Taniko Smith v. Brian Williams, Sr.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17385
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Taniko Smith was convicted in Nevada state court in 1997 of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery and attempted robbery.
- After direct appeal, Smith filed multiple state and federal habeas petitions between 1999–2006; those petitions were denied or dismissed as untimely or unexhausted.
- In 2007 Smith filed a state habeas petition invoking Nevada Supreme Court precedent (Sharma) arguing improper aiding-and-abetting instructions; the state trial court vacated murder and attempted-murder convictions and entered an amended judgment.
- The Nevada Supreme Court reversed in 2009, finding the petition untimely, and directed reinstatement; the trial court entered a Second Amended Judgment reinstating those convictions on March 14, 2012.
- Smith filed a pro se federal habeas petition in May 2012 challenging the Second Amended Judgment; the district court dismissed it as untimely, reasoning the AEDPA limitations period ran from his 1997 conviction rather than the 2012 amended judgment.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the AEDPA one-year period runs from the entry of the judgment pursuant to which the petitioner is in custody (here, the Second Amended Judgment), so Smith’s 2012 petition was timely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does AEDPA §2244(d)(1) statute of limitations begin to run after a state court enters an amended judgment? | Smith: The limitations period runs from the new (Second Amended) judgment that controls custody. | State: The limitations period runs from the original 1997 judgment; Colvin controls, requiring reversal and remand to restart limitations only in certain cases. | The limitations period runs from the judgment pursuant to which petitioner is in custody (the Second Amended Judgment); Smith’s 2012 petition was timely. |
| Applicability of Magwood to statute-of-limitations start date | Smith: Magwood supports using the new intervening judgment as the relevant judgment for AEDPA timing. | State: Argues original judgment remains controlling for limitations. | Court: Magwood compels treating the new state judgment as starting a new AEDPA limitations period. |
| Relevance of United States v. Colvin | Smith: Colvin applies to §2255 (federal cases) and does not control §2244 timing for state prisoners. | State: Cites Colvin to argue limitations restart only when judgment is reversed and expressly remanded. | Court: Colvin is inapplicable to §2244 state-habeas contexts and did not decide the broader issue the state claims. |
| Whether reinstating previously convicted counts can produce a new judgment triggering a new limitations period | Smith: An amended judgment reinstating convictions is a new judgment that restarts AEDPA timing. | State: Reinstatement of prior counts does not create a new judgment for limitations purposes. | Court: An amended judgment—even reinstating prior counts—is a new judgment and restarts the one-year AEDPA clock. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (statutory interpretation begins with plain text for AEDPA timing)
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (a new state-court judgment subjects petitioner to a new habeas filing period and avoids "second or successive" label)
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (habeas relief targets the judgment authorizing confinement)
- Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (terms repeated in a statute are generally given consistent meaning)
- Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) (an amended state-court judgment can create a new AEDPA limitations period even when it does not add new claims)
- United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000) (addresses when federal §2255 judgment becomes final; held inapplicable to §2244 state-habeas contexts)
- Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for AEDPA timeliness is de novo)