Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann
656 F.3d 1222
10th Cir.2011Background
- Tarrant seeks to export Oklahoma water to Texas under the Red River Compact (RRC).
- The RRC allocates water among signatory states and delegates regulatory authority over apportioned water to each state.
- Tarrant challenged Oklahoma statutes restricting out-of-state water use as violating the dormant Commerce Clause and claimed the RRC preempts those statutes for water in Reach II, Subbasin 5.
- Tarrant later pursued water not subject to the Compact via Stephens County groundwater and an Apache Tribe MOU, arguing Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause issues.
- District court granted summary judgment for OWRB on Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause; dismissed Stephens County and Apache Tribe claims as not ripe or standing issues.
- On appeal, this court affirms the district court’s judgments, holding the Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from Dormant Commerce Clause challenges for compacted water and upholds preemption analysis; Stephens County and Apache Tribe claims are not justiciable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Congress consent via the Red River Compact to shield state water laws from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny? | Tarrant contends Congress consented to state protectionism through the Compact. | OWRB argues the Compact grants broad state authority and thus consent to regulate apportioned water. | Yes; the Court holds the Compact provides congressional consent to regulate apportioned water, insulating Oklahoma statutes. |
| Does the Compact preempt Oklahoma water statutes as applied to Reach II, Subbasin 5? | Tarrant claims § 5.05(b)(1) preempts Oklahoma statutes that burden out-of-state use. | OWRB maintains no direct conflict; Compact allows state regulation consistent with its terms. | Preemption is affirmed only to the extent of reading § 5.05(b)(1) in context; the court finds no conflict that invalidates Oklahoma statutes for compacted water. |
| Are Tarrant's claims regarding water not subject to the Compact (Stephens County groundwater, Apache Tribe) justiciable? | Tarrant alleges Dormant Commerce Clause injury from Oklahoma statutes on non-compact water. | OWRB argues claims are not ripe or standing; no current application or concrete injury. | Not justiciable; Stephens County standing/ripe issues fail; Apache Tribe issue not ripe. |
| Did Tarrant have standing to raise preemption claims based on § 5.05(b)(1)? | Tarrant asserts injury from being precluded from accessing water § 5.05(b)(1) grants. | OWRB argues lack of standing as to preemption; no direct injury. | Court finds standing to raise preemption claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (U.S. 1982) (water included in interstate commerce; consent standards require unmistakable intent)
- New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (U.S. 1982) (consent not established by general language; preemption analysis)
- Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1946) (consent to state regulation via statutory framework (McCarran-Ferguson principle))
- Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (U.S. 1984) (express consent not talismanic; must show unmistakably clear intent)
- S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (U.S. 1945) (Congress can redefine distribution of power to permit otherwise impermissible regulation)
- Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (U.S. 1987) (interstate compact as federal law when Congress consents; governs preemption)
- Sevenoaks v. Reg'l Water Dist., 545 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2008) (ripeness/standing in compact-related challenges)
- Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielsen, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (standing analysis in preemption context involving federal approvals)