Tana Edwards v. New Century Hospice, Inc. Legacy Hospice, LLC, d/b/a New Century Hospice of Denver, LLC Legacy Hospice of Colorado Springs, LLC and Kathleen Mary Johnson. Rule Discharged en banc CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT
535 P.3d 969
Colo.2023Background
- Tana Edwards, a former New Century Hospice employee, provided in-home care; her supervisor, Kathleen Johnson, suspected Edwards of diverting patient pain medication.
- New Century reported suspected diversion to Castle Rock Police Department, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE), and filed a complaint with the Colorado Board of Nursing; no criminal charges or formal discipline resulted.
- Edwards sued New Century and Johnson for negligent supervision, negligent hiring, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the trial court granted summary judgment on several claims but denied immunity on negligent supervision.
- New Century sought immunity under four statutes: the Professions Act (§ 12-20-402(1)), the Nurse Practice Act (§ 12-255-123(2)), the Mandatory Reporter statute (§ 18-6.5-108(3)), and the Duty to Report statute (§ 18-8-115).
- The Colorado Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21, held that the first three statutes confer immunity only to a "person" meaning a natural person, not corporations; the Duty to Report statute can cover corporations but New Century failed to show entitlement to summary judgment under it because factual disputes remain about the purpose of its report to the Board (and CDPHE).
Issues
| Issue | Edwards' Argument | New Century's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Professions Act, Nurse Practice Act, and Mandatory Reporter statute grant immunity to corporations | "Person" means a natural person; corporations are not covered | "Person" should include corporations (§ 2-4-401); public policy favors corporate immunity to encourage reporting | These statutes’ contexts show "person" refers to natural persons; corporations are not entitled to immunity |
| Whether the Duty to Report statute (§ 18-8-115) covers corporations and whether the Board is a "person" | Even if corporations fit, reports must satisfy statutory purpose and to law enforcement; factual issues remain | Statute explicitly mentions corporations; immunity available if statutory conditions satisfied | The statute can cover corporations; the Board is a "person" (government entity) under the statute |
| Whether New Century met its summary-judgment burden under the Duty to Report for reports to the Board and CDPHE | There is a genuine factual dispute whether reports were made "for the purpose" of notifying those entities they might be affected by similar criminal conduct | Reports to the Board and CDPHE satisfied the statute’s purpose, entitling New Century to immunity | New Century failed to establish absence of any genuine issue of material fact about the purpose of its reports; summary judgment on immunity was not warranted |
| Appropriateness of original jurisdiction via C.A.R. 21 | (Edwards) immunity issues could be resolved normally at trial | (New Century) immediate review necessary because defending at trial would eviscerate immunity's benefits | Court accepted original jurisdiction: no adequate alternative remedy and issue of first impression merited early resolution |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Hodges, 318 P.3d 458 (discussing when original C.A.R. 21 review is appropriate)
- Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner, 467 P.3d 287 (summary judgment standard and de novo review)
- People v. Perez, 367 P.3d 695 (principles of statutory interpretation)
- N. Colo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Nicholas, 27 P.3d 828 (immunity issues reviewed de novo)
- Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 474 P.3d 46 (construing entire statutory scheme for consistent effect)
- HealthONE v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879 (caution that summary judgment is a drastic remedy)