Tapper v. Hearn
833 F.3d 166
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiffs (NYC voters, candidates, lobbyists, and affiliated entities) challenged three "pay-to-play" provisions of the NYC Campaign Finance Code: reduced contribution limits for persons doing business with the City; denial of matching funds for such contributors and certain lobbyist-affiliated persons; and an expanded ban on entity (partnership/LLC/LLP) contributions.
- Plaintiffs sued and sought a preliminary injunction; the district court consolidated the injunction motion with the merits, granted summary judgment to defendants, denied injunctive relief, and upheld the provisions as "closely drawn" to prevent corruption. Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
- The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on appeal. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011); cert. denied.
- After the Supreme Court decided McCutcheon v. FEC (2014), plaintiffs moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6) (Oct. 2014) to relieve them from the 2009 judgment, arguing McCutcheon changed the law and required reopening.
- The district court denied the 60(b) motion (June 2015), concluding McCutcheon did not clearly compel a different result and plaintiffs had not shown the extraordinary circumstances required for relief; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Second Circuit affirmed, holding Rule 60(b)(5)’s "prospective application" clause requires that the prior judgment be executory or supervise changing conduct; a final dismissal/denial of injunctive relief that only has res judicata or chilling effects is not "prospective." Rule 60(b)(6) relief also fails absent extraordinary circumstances beyond a change in decisional law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(5)'s "applying [the judgment] prospectively is no longer equitable" can be invoked to reopen a final judgment that denied injunctive relief and is not an ongoing injunction | Ognibene: McCutcheon changed law so the 2009 judgment continues to sanction a First Amendment chill and has prospective effect (including preclusive effect), so Rule 60(b)(5) applies | City: The 2009 judgment was final, required nothing going forward, and its continued effects (chill/res judicata) are not "prospective" within Rule 60(b)(5) | Held for City: Rule 60(b)(5) requires the judgment be executory or supervise changing conduct; a final dismissal/denial of injunctive relief is not "prospective." |
| Whether res judicata or continued chilling effect of the challenged law counts as a "prospective" effect under Rule 60(b)(5) | Ognibene: Res judicata and continued chill are prospective harms that justify relief | City: Res judicata and chill are collateral/consequential effects of a final judgment and not the kind of prospective, supervisory decree that Rule 60(b)(5) targets | Held for City: Res judicata or continued effects do not make the judgment "prospective." |
| Whether McCutcheon constitutes an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) | Ognibene: Change in Supreme Court law (McCutcheon) justifies reopening in the interests of justice | City: A mere change in decisional law is generally insufficient for 60(b)(6); finality favors denial absent extraordinary facts | Held for City: Change in decisional law alone is not an extraordinary circumstance; 60(b)(6) relief denied. |
| Whether plaintiffs otherwise satisfied the equitable prerequisites to reopen the judgment under Rule 60(b) | Ognibene: Continued unconstitutional burden and inability to vindicate rights justify relief | City: Plaintiffs failed to show extraordinary circumstances or that the judgment was prospective/executory | Held for City: Equitable prerequisites not met; motion denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ognibene v. Parkes, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (district court opinion upholding NYC "pay-to-play" provisions)
- Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011) (Second Circuit affirmance of district court's judgment)
- McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (Supreme Court decision altering campaign contribution jurisprudence)
- Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing limits of "prospective" application for Rule 60(b)(5))
- DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994) (judgment is not "prospective" when its only continuing effect is preclusion of relitigation)
- Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 560 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009) (dismissal of constitutional challenge not "prospective" under Rule 60(b)(5))
- Coltec Industries, Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (final dismissal with prejudice not "prospective" for Rule 60(b)(5) despite res judicata effects)
- Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) (describing traditional equitable power to modify decrees in changed circumstances)