Tarrant County Democratic Party v. Steen
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1778
Tex. App.2014Background
- Tarrant County Democratic Party (TCDP), Texas Democratic Party (TDP), and their chairs sought reimbursement from the Texas Secretary of State for attorney’s fees defending a post‑primary challenge (Brimer) to Wendy Davis’s eligibility for State Senate District 10.
- Earlier, two pre‑primary challenges (the Cerda proceedings) raised the same eligibility issue; the Secretary of State authorized reimbursement for fees in those pre‑primary matters.
- Brimer sued after the primary to remove Davis from the general election ballot; Brimer lost. Appellants then requested reimbursement for fees incurred in the Brimer suit; the Secretary of State denied reimbursement as "unrelated to the administration of the primary election."
- Appellants sued under Election Code § 173.086(a) in Travis County; trial on an agreed statement of facts resulted in a take‑nothing judgment. Parties stipulated the reasonable Brimer‑suit fees for TCDP and TDP.
- The court considered (1) whether § 173.086(a) waives sovereign immunity, (2) whether statutory prerequisites to suit were met, (3) whether Brimer fees were "in connection with" the primary, and (4) entitlement to fees and postjudgment interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 173.086(a) waive the Secretary of State’s sovereign immunity? | § 173.086(a) authorizes a district‑court challenge and thus waives immunity for compliant suits. | Sovereign immunity bars suit unless statutory prerequisites are satisfied. | Waiver: § 173.086(a) waives immunity for suits that comply with its requirements. |
| Were statutory prerequisites met so waiver applies? | Filing a statement of estimated primary expenses was satisfied (or effectively waived by Secretary’s prior payments). | Appellants failed to show they filed the required statement, so jurisdiction is lacking. | Requirement is jurisdictional; on the stipulated record the court infers the statement was filed or the Secretary waived the prerequisite, so waiver invoked. |
| Are fees from Brimer (post‑primary, seeking general‑election relief) "in connection with" the primary election? | Brimer’s challenge was based on the candidate’s alleged ineligibility to appear on the primary ballot, so fees are connected to the primary. | Because suit sought general‑election relief and was filed after the primary, fees are unrelated to primary administration. | "In connection with" is construed broadly; because the underlying claim concerned primary‑ballot eligibility, Brimer fees are in connection with the primary. |
| Is the Secretary’s denial an ultra vires act entitling broader relief (attorney’s fees for underlying suit/appeal)? | Appellants invoked declaratory relief and the ultra vires exception to recover additional fees. | The Secretary had statutory discretion in approving expenses; denial was within discretion. | Ultra vires exception does not apply; Secretary had discretion and acted within it. Appellants recover only the stipulated Brimer fees and postjudgment interest; not fees for the underlying suit or appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Amaro v. Wilson Cnty., 398 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (standard for de novo review of bench trial on agreed facts)
- Panther Creek Ventures, Ltd. v. Collin Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 234 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007) (treating agreed stipulations as the facts for appeal)
- Cummins & Walker Oil Co. v. Smith, 814 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991) (agreed case rules on appellate review)
- Lawler v. Lomas & Nettleton Mortg. Investors, 691 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985) (limits on inferring facts from agreed stipulations)
- First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. 2008) (statutory interpretation principles)
- City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008) (plain‑meaning rule in statutory construction)
- TGS‑NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) (read statute as a whole to discern intent)
- Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT‑Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (sovereign‑immunity waiver principles)
- Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) (statutory prerequisites to suit against government are jurisdictional)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (sovereign immunity and burden on defendant to plead it)
- Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (construing phrase "in connection with" broadly)
- Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2000) (broad construction of "in connection with")
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity)
- Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co., 207 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1948) (analogous definition of "good cause" using ordinary‑prudence/diligence test)