14 F.4th 322
4th Cir.2021Background
- Plaintiff Natalia Marshall, age 18–20, sued to challenge federal laws and ATF regulations barring purchases of handguns from federally licensed dealers by persons under 21.
- A divided Fourth Circuit panel held the restrictions violated the Second Amendment, issuing an opinion on appeal.
- Before the appellate mandate issued, Marshall turned 21, removing the statutory bar and rendering her original claims no longer live.
- Marshall attempted to (1) amend/recast her injury (seek to sell handguns to under-21 friends using an FFL to facilitate transfers) and (2) add intervenors/parties to preserve the case, but those efforts were untimely or procedurally improper.
- The district court lacked jurisdiction to grant intervention after a notice of appeal; the Fourth Circuit therefore found the case moot, denied the late motions to join parties, vacated the panel and district-court opinions, and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot.
- Judge Wynn concurred in the result, stressing that vacated opinions lose precedential value and have no legal effect within the circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness after Marshall turned 21 | Marshall's suit challenging dealer-sale prohibition remained justiciable despite her reaching 21 | Once Marshall turned 21, the challenged prohibition no longer injured her and her claims were moot | Court: Claims became moot when Marshall turned 21 and must be dismissed |
| New injury raised on appeal (facilitating private sales via an FFL) | Marshall first asserted desire to sell to under-21 friends and to use an FFL to facilitate those private sales | New theory was raised for the first time on appeal after the case became moot and cannot revive jurisdiction | Court: Refused to consider the newly asserted injury raised on appeal |
| Joinder/intervention to preserve case live | Plaintiff sought to add parties or intervene to keep the dispute live | District court lacked jurisdiction after notice of appeal; motion to join filed in circuit after mootness was untimely | Court: Denied motions to intervene/join because they were filed after case was moot or in a court lacking jurisdiction |
| Vacatur of prior opinions on mootness | Plaintiff implicitly opposed vacatur to preserve precedent | Government sought vacatur; equitable vacatur is discretionary and guided by fault and public interest | Court: Exercised discretion to vacate panel and district-court opinions and remand with directions to dismiss as moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013) (mootness doctrine: issues must be live and parties have cognizable interest)
- Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam) (case-or-controversy requirement and mootness)
- Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (standing and mootness principles)
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (practice of vacatur when cases become moot on appeal)
- U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (equitable—rather than mandatory—approach to vacatur; fault and public interest govern)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) (intervention/joinder cannot revive a moot action filed after mootness)
- Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2014) (notice of appeal divests district court of jurisdiction to entertain intervention motions)
- Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2000) (equitable factors—fault and public interest—inform vacatur decisions)
- Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989) (Rule 21 joinder/dropping parties to cure jurisdictional defects in diversity cases)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) (permitting post-filing adjustments to cure statutory jurisdictional defects)