Tamara Fields v. Twitter, Inc.
881 F.3d 739
9th Cir.2018Background
- Two U.S. citizens, Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach, were killed in a November 9, 2015 ISIS‑claimed attack in Jordan; their spouses and Creach’s minor children sued on behalf of the estates and survivors.
- Plaintiffs sued Twitter under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (Anti‑Terrorism Act), alleging Twitter knowingly provided material support to ISIS (via accounts and Direct Messaging), violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A/2339B, and that this conduct proximately caused the deaths.
- The Second Amended Complaint alleged Twitter hosted thousands of ISIS accounts, allowed recruitment/fundraising and propaganda, and changed its policies only recently; plaintiffs claimed foreseeability and fungibility of support.
- Twitter moved to dismiss for failure to plead causation and on the ground of CDA § 230 immunity; the district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of proximate causation.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding plaintiffs failed to plead the required direct relationship (proximate causation) between Twitter’s alleged provision of services and the specific attack; the court did not decide § 230 immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2333(a) requires proximate causation and, if so, what standard | Fields: proximate cause satisfied if defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in the causal sequence and the harms were reasonably foreseeable | Twitter: ATA requires a higher standard — some direct relationship; the injury must be directly linked to the defendant’s conduct | Court: ATA’s "by reason of" requires proximate causation with at least some direct relationship between defendant’s acts and plaintiff’s injuries |
| Whether Twitter’s alleged provision of accounts/DMs to ISIS proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries | Plaintiffs: Twitter’s services materially supported ISIS, which foreseeably enabled recruitment/attacks, so plaintiffs were injured by Twitter’s conduct | Twitter: Plaintiffs plead only generalized facilitation; no facts tying Twitter’s services to the shooter or the specific attack | Court: Plaintiffs did not allege any connection between the shooter and Twitter or any direct role of Twitter in this attack; proximate causation not pleaded |
| Whether the fungibility of support to terrorists alters proximate cause | Plaintiffs: fungibility means any support enables terrorist acts, supporting a foreseeability standard | Twitter: fungibility does not eliminate the requirement to plead causation; otherwise liability would be boundless | Court: Fungibility relates to material‑support analysis but does not replace the directness requirement for proximate causation |
| Whether the Ninth Circuit should resolve CDA § 230 immunity on appeal | Plaintiffs: sought to proceed on merits | Twitter: raised § 230 defense | Court: Declined to reach § 230 because dismissal rests on failure to plead proximate causation |
Key Cases Cited
- Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (establishes that "by reason of" requires some direct relation for proximate causation)
- Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (proximate‑cause analysis asks whether violation led directly to plaintiff’s injuries)
- Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (rejects attenuated causal chains for RICO; emphasizes directness)
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (proximate cause limits suits for harm too remote from defendant’s conduct)
- Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (discusses limits and complexity of proximate‑cause inquiry)
- Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.) (discusses proximate causation under the ATA and analyzes foreseeability and directness)
- Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.) (explains fungibility of material support to terrorist organizations)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court) (material support in various forms can further terrorist objectives)
- Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (rejects foreseeability alone as sufficient for proximate causation where liability would be too diffuse)