Taxpayers for Public Education v. Douglas County School District
2015 CO 50
Colo.2015Background
- Douglas County School District created a Choice Scholarship Pilot Program (CSP) that enrolled students in a nominal public "Choice Scholarship Charter School" to generate per‑pupil state funding, retained 25% for administration, and issued the remaining 75% to parents via restrictively endorsed checks to pay private (often religious) school tuition.
- The Charter School existed only on paper (no buildings, teachers, curriculum); many participating private schools were religious and most scholarship recipients attended religious schools.
- Petitioners (taxpayers, parents, and an education nonprofit) sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the CSP violated the Public School Finance Act of 1994 (the Act) and multiple provisions of the Colorado Constitution, including article IX, §7.
- The trial court enjoined the CSP on statutory and constitutional grounds; the court of appeals reversed, holding Petitioners lacked statutory standing and that the CSP did not violate the Colorado Constitution.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari, held Petitioners lacked a private statutory remedy under the Act, but concluded the CSP violated article IX, §7 of the Colorado Constitution and ordered reinstatement of the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing under the Public School Finance Act | Petitioners argued they had standing (taxpayer interest) to challenge the CSP as an unlawful diversion of public funds under the Act | Respondents argued the Act does not create a private right of action and enforcement was committed to the State Board | Court: Petitioners lack a private statutory remedy; Act shows no clear legislative intent to imply private suit and enforcement was entrusted to the State Board; standing denied under the Act |
| Whether CSP violates the Public School Finance Act (merits) | Petitioners contended CSP unlawfully diverts per‑pupil public funds to private education via a sham charter school | Respondents defended CSP as a student‑aid program and denied impermissible diversion | Court: Did not reach merits because of lack of statutory standing (but concurring justice would have ruled for Petitioners on statutory grounds) |
| Whether CSP violates Colorado Const. art. IX, §7 (no aid to sectarian schools) | Petitioners argued CSP aids religious schools by enabling tuition payments and sustaining them | Respondents argued CSP is neutral student aid, includes nonreligious partners, and cited Americans United and federal cases like Zelman | Court: CSP violates art. IX, §7 — providing public money to students who use it at religious schools constitutes aid that helps "support or sustain" those schools; injunction reinstated |
| Interaction with Federal Establishment Clause precedent | Respondents argued Zelman and related U.S. cases require permitting such neutral school‑choice programs | Petitioners emphasized state constitutional limits are stricter; trial court factual findings showed heavy religious use and program weaknesses | Court: Federal decisions (e.g., Zelman) are not controlling for a more restrictive state provision; striking down CSP under state constitution does not violate the First Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Americans United for Separation of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982) (upheld student grant program to religious colleges where aid was designed to assist students and institutions were not pervasively sectarian)
- Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (U.S. Supreme Court holding a neutral school‑choice program may comply with the Establishment Clause when aid reaches religious schools only through private choice)
- Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008) (struck down Colorado scholarship restrictions and critiqued "pervasively sectarian" distinctions under the First Amendment)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parfrey, 880 P.2d 905 (Colo. 1992) (three‑factor test for implying a private right of action into a statute)
- Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2004) (standing is a threshold question reviewed de novo)
- Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977) (framing the injury and legally protected interest test for standing)
- Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (state constitutions may place stricter limits on funding for religious education than the federal Establishment Clause)