; FAA relied on new statutory directives | Denied — the agency provided adequate reasons; notice requirement mirrors statute; definitional issues reserved for separate interpretive rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (standard for arbitrary and capricious review)
- Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (principle that Congress is presumed aware of prior administrative interpretations)
- FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (agency must provide reasoned explanation for policy changes)
- AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (upholding rules that track statutory language)
- Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir.) (prior decision invalidating FAA registration rule that imposed new requirements on all model aircraft)
- Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir.) (limits on claiming new legislation alone justifies a dramatic policy shift)
- POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (use of expressio unius canon in statutory interpretation)
- Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (contextual limits on applying expressio unius canon)