Tammy Bandy v. City of Salem, Virginia, 59 F.4th 705

Tammy Bandy (age 52) applied for a booking-coordinator position at the Salem Civic Center in January 2019; a three-member interview committee (Delano, Luton, Fischer) interviewed six candidates and ranked Bandy fourth.
The committee hired Jefferson Lee (about 25), who had a bachelor’s in sports business, relevant event-promotion experience, and strong interview performance; Bandy had limited, mostly part-time and clerical experience.
Luton allegedly told Bandy the committee chose Lee because he was "much younger and more energetic," and Bandy recorded a later conversation in which Delano said the three-person panel made the decision together.
Bandy sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and alleged constructive discharge; Salem moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, assuming Luton’s remark was direct evidence but concluding Bandy failed to prove age was the but-for cause.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing a jury could find the committee was the decisionmaker and that Luton’s remark was direct evidence, but holding that no reasonable juror could find but-for causation given Lee’s superior qualifications.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Luton’s age-based remark is direct evidence and whether the interview committee was the actual decisionmaker	Luton’s comment that the committee hired someone "much younger" reflects the committee’s discriminatory motive and the committee was the decisionmaker	Salem argued Delano was the ultimate decisionmaker, so Luton’s remark would be circumstantial and not attributable as direct evidence	Court assumed (for summary-judgment purposes) the committee was the decisionmaker and treated Luton’s remark as direct evidence
Whether Bandy proved ADEA but-for causation (i.e., age was the decisive reason for not promoting her)	Bandy argued age was a motivating and decisive factor; pointed to Luton’s remark, alleged committee-stacking, and hiring patterns	Salem showed legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons: Lee’s superior education, relevant experience, enthusiasm, preparation, and higher ranking by the panel	Held for Salem: even if remark is direct evidence, no reasonable jury could find age was the but-for cause; summary judgment affirmed

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (ADEA requires but-for causation)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2010) (test for when derogatory remarks constitute direct evidence)
Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999) (definition of direct evidence in employment-discrimination context)
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (employer liability tied to the actual decisionmaker)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary-judgment burdens)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for genuine dispute of material fact)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (evidence-of-pretext and actual-decisionmaker principles)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (U.S. 2002) (prima facie framework not required where direct evidence exists)
Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 2019) (application of Gross in Fourth Circuit)