Rothstein v. UBS AGRothstein v. UBS AG
Plaintiffs Rachel Rothstein et al. appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Jed S. Rakoff,
Judge,
dismissing their action brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”),
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint, whose factual allegations we take as true, as we must in reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim or a lack-of-standing dismissal on the basis of the pleadings, see,
e.g., Selevan v. New York Thruway Authority,
A. The Events Alleged in the Complaint
1. Iran and Terrorism
The Complaint alleged that Iran has, continuously since 1979, pursued an official policy designed to cause the murder and/or expulsion of the Jewish residents of Israel, bring about the eradication of the State of Israel, and cause Israel’s replacement with an Islamic state. (See FAC ¶ 48.) In furtherance of these goals, “it has been the continuous and official policy of Iran” since 1979 “to use terrorism.” (Id. ¶ 50.) Accordingly, since the early 1980s, “Iran has provided the Hamas terrorist organization with extensive material support, including hundreds of millions of dollars in funds, specifically to enable, encourage and cause Hamas to carry out terrorist attacks against Jewish civilians in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.” (Id. ¶ 50(b).)
Iran has consistently conditioned its provision of material support and resources to Hamas on Hamas’ agreement to utilize the support and resources to carry out terrorist attacks against Jewish civilians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.... Under that agreement, Hamas undertook to carry out acts of terrorism against Jews in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and in return Iran undertook to provide Hamas with financial support to carry out such attacks. The purpose of this agreement was to terrorize the Jewish civilian population in Israel. All terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas are carried out further to the aforementioned agreement with Iran.
(Id.; see also id. ¶ 50(c) (identical allegations of Iran agreement with, and support of, the Palestine Islamic Jihad terrorist organization (“PIJ”)).)
In addition, in 1982 Iran “established the Hizbollah terrorist organization.”
(Id.
¶ 50(a).) Since that time Iran has “controlled, funded and operated” Hizbollah and used that organization “to carry out thousands of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in
The support provided by Iran to Hizbol-lah, Hamas, and PIJ “for the specific purpose of facilitating and causing terrorist attacks against innocent civilians” (FAC ¶ 52) included money in the form of “hundreds of millions of dollars” (id. ¶¶ 50(b) and (c)) — “tens of millions of dollars in cash annually” (id. ¶ 52) — “both directly and via ... ‘Iranian Government Organs,’ ” including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian government-owned banks (id. ¶ 53). The terrorist organizations needed support in the form of cash because they “were unable to freely use banking services (e.g. wire transfers, checks) to pay for those activities due to counterterrorism sanctions and restrictions imposed by the U.S. government” (id. ¶ 55; see also id. ¶ 56), and “cash dollars are a universally accepted currency and means of payment” (id. ¶ 55).
If Hizbollah [and] Hamas ... had not received cash dollars from Iran, their ability to carry out terrorist attacks and (a) to build and maintain their respective operational infrastructures for the planning and execution of terrorist attacks; (b) to purchase and store weapons, explosives and other materiel used by them to carry out terrorist attacks; (c) to pay, train, transport and shelter their terrorist operatives; and (d) to carry out specific terrorist attacks, would have been severely crippled and limited.
(FAC ¶ 59.)
Since 1984, the United States Department of State (“State Department”) has continuously, under § 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.CApp. § 2405(j), designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. (See id. ¶ 51.) In 1996, a State Department report found that Iran had continued “to encourage Hizballah [sic ], HAMAS, [and] the PIJ” to engage in “violence and terrorism,” and that Iran was “the premier state sponsor of international terrorism.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) And in 2006, the Secretary of State described Iran as “the central banker for terrorism around the world.” (Id. ¶ 102 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. UBS as a Custodian of U.S. Currency
In 1996, the United States Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve” or “Fed”) established an Extended Custodial Inventory (“ECI”) Program “to facilitate the international distribution of U.S. banknotes and to protect against sudden spikes in the international demand for U.S. currency.” (FAC ¶ 62.) Under the ECI Program, the United States government designates private commercial banks to function as “overseas cash depots that hold currency on behalf of the Federal Reserve on a custodial basis.” (Id.) Each ECI facility maintains an account with the Federal Reserve; when a customer withdraws U.S. dollars from, or deposits U.S. dollars in, the facility, the facility’s ECI account with the Fed is debited, or credited, accordingly. (Id.) The ECI facility is obligated “to provide monthly reports of its transactions and to comply with all regulations issued by the Office of Foreign Asset[s] Control (‘OFAC’) of the U.S. Treasury.” (Id. ¶ 64.)
OFAC regulations provide, in part, that “no United States person, on or after [August 22, 1996], knowing or having reasonable cause to know that a country is designated under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act ... as a country supporting international terrorism, shall engage in a financial transaction with the government of that country.”
UBS, which has numerous offices in the United States and thus is a “ ‘United States person’ within the meaning of
3. UBS and Iran
In 2003, after American soldiers discovered, concealed on property of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, approximately $650 million in U.S. currency in Federal Reserve wrappers, an investigation was launched into which of four likely ECI facilities, one of which was UBS, was the source of that currency. {See FAC ¶¶ 66-68.) Documents eventually produced by UBS revealed, to the extent pertinent here, “that UBS had transferred U.S. currency to Iran and to Iranian Government Organs.” {Id. ¶ 71.) These transfers were forbidden by OFAC regulations {see id. ¶ 100), and had not been reported to OFAC or the Federal Reserve by UBS {id. ¶ 72).
In light of discoveries that UBS had engaged in forbidden U.S. currency transactions with Iran, as well as with Cuba, Libya, and the former Yugoslavia, at times when such transactions were prohibited {see FAC ¶ 86 (“[f]rom the time UBS began working with the Fed in 1996 until sometime [in 2003] ... UBS used the Federal Reserve to conduct” with those countries “billions of dollars worth of transactions” (internal quotation marks omitted))), the Federal Reserve terminated UBS’s ECI Agreement in 2003. {See id. ¶¶ 78-88.) In 2004, pursuant to an “Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent” {id. ¶ 82), the Federal Reserve fined UBS $100 million {id. ¶ 83).
4. Plaintiffs’Injuries
The Complaint alleged that plaintiffs were injured, and/or had family members who were injured or killed, in five bombings and several rocket attacks in Israel, conducted by Hamas or Hizbollah between July 30, 1997, and July 22, 2006. (See FAC ¶¶ 4-43.) It alleged that the ability of Hizbollah and Hamas to, inter alia, purchase weapons and other materiel, train their terrorist operatives, and carry out those attacks was substantially increased by those organizations’ receipt of cash dollars from Iran. (See id. ¶¶ 59-60.)
The fact that Iran was subject to United States government sanctions made it difficult for Iran to obtain the large sums of cash dollars needed for the Hizbollah and Hamas operations. (Id. ¶ 61.) The Complaint alleged that “UBS solved this problem for Iran by illegally providing Iran with hundreds of millions of dollars in cash between 1996 and 2004....” (Id.)
In 2008, plaintiffs commenced the present action under the civil liability provision of the ATA, which provides that
[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees,
In an opinion reported at
far too attenuated to provide plaintiffs with sufficient standing to bring this action under federal law. See Allen v. Wright,468 U.S. 737 , 750,104 S.Ct. 3315 ,82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (standing requires that the injury be “fairly traceable” to the alleged actions of the defendant); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,426 U.S. 26 , 42-43,96 S.Ct. 1917 ,48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (standing is not established where injury results from “the independent action of some third party not before the court”); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544 , 545,127 S.Ct. 1955 ,167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (from a pleading perspective, “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662 ,129 S.Ct. 1937 , 1949-50,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (affirming Twombly).
Specifically, plaintiffs, to establish standing here, must at a minimum allege facts that show a proximate causal relationship between UBS’s transfers of funds to Iran and Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s [sic] commission of the terrorist acts that caused plaintiffs’ injuries. This they have entirely failed to do.
Rothstein I,
Among many other deficiencies in the causal chain, the First Amended Complaint (“Am.Compl.”) does not allege that UBS is a primary or even relatively significant source of U.S. banknotes for the Iranian government. Moreover, cash dollars have multiple legitimate uses besides funding terrorism, and, as the amended complaint itself states, “[U.S.] cash dollars are a universally accepted currency and means of payment.” Am. Compl. ¶ 55. Further still, there are no specific allegations showing that the terrorist groups here in question raise their funds from monies transferred from Iran. Without multiplying examples, the point is that plaintiffs’ allegations here are far too speculative to provide the plausible indication of proximate causation necessary to establish plaintiffs’ standing in this case.
Id. (emphases added).
For essentially the same reason, the district court also concluded that the Com
The court further concluded that Count One of the Complaint was insufficient to state a claim on a theory of aiding and abetting.
[S]uch a theory would here require adequate allegations that the defendant not only knew that its funds would be used to sponsor terrorist acts by Hamas and Hezbollah [sic ], but also intended to do so....
No such allegations are remotely made here. In fact, the Court cannot discern any substantive allegation in the amended complaint that adequately alleges intent in any form.
Id.
Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ claims against UBS in Count Two for aiding and abetting violations of customary international law, as incorporated in federal common law, were preempted by the ATA. See id. at 296. The Complaint was dismissed in its entirety.
Plaintiffs appealed to this Court. While their appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
— U.S. -,
On remand, the district court received supplemental briefing from the parties, and, in an opinion reported at
As the Second Circuit suggested, there are several obvious and potentially dispositive differences between Humanitarian Law Project and Rothstein. To begin with, Humanitarian Law Project does not address Article III standing, a central component of the Court’s Roth-stein decision. This is especially important as Article III “requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,526 U.S. 574 , 583,119 S.Ct. 1563 ,143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999).Indeed, no statute could cure plaintiffs’ standing deficiencies, as Congress cannot “abrogate the Art. Ill minima.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 , 100,99 S.Ct. 1601 ,60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). Thus, neither18 U.S.C. § 2339(B)(a)(l) nor the Supreme Court’s interpretation thereof alters in any way plaintiffs’ obligation to satisfy the “fairly traceable” prong of the standing inquiry, which requires them to plausibly plead that a defendant’s alleged actions “materially increase[d] the probability of injury.” Huddy v. F.C.C.,236 F.3d 720 , 722 (D.C.Cir.2001).
Rothstein III,
The district court pointed out that
HLP
also did not address
This renewed appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in concluding that they lack standing to pursue their Count One claims against UBS under the ATA. They advance no argument that the district court erred in dismissing their Count Two claims under international law as incorporated into federal common law; accordingly, any challenge to the dismissal of Count Two is waived. Plaintiffs also contend that, once the court concluded that they lacked standing, it exceeded its authority in addressing the sufficiency of the complaint, and that, in any event, the court erred in concluding that Count One was insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
“We review
de novo
a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing,
see
Fed.R.CivJP. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim,
see
A. Standing
1. Article III Standing; Jurisdiction
No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.... The concept of standing is part of this limitation.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.... Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.... Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan,
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court erred in ruling that, because the Complaint was insufficient to allege proximate cause, plaintiffs failed to show Article III standing, i.e., failed to show that their injuries were fairly traceable to UBS’s acts.
2. “Fairly Traceable" vs. “Proximate Cause ”
The traceability requirement for Article III standing means that the plaintiff must “demonstrate a causal nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the injury.”
Heldman v. Sobol,
Central to the notion of proximate cause is the idea that a person is not liable to all those who may have been injured by his conduct, but only to those with respect to whom his acts were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation and whose injury was reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.
Lerner,
The requirement that a complaint “allege[ ] an injury” that is “ ‘fairly traceable’ to defendants’ conduct ... for [purposes of] constitutional standing” is a “lesser burden” than the requirement that it show proximate cause.
Lerner,
Accordingly, we, like other courts, have noted that, “particularly at the pleading stage, the ‘fairly traceable’ standard is not equivalent to a requirement of tort causation” and that “for purposes of satisfying Article Ill’s causation requirement, we are concerned with something
less than the concept of proximate cause.” American Electric Power,
In sum, the test for whether a complaint shows the “fairly traceable” element of Article III standing imposes a standard lower than proximate cause.
3. The Allegations of the FAC
The factual allegations in the Complaint in the present case
(see
Part I.A. above), taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor, asserted that at all pertinent times, Iran had a policy of promoting terrorism to injure and intimidate the Jewish residents of Israel and to cause the eradication of the State of Israel; that Hizbol-lah and Hamas are terrorist organizations; that Iran provided Hamas and Hizbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars to fund terrorist attacks; that Iran conditioned that funding on agreement by those organizations to conduct terrorist attacks on Israel and its residents; and that the bombings and rocket attacks between July 1997 and July 2006, in which plaintiffs
The Complaint also alleged that Hizbol-lah and Hamas needed large sums of money to fund their operations; that those organizations, by reason of their nature and the existence of counterterrorism sanctions, could not freely use normal banking services such as checks or wire transfers; and that U.S. currency is a universally accepted form of payment. (See, e.g., FAC ¶56 (citing Congressional testimony of the United States Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence that, “[a]s the formal and informal financial sectors [have] become increasingly inhospitable to financiers of terrorism,.... [t]he movement of money via cash couriers is now one of the princip[al] methods that terrorists use to move funds” (internal quotation marks omitted)).) The Complaint alleged that between 1996 and 2004, in violation of United States laws, UBS provided Iran with hundreds of millions of dollars in cash — transactions that UBS has publicly acknowledged.
UBS argues that the dollars provided by Iran to Hizbollah and Hamas cannot fairly be traced to the U.S. currency transfers to Iran from UBS because during the period when UBS was sending U.S. currency to Iran, Iran held billions of U.S. dollars in its reserves.
(See
UBS brief on appeal at 27;
see also
Exhibit 14 to Declaration of Daniel L. Cantor dated September 4, 2008, in support of UBS Motion To Dismiss FAC (March 27, 2007 news report of Iran’s estimate that it had between $10 billion and $20 billion of its foreign reserves in dollars).) Plaintiffs argue that the fact that Iran was obtaining U.S. currency from multiple sources should not affect plaintiffs’ standing to sue. We agree. Although the size of Iran’s well-publicized reserve affects the issue of proximate cause, we cannot conclude that it prevents the Complaint from meeting the lower standard of fair traceability.
Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA,
It is reasonable to infer that Iran’s ability to amass U.S. currency was increased by UBS’s transfers. Iran thus had available more U.S. currency than it would have had without UBS’s transfers; the more U.S. currency Iran possessed, the greater its ability to fund Hizbollah and Hamas for the conduct of terrorism; and the greater the financial support Hizbollah and Hamas received, the more frequent and more violent the terrorist attacks they could conduct. The fact that plaintiffs did not more specifically describe the scale of UBS’s financial transactions with Iran as a “primary” or “significant” source of Iran’s cash supply is irrelevant. In sum, we cannot conclude that the Complaint failed to allege sufficiently that plaintiffs’ injuries in bombings and rocket attacks conducted by Hizbollah and Hamas were fairly traceable to UBS’s provision of U.S. currency to Iran. Accordingly, plaintiffs have Article III standing to pursue their claims under the ATA.
B. The Sufficiency of the Complaint
Although we conclude that the Complaint should not have been dismissed
The private-civil-action section of the ATA, quoted in full in Part I.B. above, allows a United States national to bring an action in federal court for treble damages if he or she is “injured in his or her person ... by reason of an act of international terrorism.”
In the present case, Count One of the Complaint asserted that UBS was civilly liable for its cash transfers to Iran on an aiding-and-abetting theory
(see, e.g.,
FAC ¶ 138 (“[b]y its course of conduct described herein, defendant UBS aided and abetted acts of international terrorism, within the meaning of
With respect to the causation element of
First, we do not agree with plaintiffs’ contention that the “by reason of’ language chosen by Congress in creating a civil right of action under the ATA was intended to permit recovery on a showing of less than proximate cause, as the term is ordinarily used. The “by reason of’ language had a well-understood meaning, as Congress had used it in creating private rights of action under RICO and the antitrust laws, and it had historically been interpreted as requiring proof of proximate cause. As described in
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
We reach the same conclusion here with respect to the ATA — finally enacted in 1992,
see
Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102-342, at 22 (1992) (noting that
Further, the statutory scheme does not suggest that Congress intended a presumption of proximate causation to be read into
As discussed in Parts II.A.2. and 3. above, the burden of showing that plaintiffs’ injuries were proximately caused by UBS’s transfers of U.S. currency to Iran is higher than the burden of showing that plaintiffs’ injuries were fairly traceable to those transfers. Although we agree with plaintiffs’ contention that, despite the fact that Iran had billions of dollars in its reserves from multiple sources, plaintiffs’ in
And while the Complaint alleges that “UBS knew full well that the cash dollars it was providing to a state-sponsor of terrorism such as Iran would be used to cause and facilitate terrorist attacks by Iranian-sponsored terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hizbollah and PIJ” (id. ¶ 108 (emphases added)), these are conclu-sory allegations that do not meet Twom- bly’s plausibility standard with respect to the need for a proximate causal relationship between the cash transferred by UBS to Iran and the terrorist attacks by Hizbol-lah and Hamas that injured plaintiffs. The fact that the transfers were made to a state sponsor of terrorism of course made it more likely that the moneys would be used for terrorism than if the transfers were to a state that did not sponsor terrorism. But the fact remains that Iran is a government, and as such it has many legitimate agencies, operations, and programs to fund. We see no nonconclusory allegation in the Complaint that plausibly shows that the moneys UBS transferred to Iran were in fact sent to Hizbollah or Hamas or that Iran would have been unable to fund the attacks by Hizbollah and Hamas without the cash provided by UBS.
Finally, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had not stated a claim on which relief could be granted against UBS on an aiding-and-abetting theory, because it does not appear to us that Congress intended
Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute.... Thus, when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.
Id.
at 182,
In the ATA,
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of plaintiffs’ contentions on this appeal and, except to the extent discussed above, have found them to be without merit. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
No costs.