Rule Made Absolute
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
T1 In this original C.A.R. 21 proceeding, we review the trial court's Order denying the Jefferson County Sheriff's and Deputy John Hodges's (collectively, "the County") Renewed Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Immunity ("Renewed Motion"). We issued a Rule to Show Cause why the trial court's Order should not be vacated. We now hold that the trial court erred in finding that allegations of negligence alone are sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement officers pursuant tо section 19-2-508(7), C.R.S. (2018). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's Order, make the rule absolute, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
2 On July 28, 2010, Deputy Hodges was lawfully transporting Daniel Larson and Dylan Bucy (collectively, "the Juveniles") from a court hearing to the Mount View Youth Services Center. The Juveniles were seated in the rear of a van, handcuffed. While the van was en route, Cristian Robinson,
13 The Juveniles filed suit against the County, alleging that Deputy Hodges acted negligently by (1) failing to secure their seat-belts, and (2) driving into the intersection without ensuring that it was clear. Initially, the County filed a Partiаl Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"), claiming that it was immune pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CCGIA"). The trial court denied the Motion, and the County filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 24-10-108, C.R.S. (2013), of the CGIA. The court of appeals affirmed thе trial court's denial of the Motion, holding that the County had waived its immunity under the CGIA.
15 After conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding whether Deputy Hodges had secured the Juveniles' seatbelts, the trial court denied the County's Renewed Motion. Specifically, the trial court found that the County was not entitled to immunity under section 19-2-508(7) becаuse the Juveniles had offered sufficient evidence to "infer that [Deputy] Hodges failed to act in faithfulness to his duty or obligation to secure the [Juveniles] and accordingly did not transport the [Juveniles] in good faith."
16 After the trial court denied the County's Motiоn for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.2, the County petitioned this Court for review of the trial court's Order pursuant to C.A.R. 21. The County argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that negligence alone is sufficient to ovеrcome the presumption of good faith in section 19-2-508(7). We issued a Rule to Show Cause why the trial court's Order should not be vacated.
II. Original Jurisdiction
17 Original relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy that is warranted only when no other adequate remedy is available. In such cireumstances, this Court will generally exercise original jurisdiction if the petition raises an issue of first impression that is of significant public importance. In re Marriage of Wiggins,
18 Exercise of our original jurisdiction is warranted in this case because there is no other adequate remedy available to the County. First, the normal appellate process is fundamentally inadequate because erroneously permitting this ease to proceed to trial would necessarily eviscerate the benefits of immunity. See Wood v. People,
T9 Moreover, this case presents an issue of first impression that is of significant public importance. This Court has not yet determined whether allegations of negligencе alone are sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith under section 19-2-508(7). Resolution of this issue as early as possible in the litigation process is important, as it not only furthers judicial efficiency but alsо honors the fundamental purpose of immunity.
IIL - Standard of Review
110 In most cases, "immunity determinations raised pursuant to a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard because they are essentially factual." Corsentino v. Cordova,
IV. Analysis
111 We hold that allegations of negli-genee alone are not sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enfоrcement officers under section 19-2-508(7).
T12 Principles of statutory construction anchor our conclusion that allegations of negligence alone are not sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith under section 19-2-508(7). It is well-established that legislative intent is the "polestar" in statutory construction and that we "will not construe a statute in such a way as to defeat the legislative intent." People v. Lee,
113 Given the legislature's clear intent that section 19-2-508(7) shield qualifying law enforcement officers from liability-our polestar in interpreting the statute-it follows that negligence alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith. Indеed, if negligence were sufficient, the immunity afforded by section 19-2-508(7) would be gutted because law enforcement officers would have to demonstrate a complete lack of negligence-meaning they would not be liable in the first place-in order to receive immunity. Such a result is illogical because it would render the immunity provided by section 19-2-508(7) illusory and therefore defeat the legislature's intent. Accordingly, we conclude that the party seeking to rebut the presumption of good faith under section 19-2-508(7) must allege something more than negligence.
T 14 Colorado appellate precedent further supports our conclusion. - Specifically, in Montoya ex rel. Montoya v. Bebensee, T6l P.2d 285, 289 (Colo.App.1988), the court of аppeals considered whether allegations of negligence were sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith provided for persons reporting child abuse under a different provision of the Children's Code, section 19-83-8309, C.R.S. (2013)
{15 Although the court of appeals held that Bebensee owed Montoya a duty of care in formulating her opinion regarding the existence of child abuse, it noted that the legislaturе immunized Bebensee under section 19-3-309 "from liability for actions that would otherwise constitute a breach of [her] duty." Id. at 289. Emphasizing the absence of any allegation that Bebensee reported the suspected child abuse in bad faith,
16 Our holding that negligence alone is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith in the juvenile detainee transport context chimes with the court of appeals' holding in Montoya.
V. Conclusion
1 17 We hold that allegations of negligence alone are not sufficient to overcome the immunity and the presumption of good faith provided by section 19-2-508(7). To hold othеrwise would impermissibly defile the legislature's attempt to immunize qualifying law enforcement officers from liability. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's Order, make the rule absolute, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this оpinion.
Notes
. Although Robinson was also named as a defendant in the underlying action, the Juveniles claims against Robinson are not relevant to the governmental immunity issue presented here.
. Our holding is tailored to address only this narrow point of law. We do not, explicitly or implicitly, consider the interaction between the CGIA and section 19-2-508(7). Cf. Fleckman v. City of Greeley,
. A prior version of the child abuse reporting statute, section 19-10-110, C.R.S. (1986), was in effect at the time Montoya was decided in 1988. A year later, the legislature renumbered and amended section 19-10-110 to its current form, section 19-3-309. For clarity, we cite only to section 19-3-309 when discussing the child abuse reporting statute.
. Although the court of appeals concluded that the allegations tied to Montoya's negligence claim were insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of good faith under section 19-3-309,
. - We therefore reject the Juveniles' assertion that the 1989 amendment to the child abuse statute-which added language consistent with Montoya to clarify that only "willful, wanton, and malicious" conduct is sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith-requires us to overrule Montoya. Far from denigrating the court of appeals' holding, the legislature's decision to add consistent, clarifying language demonstrates its agreement with, and implicit approval of, Montoya.