Taite v. Bridgewater State University, 999 F.3d 86

Bridgewater State University created a Staff Associate, Equal Opportunity/Title IX Investigator position in early 2015 with specified minimum and preferred qualifications (including advanced degree, Title IX and higher-education experience, investigation experience).
Brenda Taite (Black) applied; she held a J.D., a master’s degree, and several years of investigation experience at Dartmouth and elsewhere; she was one of five finalists (four finalists were Black; the lone white finalist was Jocelyn Frawley).
The on‑campus interview heavily weighted a presentation and a 20‑minute mock Title IX investigation; evaluators used uniform evaluation forms and were asked to score presentation/delivery among other categories; most evaluators and Search Committee members were white.
Taite received an email from Samantha Campbell (an OEO staffer and evaluator) instructing her not to cover retaliation and not to tie her presentation to BSU policies; there is no record that Frawley received the same instructions; Taite followed those instructions but was criticized for failing to mention retaliation while Frawley was praised for doing so.
BSU hired Frawley; Taite sued under Title VII alleging race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for BSU; the First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding triable issues of fact exist regarding pretext and discriminatory animus.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas	Taite was qualified, applied, not hired, and position filled by a similarly or less qualified person	BSU for summary‑judgment purposes conceded Taite met prima facie	Court assumed prima facie established for analysis
Did BSU articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Frawley?	Taite: BSU’s stated reason (Frawley more qualified) is unsupported and pretextual	BSU: Frawley performed best in presentation/mock investigation and had more current relevant experience	Court assumed BSU articulated a legitimate reason and proceeded to Step Three
Was BSU’s proffered reason pretextual?	Taite: evaluators deviated from uniform process, Taite received different pre‑instructions and was penalized for following them, creating an inference of pretext	BSU: objective evaluation scores show Frawley outperformed Taite and was a better fit	Court: Genuine dispute of material fact exists; a reasonable jury could find pretext (denying summary judgment)
Did the record permit summary judgment for BSU?	Taite: no—aggregate circumstantial evidence permits inference of discrimination	BSU: yes—record shows the best‑qualified candidate was selected	Court: Vacated grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes three‑step burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 2014) (summary judgment standard; consider record in light most favorable to nonmovant without assessing credibility)
Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2013) (summary judgment review; draw all reasonable inferences for nonmovant)
Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477 (1st Cir. 2020) (deviation from standard procedures can support inference of pretext)
Santiago‑Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (pretext shown via weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in employer’s reasons)
Mesnick v. Gen. Elec., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991) (courts assess aggregate circumstantial evidence as a mosaic to infer discrimination)
Bonilla‑Ramirez v. MVM, Inc., 904 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2018) (plaintiff must show employer’s reason is pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason)
Cruz v. Mattis, 861 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (applies McDonnell Douglas framework to hiring discrimination claims)
LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993) (pretext evidence plus prima facie case may permit inference of intentional discrimination)